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1Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Southern and Continental European labor mar-
kets were characterized by worse labor market conditions, e.g. increasing unem-
ployment and failure to absorb disadvantaged groups, in comparison to Anglo-
Saxon labor markets. In the public debate, high employment protection legisla-
tion (EPL) was considered to be one major factor for this adverse development
(OECD, 1994). On the one hand, EPL can improve market efficiency in the
case of imperfect capital markets by providing insurance against income losses
(Pissarides, 2001). On the other hand, given risk-averse workers or inflexible wages,
EPL decreases employment according to Lazaer (1990).
In general, EPL is a labor market institution which formally regulates the
dismissal and hiring of employees,1 and has two major dimensions: employment
protection for temporary contracts (EPLT)2 and employment protection for per-
manent contracts (EPLP)3. After an agreed upon period, temporary contracts are
terminated without any (or with low) costs for employers. In contrast, permanent
1For an overview of the extensive literature on theoretical and empirical effects of EPL as well as
on measuring EPL, see Cahuc and Koeniger (2007), Venn (2009), Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004),
Boeri (2011), OECD (2013b),OECD (2004), OECD (1999) or Boeri and van Ours (2013).
2I refer to temporary workers as fixed-term workers, and temporary agency workers. The former
are employees with a working contract between the worker and the firm. The latter are em-
ployees with a working contract between the worker and an agency rather than the firm.
3The terms regular, permanent and open-end are used equivalently.
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contracts can only be terminated from the employer by paying firing costs. These
costs consist of firing taxes (i.e. payments from the employer to a third party such
as the court fees), and transfers (i.e. payments from the employer to the employee
such as severance payments). Overall, employment protection for regular workers
aims to protect workers from unfair dismissals.
Liberalizing EPLP, in order to improve labor market outcomes, however, was
perceived to be politically harmful as the majority of voters had a regular con-
tract and would be adversely affected (Bentolila, Cahuc, Dolado and Le Barban-
chon, 2012; Rueda, 2005; Saint-Paul, 2002; Saint-Paul, 1996b). Therefore, in the
1980s and 1990s, labor market reforms were characterized by decreasing protection
for temporary workers (the small labor market segment) as well as by continued
protection for regular workers (the large labor market segment). Saint-Paul (2002)
shows that such reforms were a promising mechanism to win the political support
of regular workers for liberalizing EPL reforms. Boeri (2011) labels these reforms
as two-tier reforms in employment protection legislation.
Hence, two-tier labor reforms made it more attractive to employ temporary
workers as adjustment costs for regular workers remained in place while it became
less costly to adjust by temporary workers (e.g. Boeri and Garibaldi, 2007; Blan-
chard and Landier, 2002). According to Boeri and Garibaldi (2007), two-tier
reforms increase the share of temporary employment over time. Indeed, over
the last decades, the share of temporary workers rose from 11.5 percent in the
EU15 in 1995 to the considerable share of 14.9 percent in 2007 (Eurostat, 2014).4
Hence, European labor markets became more segmented5 (e.g. Boeri and van
Ours, 2013; European Commission, 2010; OECD, 2013b; OECD, 2014). In the
aftermath of the 2007 financial crisis, temporary employment decreased to 13.8
percent in 2013 (Eurostat, 2014) as firms decreased the number of workers through
the more preferable and lower cost route of terminating temporary contracts.
On the one hand, temporary employment provides important advantages for
firms in countries with high EPLP, e.g. cheap buffering function for firms in re-
4Technological and organizational change are also important factors for the increasing share of
temporary workers (OECD, 2014).
5Segmented labor markets are characterized by strong differences in the job quality in labor
market segments, e.g. job security, with low transition between segments (Boeri and van Ours,
2013; OECD, 2014).
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sponse to product demand shocks or screening at lower costs in the presence of
imperfect information. From the perspective of workers, temporary employment
has advantages, too. Temporary contracts provide easier access into employment
for people who are less attached to labor markets, e.g. long-term unemployed or
young workers. Furthermore, workers might choose temporary contracts volun-
tarily if they prefer an employment relationship with less commitment. In the
EU27 in 2013, only 11.8 percent of temporary workers, however, did not want a
permanent job (Eurostat, 2014).
On the other hand, a strong use of temporary employment is associated with
adverse equity effects in terms of job quality and efficiency effects in terms of eco-
nomic growth. Job quality in the segment of temporary contracts is worse than
that of regular contracts, especially with regard to job security, wages, or training
(OECD, 2014; European Commission, 2010; Booth, Francesconi and Frank, 2002).
This is often accompanied by low transition rates into permanent contracts. Thus,
disadvantages seem to outweigh advantages: In the EU27, 61.8 percent of tempor-
ary workers were in a temporary job because they could not find a permanent one
in 2013 (Eurostat, 2014). From the perspective of economic growth, there is an on-
going debate whether high shares of temporary work adversely affect productivity
growth, for instance, because firms usually invest less in training for non-regular
jobs (European Commission, 2010). Boeri and Garibaldi (2007) and Cahuc and
Postel-Vinay (2002) found that, indeed, two-tier labor market reforms led to a
decrease in productivity growth. Eslava, Haltiwanger, Kugler and Kugler (2014),
however, show an increase in productivity in response to Colombian reforms.
In order to decrease the adverse effects of a strong reliance on temporary em-
ployment, liberalizing reforms in EPLP were often proposed in the public debate.
In fact, in the aftermath of the 2007 financial crisis, policy makers specifically in
Southern European countries started to react to this critique. For instance, in
Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece, EPLP was liberalized between 2008 and 2013
(OECD, 2013b, p. 94). Therefore, it is highly relevant to understand the effects
of a decrease in EPLP on economic outcomes.
This dissertation contributes to the quantitative literature on the effects of
EPLP as well as the conditioning effects of EPLP on temporary employment and
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well-being, and can be divided in two parts6: In the first part, the effect of EPLP
and the conditioning role of EPLP for the effect of product demand shocks on
the use of temporary employment at the establishment-level is investigated. This
part consists of Chapter 2 Employment protection reform effects on temporary
employment and Chapter 3 The effect of shocks on temporary employment condi-
tional on EPLP. After finding that reforms increasing (decreasing) EPLP have a
positive (negative) effect on temporary employment and that EPLP strengthens
the positive effect of shocks on temporary employment, I analyze the effect of
EPLP reforms on well-being, proxied by life satisfaction at the individual-level, in
Chapter 4 Employment protection reform effects on well-being.
Hypotheses are built upon the literature in labor economics and on the lit-
erature on determinants of well-being proxied by life satisfaction. I refer to the
literature on search and matching models and labor demand models which are
the workhorses for modeling EPLP.7 Several models predict a negative impact of
EPL on labor market flows, e.g. hiring or firing, but the effects on levels, e.g.
unemployment rate, is ambiguous. Within the literature on determinants of well-
being, I mainly refer to the concept of relative social positions as an important
determinant of well-being.8
All research questions are answered empirically. I employ econometric meth-
ods and utilize micro data in order to identify effects and conditioning effects
of EPLP rather than exploring or describing the social phenomena (e.g. Angrist
and Krueger, 1999; Diekman, 2003; Heckman, 2010). Concretely, I explore EPLP
reforms in a difference-in-difference approach (Chapter 2 and Chapter 4) and re-
gression analyzes (Chapter 3). In particular, the latter method is very demanding
in its assumptions for the identification of effects rather than correlations, which I
account for by discussing these assumptions in detail.
The remainder of the introduction is organized as follows. In the next section, I
present the research questions and contributions. This is followed by a description
6I would like to acknowledge here my coauthors Paul Marx (Chapter 3), Steffen Ku¨nn (Chapter
2) and Ulf Rinne (Chapter 2).
7For search and matching models, see for instance: Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), Cahuc and
Postel-Vinay (2002), Cahuc, Charlot and Malherbert (2012), Bentolila, Cahuc, Dolado and Le
Barbanchon (2012). For labor demand models, see for instance: Bentolila and Bertola (1990),
Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992), Nunziata and Staffolani (2007), or Boeri and Garibaldi (2007).
8See Easterlin (1974), Luttmer (2005), Clark and Senik (2010), and Karacuka and Zaman (2012).
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of the empirical strategy in Section 1.3. Finally, in Section 1.4, I summarize the
main findings and discuss their external validity.
1.2 Research questions and contributions
1.2.1 The effect and conditioning effect of EPLP on tem-
porary employment
In the public debate, high shares of temporary work are considered to have adverse
effects on equity and efficiency. Thus, one popular proposed solution suggests that
reducing EPLP would lead to a reduction in the share of temporary workers.
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 contribute to a better understanding of the effect and
the conditioning effect of EPLP on temporary employment.
Chapter 29
This chapter focusses on the demand for temporary workers at the establishment-
level in Germany when EPLP is increased and decreased. The empirical literat-
ure which is based on within-country subgroup (and time) variation has shown
that EPLP is positively related to temporary work (Boockmann and Hagen, 2001;
Centeno and Novo, 2012; Hijzen, Mondauto and Scarpetta, 2013). Studies which
employ within-country time variation but not subgroup variation can, however, not
consistently confirm an impact of EPLP on temporary employment (Kahn, 2010;
Nunziata and Staffolani, 2007). An asymmetric effect of increases and decreases
of EPLP on temporary employment might contribute to a deeper understanding
of the aforementioned findings.
Building upon this literature and to the best of my knowledge, my contri-
bution is to answer the novel research question: Does a symmetric increase or
decrease in EPLP have a symmetric effect on the share of temporary workers at
the establishment-level? Germany provides a unique opportunity to investigate
this in a quasi-experimental approach based on two reforms in EPLP in 1999 and
9This chapter is circulated as ”The asymmetric effects of employment protection reforms on
temporary employment” (joint with Steffen Ku¨nn and Ulf Rinne).
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2004. In line with Boeri (2011) and Cahuc et al. (2012), I expect that the increase
in EPLP in 1999 increased the share of temporary jobs at the establishment-level,
because temporary workers became relatively more attractive for firms. When
EPLP increases, I expect that firms hire more on permanent workers as these
contracts might be associated with advantages, e.g. higher job filling rates.
Chapter 310
This chapter contributes to the research on determinants of temporary employ-
ment in Europe by studying firms’ demand for temporary workers in response to
product demand shocks in different institutional settings regarding EPLP. Next to
employment protection and other factors, firm-level shocks are one major reason
for employing temporary workers (Eslava et al., 2014; Morikawa, 2010; House-
man, 2001). The 2007 financial crisis might has increased shocks at the firm-level
(Buch, Do¨pke and Stahn, 2008). The importance of volatilities for employment,
however, depend on adjustment costs. Eslava et al. (2014) and Bentolila and
Saint-Paul (1992) showed this in single-country, firm-level studies, and to a minor
extend, Nunziata and Staffolani (2007) in a country-level study.
Based on this literature, I ask: Is the effect of shocks on firms’ decision to
employ temporary workers stronger in countries that impose strict rules on the
dismissal of permanent workers? In line with a recently developed search and
matching model by Cahuc et al. (2012), I expect that it is more likely that firms
employ temporary workers when the demand shocks are of short duration. The
effect, however, is expected to depend on sufficiently high EPLP.
Employing European establishment-level data for 2009 and 2004/2005 and to
the best of myknowledge, the contribution of this chapter is threefold. First,
I add a broad cross-country perspective to the single-country firm-level study
of Eslava et al. (2014), thus, contributing to a much broader generalization of
previously found relations. Second, in comparison to previous research (Eslava
et al., 2014; Nunziata and Staffolani, 2007; Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 1992), I
10This chapter is based on a revised and resubmitted version to the Industrial and Labor Rela-
tions Review (ILRReview) of ”Do firms demand temporary workers when they face workload
fluctuation? Cross-country firm-level evidence” (joint with Paul Marx). An earlier version
circulates as Dra¨ger and Marx (2012).
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am the first investigating the relevance of different durations in product demand
shocks for temporary employment, which is theoretically relevant for temporary
employment (Cahuc et al., 2012). Third, I add the firm-level perspective in com-
parison to Nunziata and Staffolani (2007), and thereby, accounting for firm-level
compositional effects.
1.2.2 The effect of EPLP on well-being
Chapter 411
A broad literature strand investigates the effect of EPLP on objective labor mar-
ket outcomes in cross-country studies (e.g. Nunziata and Staffolani, 2007; Kahn,
2010), and more recently, in studies employing evaluation techniques (e.g. Bauer,
Bender and Bonin, 2007; Kugler and Pica, 2008; Martins, 2009; Centeno and
Novo, 2012; Leonardi and Pica, 2013). Furthermore, a fast growing literature
strand is on determinants of well-being (e.g. Benjamin, Heffetz, Kimball and
Rees-Jones, 2014; Frey and Stutzer, 2012; Clark and Senik, 2010; Kassenboehmer
and Haisken-DeNew, 2009; Clark, Diener, Georgellis and Lucas, 2008; Frey and
Stutzer, 2002; Easterlin, 1974) and its importance as an ingredient for measuring
social progresses (e.g. OECD, 2013c; OECD, 2013a; OECD, 2011; Oswald, 2010).
Surprisingly, only a few papers investigate the effect of employment protection
on well-being proxied by life satisfaction, job satisfaction or perceived job secur-
ity (Lepage-Saucier and Wasmer, 2012; Boarini, Comola, Keulenaer, Manchin
and Smith, 2013; Ochsen and Welsch, 2012; Kuroki, 2012; Clark and Postel-
Vinay, 2009; Salvatori, 2010).
Building upon this research, I ask: Does employment protection for regular
workers affect well-being of workers? Based on the literature in labor economics
and on the literature on determinants of well-being, I derive a set of hypotheses
how EPLP affects life satisfaction (e.g. Falk and Knell, 2004; Kugler and Pica,
2008; Clark and Senik, 2010; Boeri and van Ours, 2013). Overall, the effects are
ambiguous.
Thereby and to the extent of my knowledge, I contribute to the literature in two
11This chapter is circulated as ”Does employment protection legislation affect well-being? A
quasi experiment”.
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ways. First, in comparison to Busk, Jahn and Singer (2015), Kuroki (2012) and
Lepage-Saucier and Wasmer (2012) who employ evaluation techniques, I add life
satisfaction as a new outcome. Second, in comparison to Boarini et al. (2013) and
Ochsen and Welsch (2012) who conduct cross-country studies for which omitted
variable bias is not easily ruled out, I add evaluation tools and include the distinc-
tion between employment protection legislation for permanent and for temporary
workers.
1.3 Empirical strategy
This section presents the corresponding empirical strategies to investigate above
research questions. The aim is to provide the intuition guiding the crucial assump-
tions in the empirical approaches rather than to provide an in-depth econometric
discussion. For this purpose, I start by locating the empirical strategies within the
range of social science methods and continue by introducing the concrete empirical
strategies which are applied.
In each chapter of the dissertation, I focus on the effect (or conditioning ef-
fect) of EPLP on labor market outcomes rather than exploring or describing so-
cial phenomena. The well-known fundamental evaluation problem is that I do
not observe the dependent variable for the same unit with and without EPLP or
labor demand shocks. In order to gain insights in counterfactual worlds, different
techniques can be applied. According to Angrist and Krueger (1999), Diekman
(2003), and Heckman (2010) and with reference to the EPLP literature, I broadly
categorize them into calibration, structural, and experimental/quasi experimental
approaches. These approaches differ, among others, with regard to the identific-
ation of the causal effect. In the calibration approach, mathematical economic
models are calibrated to a benchmark of economic data. This is done by choosing
some model parameters from the literature, e.g. elasticities, while calibrating other
model parameters in such a way that they replicate a benchmark of economic data.
Changes in the model parameter, e.g. firing costs, can then be used in order to
derive key indicators of an economy with hypothetical reforms in EPLP. Therefore,
EPLP reforms can be evaluated ex-ante. The workhorse models with respect to
EPLP are search and matching models (e.g. Cahuc and Postel-Vinay, 2002; Blan-
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chard and Landier, 2002; Cahuc et al., 2012; Bertola, Dabusinskas, Hoeberichts,
Izquierdo, Kwapil, Montorne`s and Radowski, 2012) and labor demand models (e.g.
Bentolila and Bertola, 1990).
In the structural approach, researchers more directly try to transmit economic
theory into an empirical model through full parametrization of empirical models.
The aim is then to estimate the behavioral parameters of an economic model.
Based on these parameters, they simulate the effects of hypothetical reforms.
Reforms can be evaluated ex-ante again. EPLP reforms are investigated in dy-
namic structural models of labor demand (e.g. Hamermesh, 1996; Hamermesh and
Pfann, 1996; Cooper and Willis., 2004). For instance, Aguirregabiria and Alonso-
Borrego (2014) analyzing a two-tier labor market reform in Spain. Based on a
structural labor demand, they estimate hiring and firing costs of permanent and
temporary workers before and after the reform. They use these estimates in order
to predict the effect of this two-tier labor market reform keeping other institutions
constant and finding a positive effect on total employment and the share of tem-
porary workers as well as negative effects on firms productivity. An example from
public economics is structural labor supply modelling (e.g. van Soest, 1995; Bar-
gain, Orsini and Peichl, 2015). Estimated labor supply elasticities enable the
simulation of a counterfactual world of labor supply when e.g. taxes change. In
general, if assumptions of these model are not met, results might be biased. An
example is the assumption of voluntary unemployment (e.g. Bargain, Caliendo,
Haan and Orsini, 2010; Haan and Uhlendorff, 2013).
In the experimental/quasi-experimental approach, researchers rely on exper-
iments with controlled random assignments of participants to the control and
treatment group in order to specify their empirical model and identify the causal
effect. Thereby, the treatment, e.g. a reform, is not evaluated ex-ante but ex-post.
Hence, the ideal strategy for estimating a causal effect is a real experiment. Al-
though controlled randomization is common in life sciences, such as medicine, it is
less common in social sciences. In my case, I would need random selection of indi-
viduals/firms to EPLP. As these kinds of real experiments are difficult to conduct,
researchers often rely on observational data and statistical methods. Based on this,
one can at least proxy real experiments. The identification strategies are broadly
categorized into those dealing with observational differences between treatment
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and control group, e.g. regression analyses and propensity score matching, and
those handling unobservable differences, e.g. instrumental variables, difference-in-
difference approaches or selection models. If identifying assumptions are not met,
the estimated ex-post effects are biased.
In this dissertation, I employ the experimentalist approach in order to investig-
ate effects and test hypotheses. For this purpose, I make use of regression analyses
and difference-in-difference approaches, both of which are briefly presented in the
following sections.
1.3.1 Regression approach
The identifying assumption for a causal effect in regression analyzes is called the
conditional independence assumption. This means that controlling for observable
covariates ensures that the error is not correlated with the variable of interest. If
one does not control for all relevant covariates, the error might be correlated with
the variable of interest and yields an omitted variable bias. A special case is a bias
due to reversed causality. This occurs when the dependent variable (e.g. share of
temporary workers) has an effect on the covariate (e.g. EPLP) of interest.
Application: Chapter 3
I employ regression analysis in order to test the hypothesis that a firm’s propensity
to employ at least one temporary worker is higher if the firm is exposed to annual
workload fluctuations, but only if dismissal protection for regular workers is suf-
ficiently high. I employ cross-country and within-country variation (firm-level) in
order to obtain sufficient variation in EPLP and workload fluctuation, respectively.
Assuming that the profit of firm i in country j of employing at least one tempor-
ary worker can be presented in a latent variable approach, I estimate the following
specification:
Y ∗ij = EPLPj ∗WFijγ1 +WFijγ2 + β′Xij +Rij + Uj (1.1)
with
Yij = 1[Y
∗
ij > c] (1.2)
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and the latent variable (Y ∗ij), employment protection legislation for regular
workers (EPLPj), annual workload fluctuations (WFij), a vector of controls (Xij)
and the error terms (idiosyncratic term Rij, country fixed effect Uj). If the profit
of employing at least one temporary worker (Y ∗ij) is larger than c, firms employ at
least one.
The conditional independence assumption means that all relevant covariates
need to be observed and controlled for in order to avoid an omitted variable bias.
Vector Xij controls for a large battery of covariates at the firm-level (Salvatori,
2009; Bo¨heim and Zweimu¨ller, 2012; Kahn, 2007; Houseman, 2001; Bentolila and
Dolado, 1994; Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 1992) and at the country-level (Kahn,
2010; Polavieja, 2005; Lazaer, 1990) which are relevant for the decision of a firm
to employ temporary workers. In some models, any country-specific unobserved
heterogeneity is account for by including country fixed-effects (Uj). Due to clus-
tering, errors are likely not to be independent which I allow for by estimating
cluster-robust standard errors at the country-level.12
There, however, might still be concerns in terms of the conditional independ-
ence assumption due to reversed causality. First, high shares of temporary em-
ployment might volatilize domestic demand, which, in turn, might yield workload
fluctuation at the firm-level. I argue that this point is less relevant in my case as
temporary work is also strongly used by firms in sectors which depend less on do-
mestic demand. I cannot, however, rule out reversed causality and account for this
in my interpretation. Second, EPLP might be endogenous to the hiring behavior
of firms and to the share of temporary workers. The hiring of temporary workers
as well as the existence of high shares of temporary workers in the labor market
in general might induce liberalizing reforms (Marx, 2012; Bentolila, Dolado and
Jimeno, 2012). If these political-economy arguments hold, however, the positive
conditioning effect of protection on employing temporary workers would bias be
towards zero.
I combine establishment-level data with country-level data for 2004/2005 and
2009 where each cross-section consists of around 18,000 observations in up to 20
European countries. Establishment-level data are from the European Company
12Cameron and Miller (2015) suggest other strategies, too, e.g. hierarchical models (Snijders and
Bosker, 2012). I follow (Kahn, 2007).
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Survey, which is a four-year survey starting in 2004/2005. It is conducted by
the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions
(Eurofound). The survey is representative for establishments with more than ten
employees in the European Union. The dependent variable is operationalized by a
binary variable which equals one if an establishment employed temporary workers
in the last 12 months. I proxy labor demand shocks of short duration with an
item on whether an establishment normally faces workload shocks within a year.
Employment protection legislation is measured at the country-level using a well-
known indicator13 from the OECD (Venn, 2009).
1.3.2 Difference-in-difference approach
In contrast to regression analyzes, the difference-in-difference approach is less de-
manding and allows for unobservable differences between control and treatment
group. The identifying assumption which is employed here, however, is that these
unobservable differences are constant over time conditional on the controls. This
means that the dependent variable for the treatment and the control group is
allowed to differ in its level due to unobservables but the difference in the level
between the groups is not allowed to change over time. This assumption is called
the common trend assumption.
This assumption is violated if the unobservable composition of the treatment
and control group would change over time or if groups would differ in time-varying
unobservable covariates. For instance, a reform decreases protection for small firms
and induces workers with a (unobserved and uncontrolled) preference for high job
security to select into large firms after the reform in order to be protected again. If
those workers are also less satisfied with life, the effect of a decrease in employment
protection for regular workers on life satisfaction would be downward biased due
to changing compositions.
13This indicator allows to distinguish between protection for regular workers, fixed-term contract
workers and temporary agency workers.
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Application: Chapter 2 and Chapter 4
I employ a difference-in-difference approach to test the effect of EPLP on the share
of temporary employees at the firm-level and on life satisfaction at the individual-
level. The identification is based on within-country time and subgroup variation
(Boeri and Jimeno, 2005). Employing this combination of variation became a
standard tool in the evaluation of the effect of employment protection on objective
outcomes (e.g. Boeri and Jimeno, 2005; Bauer et al., 2007; Kugler and Pica, 2008;
Martins, 2009; Centeno and Novo, 2012; Leonardi and Pica, 2013).
In Germany, small firms are exempted from EPLP. The small firm-size threshold
below which the firm is exempted from EPLP changed in the last two decades
three times. In 1996, the small firm size threshold changed from 5 to 10 full-time-
equivalent workers. In 1999, the threshold decreased from 10 to 5 workers. In
2004 the threshold increased again from 5 to 10 workers. Thereby, small firms
(treatment group) faced a decrease in protection for permanent workers in 1996
and 2004 and an increase in 1999 while larger firms (control group) did not face
changes. Thereby, one can compare the change in the dependent variable for the
treatment group to that of the control group. When the common trend assumption
is met, a difference-in-difference regression gives the causal effect of employment
protection legislation.
I use a standard conditional difference-in-difference model:
Yit = TGitγ1 +Rtγ2 + TGitRtγ3 + β
′Xit + it (1.3)
Rt = 1[year ≥ reform yeart] (1.4)
it = uit + ai (1.5)
with Yit as the dependent variable of individual/firm i in time t, TGit
14 is
defined for each worker/firm depending on the number of workers in the firm in
the year of observation (one for small firms (treatment group), zero for large firms
(control group)), Rt is the reform dummy (zero before the reform takes place and
one afterwards); γ3 gives the effect of employment protection on the dependent
variable if the common trend assumption is met.
14Depending on the specification, the treatment group dummy is time-invariant TGi.
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In order to avoid violation of the common trend assumption, I control for
time-variant observables (Xit) as well as for unobservable time-invariant indi-
vidual/firm characteristics: it = αit + ui with the idiosyncratic term (αit) and
the individual/firm fixed effect (ui). Hence, I control for compositional changes
when observed and for unobservable time-invariant characteristics. Therefore, I
checked whether the common trend assumption is plausible by employing a battery
of indirect tests, e.g. a pre-reform trend test, a placebo treatment group test, a
placebo reform test, and an anticipation test. Similar tests are conducted, e.g., by
Leonardi and Pica (2013). The common trend assumption could still be violated.
For instance, I would not capture selection if the selection process into the control
or treatment group is due to unobservable time-variant variables. I discuss these
issues in Chapter 2 and 4, separately.
Chapter 2
I estimate the impact of dismissal protection on the share of temporary workers at
the establishment-level in the difference-in-difference approach. The data source
is the IAB establishment panel (IAB EP), an establishment-level survey of 4,000
to 19,000 establishments conducted annually since 1993. The survey is conducted
by the research institute of the Federal Employment Agency. The population of
establishments are all German establishments with at least one worker who is
subject to social insurance contributions. The dependent variable is the share of
temporary workers at the establishment-level. The major independent variable is
the treatment group dummy which indicates whether a firm is in the treatment or
in the control group. The allocation to the treatment or control group is based on
the definition of full-time equivalents in the German EPLP. The IAB EP allows
for a sound approximation of these full-time equivalents according to the German
EPLP.
I allow the error term (it) to consist of αit and ui by estimating firm fixed-
effects. As firms are clustered over time, it is reasonable to allow for αit to be
correlated over time. I account for this by estimating cluster-robust standard
errors clustered at the establishment-level. Furthermore, the share in temporary
workers (Yit) is assumed to be continuous and unlimited.
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Chapter 4
I employ the reforms in German protection law in a difference-in-difference ap-
proach as described above to estimate the effect of employment protection legis-
lation for regular workers on life satisfaction at the individual-level. I use the
German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), a representative annual household sur-
vey of around 11,000 households and 20,000 individuals conducted since 1984.
The dependent variable well-being is proxied by life satisfaction. Life satisfaction
is measured based on a standard life satisfaction question (0 to 10 scale). The
major independent variable is the treatment group dummy. Due to data limita-
tions, it can only be proxied; therefore, the effect of employment protection on life
satisfaction is likely biased towards zero, which has to be accounted for.
The error term (it) consists of αit and ui. It is assumed that life satisfaction
(Yit) is cardinal which is based on Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004). They
show that the cardinality versus ordinality assumption is less relevant for the
estimates in life satisfaction equations. In contrast, they pronounce the importance
of considering individual fixed effects in life satisfaction equations (ui). Hence,
my preferred model is an OLS fixed effect model. I allow the error terms to be
correlated at the individual-level by estimating cluster-robust standard errors.
1.4 Summary and discussion
1.4.1 The effect and conditioning effect of EPLP on tem-
porary employment
Chapter 2
I test whether an almost perfectly symmetric increase and decrease in EPLP has
a symmetric effect on the share of temporary workers. Applying within-country
time and subgroup variation in a difference-in-difference regression approach with
establishment-level panel data, the main result is that the EPLP reforms had an
asymmetric effect. In line with expectations, the increase (decrease) in EPLP
increased (decreased) the share of temporary workers. The effect, however, was
stronger in terms of statistical and economical significance for the increase. Pre-
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reform trend tests do not support a failure of the common trend assumption in the
preferred specifications. The asymmetric pattern is relatively robust with reference
to a time invariant definition of the treatment group dummy and to the size of the
control group.
The asymmetric effects of changes in EPLP might contribute to explain less
clear effects of EPLP on temporary employment in studies not allowing for asym-
metries. Policy makers should consider this in designing EPLP reforms because
they might under- or over-expect effects on temporary employment. Future re-
search could built up on these findings by investigating the mechanism behind the
asymmetry as well as the magnitude of an asymmetry.
Chapter 3
The aim of Chapter 3 is to test whether short-term product demand shocks only
increase the propensity to employ temporary workers when EPLP is sufficiently
large in the respective country. Employing pooled cross-country firm-level data, I
confirm this. Workload fluctuations within a year have no positive relation with
the propensity to employ temporary workers in countries with low EPLP but an
economically and statistically relevant relation in countries with sufficient large
EPLP: The propensity to employ temporary workers for firms without annual
fluctuations is around 70 percent, while for firms with fluctuations it is eight per-
centage points higher. I show that the results are robust with respect to fixed-term
contract and - although less - to temporary agency workers. The second novel find-
ings are related to the duration of shocks. I show that daily and weekly shocks are
less positively related to temporary employment for the first time. Furthermore,
I provide first findings on the distribution of the duration of shocks in European
establishments which indicates that specifically annual fluctuations play a major
role in Europe.
Thereby, I can generalize previous findings of single-country analyses and country-
level analyses, while at the same time providing first insights in the role of the
duration of shocks. Furthermore, I show that a considerable portion of firms in
European economies are in the need of flexibility. Therefore, high EPLP might
have severe effects on economic development and, at the same time, polarize job
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quality, which is important for policy makers when reforming EPLP. Future re-
search can build upon the findings by investigating adjustment mechanisms be-
hind daily and weekly shocks. Furthermore, my empirical strategy is demanding
in terms of its identifying assumptions and some concerns remain after discuss-
ing reversed causality and omitted variable bias in detail. Future research could
investigate other sources of variation in order generalize these findings.
1.4.2 The effect of EPLP on well-being
Chapter 4
In Chapter 2 and 3, I show that employment protection legislation for regular
workers is an important determinant of temporary employment. Reducing EPLP
could decrease temporary employment. The aim of Chapter 4 is to shed light
on the effect of such reforms on well-being. Employing a difference-in-difference
approach based on German reforms in EPLP, I find a temporarily negative effect
of the reduction in EPLP on the life satisfaction of temporary workers. An ex-
planation would be that temporary workers who remain in a temporary job after
the reform suffer from the comparison to colleagues who benefited from the de-
crease in EPLP by transitioning into a permanent job. This interpretation is in
line with the finding of Centeno and Novo (2012) that EPLP adversely affects the
transition probabilities from a temporary into a permanent job and is in line with
the literature on social comparison. Another potential explanation, however, is
that EPLP reforms induced selection into the treatment group. If this is the case
and is driven by time-invariant unobservables or observables, I account for this. I
cannot fully rule out selection due to unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity. I
show, however, that pre-reform trends do not differ between treatment and control
group. Thereby, I can at least reduce some concerns. For an increase in protec-
tion, I do not find significant effects which would be in line with loss aversion. The
analysis focuses on temporary workers because the majority of permanent workers
did not face major changes in EPLP. Pre-reform trend tests, anticipation tests,
placebo reform and placebo group tests as well as group-specific linear trends do
not support a violation of the common trend assumption.
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This chapter provided first evidence on the effect of EPLP reforms on life satis-
faction by employing evaluation tools. Thereby, I showed that temporary workers,
on average, do not necessarily benefit from a decrease in EPLP (Saint-Paul, 2002).
Policy makers liberalizing EPLP should consider that such reforms might affect
temporary workers adversely, too. A deeper analyses of the mechanisms behind
the negative effect which I discuss in the paper (e.g. comparison and anticipa-
tion hypotheses) remains open for future research, too. A drawback of this study
is, that I can only reduce concerns about unobserved time-variant heterogeneity
but cannot fully rule it out. Hence, future research investigating other sources
of variation in EPLP would be beneficial in order to investigate the relevance of
this concern. In general, research combining the literature on determinants of
well-being and evaluation techniques when it comes to labor markets institutions
is still rare but seems to be a promising field.
1.4.3 External validity
My samples consist either of establishments in the European Union, of small es-
tablishments in Germany or of workers in small German establishments. Hence, it
is relevant whether results are externally valid beyond these cases (Cook, Camp-
bell and Shadish, 2002). For generalization, it is important to account for relevant
interactions of country-level as well as establishment- and worker-level variables
with EPLP. There are at least four of those interactions which are important.
First, for the effect of EPLP on the behavior of firms, differential enforcement
due to governance differences is relevant (e.g. Micco and Pages, 2007; Venn, 2009;
Haltiwanger, Scarpetta and Schweiger, 2014). For instance, if corruption is high,
legislation on employment protection might not be followed by the employers. Sim-
ilar to aforementioned studies, I also consider governance indicators (government
effectiveness, rule of law, control of corruption) in Chapter 3, too. I, however, do
not find that countries with a low governance indicator have a differen condition-
ing effect of EPLP compared to countries with a high indicator. This is explained
by the fact that differential enforcement is specifically relevant in countries with
very low enforcement, which is the case in e.g. developing countries (Venn, 2009).
Employing a sample of developing and non-developing countries, Micco and Pages
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(2007) have an average of -0.18 in the rule of law indicator, while in my sample
of European countries the rule of law average is 1.26 on a scale from -2.5 to 2.5.
Thus, I expect my results on the abolishment of EPLP and on the conditioning
effect of EPLP on temporary employment to hold in countries with similar levels
in the governance indicator but not necessarily in countries with low levels in this
indicator, such as in developing countries.
Second, the effect of EPLP may also differ with respect to the level of EPLP
itself. With reference to the literature on varieties of capitalism (Hall and Soskice,
2001; Estevez-Abe, Iversen and Soskice, 2001), coordinated economies (CME), e.g.
Germany, Netherlands, and mixed market economies (MME), e.g. Spain, Italy, are
usually characterized by more rigid labor markets with high levels of employment
protections compared to liberal market economies (LME), e.g. Ireland, United
States. Indeed, EPL as measured by the OECD was 65% smaller in LME compared
to CME in the period from 1990 to 2002 (Hall and Gingerich, 2009). MME were
even more regulated (1.65 times) compared to CME. Hence, abolishing EPLP
in CME or MME makes a strong difference in firing costs for firms compared to
LME. Germany is generally categorized as a CME and is characterized by relatively
strong protection. Hence, in LME, I would expect only small effects of abolishing
EPLP on firms behavior with regard to temporary workers.
Third, and related to the second, firm-specific skills - as well as industry-
specific skills - are considered to be important in CME (Hall and Soskice, 2001).
This is related to the level of EPLP and the rational behind the investment in
human capital by employees (e.g. Estevez-Abe et al., 2001; Wasmer, 2006a; Was-
mer, 2006b). Hence, the substitution of permanent workers by temporary workers
might be limited (Hijzen et al., 2013). This, however, would less likely be the
case in LME, which are assumed to rely more on general skills (e.g. Hall and
Soskice, 2001; Estevez-Abe et al., 2001; Wasmer, 2006a; Wasmer, 2006b). Hence,
the effect of abolishing EPLP on temporary workers is expected to be stronger
in LME such as in the United States compared to Germany. The conditioning
effect of EPLP is also expected to be stronger in those countries - keeping other
institutions constant. Furthermore, larger firms might rely more heavily on firm-
specific skills (Pfeifer, Scho¨nfeld and Wenzelmann, 2011). This may result in limits
concerning the substitution of permanent workers by temporary workers in larger
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firms. I would expect that the effect of abolishing EPLP is smaller in firms which
are relatively large in Germany. In Chapter 3, I do not find that the conditioning
effect of EPLP is driven by large or small firms.
Fourth, wage rigidity might be relevant for the effect of EPLP on temporary
employment at the establishment-level as well as on life satisfaction (via temporary
employment). According to Lazaer (1990), if wages are flexible, firms could at least
compensate for EPLP related transfers, e.g. severance payments, by lower wages.
This is empirically supported by Leonardi and Pica (2013). They show that an
increase in EPLP has a negative effect on wages of new workers, specifically when
they are in a weak bargaining position, e.g. young blue-collar workers or workers
in labor markets with low employment rates. If firms can compensate EPLP by
lower entry wages, numerical reactions are expected to be less strong (Leonardi
and Pica, 2013; Lazaer, 1990). Hence, the effect of abolishing EPLP on temporary
employment might be stronger in German establishments which are larger than
those in the treatment group. This is because larger German firms employ, on
average, more white-collar workers, and according to Leonardi and Pica (2013),
blue-collar workers are associated with low bargaining power. As already mention,
in Chapter 3, I do not find that the conditioning effect of EPLP is driven by
large or small firms. Furthermore, the conditioning effect of EPLP for the effect
of shocks and the effect of EPLP might be an upper bound estimate as other
countries beyond the European Union and beyond Germany might have labor
market institutions which are more supportive in terms of wage flexibility, i.e.
less collective wage bargaining and lower unemployment benefits. In developing
countries, for instance, effects are expected to be less strong.
I show that workload fluctuations are only positively related to temporary
employment at the establishment-level if EPLP is sufficiently large. Next to the
discussion on generalization above, I show that these results are robust with respect
to country subsamples, to different periods (2009 and 2004/2005), as well as to
sector subsamples. Thereby, this provides empirical support that one specific set
of national institutions, one specific sectoral production function, or one specific
year drives the results.
Finally, if the negative effect of abolishing EPLP on life satisfaction of tem-
porary workers is due to the comparison to former temporary worker colleagues
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who transitioned into a permanent job, the behavior of firms in terms of trans-
forming temporary into permanent contracts is important for the effect of EPLP
on life satisfaction. Hence, the aforementioned arguments apply to the results of
the effect of EPLP on life satisfaction, too. Additionally, from the perspective of
workers, the perception of individuals of income mobility might also play a role in
the effect of EPLP on life satisfaction. For instance, Senik (2008) shows that the
effect of social comparison (here income) is adverse in ”old” European countries
but that the relation is positive in the United States as well as in post-transition
countries. Hence, in countries with a high perceived mobility, abolishing EPLP
might not have a negative but rather, a positive effect on well-being of temporary
workers.
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Chapter 2
Employment protection reform
effects on temporary employment
2.1 Introduction
In the public debate, employment protection legislation for permanent workers
(EPLP) is considered to be a structural source of high incidences in temporary1
employment, a high youth unemployment rate and low transition rates from tem-
porary to permanent work. Thus, reform proposals for labor market institutions of-
ten suggest a decrease in EPLP. For instance, in Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece,
EPLP was liberalized in the aftermath of the 2007 financial crisis (OECD, 2013b).
Therefore, it is highly relevant to understand the effects of a decrease in EPLP on
economic outcomes.
EPLP is generally modeled via firing costs of workers with a permanent contract
(e.g. Bentolila and Bertola, 1990; Cahuc et al., 2012). Boeri (2011) predicts that
by increasing these costs, the share of temporary employment increases, while the
effect on the unemployment level is ambiguous. This finding is in line with papers
employing within-country time and subgroup variation. Centeno and Novo (2012)
show that the increase in EPLP has a positive effect on the share of temporary
workers at the firm-level. Boockmann and Hagen (2001) show that a decrease in
1Temporary is referred to as fixed-term contract workers (FTC) or and/or to temporary agency
workers. The former holds a direct fixed-term contract with a firm, while the latter holds a
contract with an employment agency and works on a fixed-term basis for a user firm.
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EPLP has a negative effect on the binary decision to employ at least one temporary
worker. Literature using within-country time variation but no subgroup variation,
however, show that the effect of EPLP on temporary employment is less clear
(Nunziata and Staffolani, 2007; Kahn, 2010).
Building upon this literature, we investigate for the first time the symmetry
of the effect of symmetric EPLP reforms (increase, decrease) on temporary em-
ployment. None of the aforementioned papers analyzed, whether a decrease in
EPLP has a similar effect on temporary employment as an increase in EPLP. If
a decrease in EPLP affects temporary employment less strongly compared to an
increase, this should be accounted for in theoretical models as well as by policy
makers when they design reforms in EPLP.
Germany provides the unique opportunity to investigate a symmetric increase
and decrease in EPLP. In 1999, German EPLP increased for new hires in firms
with 6 to 10 full-time equivalent employees (FTE) but not for other firms. In
2004, EPLP decreased for new hires for the same group of firms. Both reforms
were almost perfectly symmetric. These reforms provide within-country time and
subgroup variation which we employ in a difference-in-difference approach (DID).
This became a standard tool in the evaluation of EPLP2 and was also applied
in the case of German EPLP reforms (e.g. Boockmann and Hagen, 2001; Bauer
et al., 2007; Boockmann, Gutknecht and Steffes, 2008). By focusing on firms which
are close to the threshold (6-12 full-time equivalent employees), we conduct the
DID in a regression discontinuity design (Leonardi and Pica, 2013).
The main result is that symmetric EPLP reforms have asymmetric effects in
terms of statistical and economical significance. The increase in EPLP in 1999
raised the share of fixed-term workers in firms with 6 to 10 FTE by 1.7 percentage
points. The decrease in EPLP in 2004 decreased the share of fixed-term workers.
These effects, however, were asymmetric. The effect of the increase in EPLP was
more economically (58% versus 12% of the mean) and statistically significant.
The sign of the effects as well as the asymmetric pattern is robust to different
definitions of the treatment group dummy, different controls and different samples.
The change in share of fixed-term workers was driven by changes in the number
of fixed-term workers, while the employment level remains almost unaffected. For
2For instance, Leonardi and Pica (2013), Scoppa (2010), Martins (2009), Kugler and Pica (2008).
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our main results, we do not find pre-reform trend differences between treatment
and control group, which supports the common trend assumption.
The article is organized as follows: In the next section, we explain the insti-
tutional setting with regard to EPLP and the degree of symmetry of the reforms
in EPLP. In Section 2.3, we describe the theoretical and empirical background. A
section on the empirical strategy follows. It presents the identification strategy,
data sources, sample selection and the definition of the treatment group dummy
as well as of the dependent variables. In Section 2.5, we present some descript-
ive statistics and the difference-in-difference results, and a conclusion is drawn in
Section 2.6.
2.2 Institutional background
2.2.1 Employment protection legislation for permanent work-
ers
Employment protection legislation regulates the hiring and firing of workers. Dif-
ferent employment protection legislation exists for permanent (open-ended or reg-
ular) and for temporary workers. One major difference between these two types of
workers is the cost which is associated with the termination of a contract. Tem-
porary contracts are of limited duration and end automatically after a specified
period at no (or low) costs. In contrast, permanent contracts are of unlimited
duration, and the termination of such a contract is costly. Employment protec-
tion for permanent workers increases firing costs of permanent workers in terms of
transfers from the employer to employee (e.g. severance payments) and in terms
of taxes (e.g. legal advice costs, court costs). In this paper, we focus on the effect
of employment protection legislation for permanent workers on the employment of
temporary workers.
In Germany, protection for permanent workers ranked among the top fifth of
OECD countries in 2013 according to the OECD indicator (Venn, 2009; OECD,
2015). To give some perspective, this is comparable to the EPLP levels of Portugal
and France but contrasts to that of the United Kingdom and the United States.
German protection for permanent workers varies across subgroups of firms. All
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firms have to meet minimum criteria for a fair dismissal e.g. no dismissal due to
discriminatory reasons and laws for specific groups e.g. disabled workers. In addi-
tion, firms above a specific threshold in terms of number of employees have to apply
more restrictive legislation when they terminate a permanent contract. We refer to
this German legislation as employment protection for permanent workers (EPLP).
EPLP exempts small firms. This small firm size exemption also exists/existed in
other countries such as Italy (Leonardi and Pica, 2013) and Portugal (Centeno
and Novo, 2012).3
Dismissals are only considered fair under EPLP regulations if: 1) the cause
lies in the worker (e.g. long-term incapacity); 2) the worker’s behavior is deemed
damaging or unacceptable; 3) it is an economic necessity. Furthermore, a fair
dismissal has several other conditions as well, for instance, to meet the criteria of a
specific form, the obligation to properly inform about causes for the dismissal, and,
in the case of collective dismissals, to give announcements. After being dismissed,
a worker has the right to go to court in order to challenge the validity of the
dismissal. If the dismissal is not valid, the employer has to continue the working
contract or has to pay severance payments. Finally, since the German law is
characterized by a high legal uncertainty (Eichhorst and Marx, 2011b), costs for
legal advice increase and firing costs become highly uncertain.
2.2.2 EPLP reforms
The specific design of EPLP reforms in Germany over the last 20 years provides
the unique opportunity to evaluate whether a symmetric increase and decrease in
EPLP has a symmetric effect on temporary employment in a quasi-experimental
design. Figure 4.1 presents EPLP reforms in Germany in 1996, 1999 and 2004.
The changes in legislation were mainly restricted to changes in the threshold of the
number of full-time equivalent workers (FTEs) that, once passed, firms are required
to adhere to the regulations of EPLP. The threshold (solid line) went up in 1996
(from 6 to 11 FTEs), down in 1999 (from 11 to 6 FTEs), and up in 2004 (from
6 to 11 FTEs). Thereby, for firms with 6 to 10 FTEs, EPLP increased (1999)
and decreased (1996, 2004) symmetrically. Due to data limitations concerning
3Venn (2009) gives an overview of small firm size exemptions in the OECD.
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temporary employment, however, we only focus on the 1999 and 2004 reforms.
Figure 2.1: EPLP reforms in Germany from 1996 to 2005
FTE
11
6
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
EPLP
No- EPLP
Note: Own presentation; FTE: full-time equivalent workers;
EPLP: employment protection legislation for permanent workers.
Before the reform in 1996, firms with 6 or more FTEs had to follow EPLP. Dur-
ing a period of economic downturn and flexibilization (Eichhorst and Marx, 2011a),
the Christian Democratic Union/Free Democratic Party government increased the
threshold from 6 to 11 FTEs in October 1996.4 Hence, firms with 6-10 (FTEs)
faced a decrease in EPLP for new hires but not for incumbents, who signed the
labor contract before the reform took place (incumbents) and were exempted from
the reform until 1999.
The second reform followed in a period of economic recovery and re-regulation
(Eichhorst and Marx, 2011a) in the late 1990s. In January 1999, the newly elected
4EPLP for firms above 10 FTEs decreased as social selection criteria in the case of economic
redundancies were loosened (Eichhorst and Marx, 2011a). Counting of FTEs changed, too.
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Social Democratic/Green government revoked the reform from 1996 (Eichhorst and
Marx, 2011a) by decreasing the threshold from 11 to 6 FTEs.5 Thereby, firms with
6-10 (FTEs) faced an increase in EPLP for new hires but again not for incumbents
hired at least two years before. Concerning anticipation, it is important to note
that revoking the EPLP reform was already proposed by the Social Democrats
during the election campaign in the fall of 1998 (Bauer et al., 2007). This has to
be accounted for when interpreting results. From the empirical analyses, we can
conclude, however, that anticipation is less relevant for our main results.6
The third reform took place in a period of an economic downturn and as be-
ing part of several liberalizing reforms in the 2000s. Among others, the Social-
Democratic/Green government revoked the EPLP reform in 1999 and increased
the threshold from 6 to 11 FTEs again.7 Once more, incumbents were exempted
from these reforms. Thereby, firms with 6 to 10 FTEs faced another decrease in
EPLP for new hires. Unlike the previous reform, this reform was quite unforesee-
able, thus anticipation is likely not a major factor (Bauer et al., 2007).8
Finally, our interest remains focused on the symmetry of EPLP reform effects.
Hence, it is relevant whether the increase and decrease in EPLP are indeed sym-
metric. First, the reform in 1999 affected incumbents with a job tenure of less than
two years, while the 2004 reform affected no incumbents. The share of incumbents
with a job tenure below 3 years in total employment (including permanent and
temporary workers) was around 27.9% in 1999 (OECD, 2015). We discuss po-
tential implications for the symmetry of EPLP reforms in Section 2.3, which we
summarize to be of minor relevance in our case. Second, the macro-economic
conditions between the reforms differed. The 1999 reform took place in a period
of good economic performance (1997 to 2001: GDP growth was 2.1 percent, and
the unemployment rate growth rate was -2 percent), while the 2004 reform took
5EPLP for firms above 10 FTEs increased again as the government strengthened selection criteria.
We account for changes in the counting of FTEs in detail in Section 2.4.2.
6See Section 2.5 for a discussion.
7Social selection criteria increased again. Concerning regulations about severance payments, in
the case of an economic reason for dismissal, employees can now exchange the right to go to
the court for severance payments by elapsing the period for filing an action. As determining
a permanent contract, however, is still related to uncertainty within the period for filing an
action, we assess this change as irrelevant for the symmetry of EPLP reforms.
8This is supported in the empirical analyses in Section 2.5.2.
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place in a period of lower economic performance (2002 to 2006: GDP growth was
1 percent, and unemployment rate growth rate was 2 percent). We discuss this
issue in Section 2.3, and we conclude that this difference is less relevant in our
case. Third, parallel reforms took place, e.g. liberalizing fixed-term employment.
They are, however, considered to be not relevant for inducing trend differences
in the treatment and control group, as we choose a very small neighborhood for
our treatment and control group. In order to mitigate any concerns, however, we
discuss potential relevant reforms in Section 2.5.2.9
2.3 Relevant literature
We are interested in how firms change their behavior in terms of employing tem-
porary workers in responses to symmetric changes in EPLP. EPLP increases firing
cost for firms, which are then modeled in the profit function of a firm. If EPLP
only consists of transfers, if wages are flexible and if workers are risk-neutral,
then EPLP is neutral in terms of employment as the tansfer is entirely set off
by lower wages (Lazaer, 1990). In most economies, however, wages are not per-
fectly flexible (e.g. due to unions), and firing costs also consist of taxes (Leonardi
and Pica, 2013). In this case, EPLP clearly negatively affects labor market flows
with less clear effects on employment levels (e.g. for a labor demand model, see
Bentolila and Bertola, 1990). To uncover the effect of EPLP on temporary em-
ployment, no (or low) firing costs for temporary jobs and higher firing costs for
permanent jobs need to be modeled. Blanchard and Landier (2002) and Boeri and
Garibaldi (2007) present the effects of an introduction of entry jobs with lower
firing costs (two-tier reforms).
Closer related to the institutional setting and EPLP reforms in Germany are
studies which investigate an increase in EPLP in a two-tier regime. Boeri (2011)
predicts - based on a search and matching model - that such a reform increases the
9Fixed-term work was liberablized in 2001, 2003, 2004 and slightly re-regulated in 2005. Tem-
porary agency work was liberalized in 1997, 2002 and 2003. Furthermore, we also checked
parallel reforms in laws with firm size thresholds similar to the thresholds in EPLP. In August
2004, a reform took place which reduced the costs for break rooms only for firms with above
10 employers. These costs are, however, not related to the employment of fixed-term versus
permanent workers.
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share of temporary jobs in total employment, while unemployment is less clearly
affected. Cahuc et al. (2012) - search and matching model - find that an increase
in EPLP induces substitution of permanent jobs in favor of temporary jobs, while
the employment level is less clearly affected.
In line with Cahuc et al. (2012) and Boeri (2011), we expect that the increase in
EPLP in 1999 increased the share of temporary employment at the establishment-
level. In 1999, firms faced increased EPLP for new hires and incumbents with less
than two years of job tenure. Profit maximizing firms circumvent increased firing
costs for permanent workers by hiring temporary workers instead of permanent
workers.10 In contrast, in 2004, firms faced a decrease in EPLP for new hires with
a permanent contract. Firms might now reduce hiring temporary workers and
increase the hiring of permanent workers as, e.g., costs associated with recruiting
might be lower for permanent contracts.11 We expect that a decrease in EPLP
decreases the share of temporary employment.
Concerning the symmetry of reforms, first, the difference in the affected in-
cumbents in the 1999 and the 2004 reform seems to be less relevant in our case
- no permanently employed incumbents were affected from the decrease in EPLP
in 2004, while permanently employed with less than two years of tenure were af-
fected from the increase in EPLP in 1999. At the utmost, a reform which would
also decrease EPLP for permanently employed incumbents with a job tenure of
less than two years but not for other permanent workers would induce substitu-
tion of permanently employed incumbents with a tenure more than two years by
new permanent contracts. This substitution, however, has no effect on the share
of temporary workers. Second, in poor economic conditions the effect of EPLP
reforms might be negligible (Boeri and Garibaldi, 2007, p. F371). In economic
bad conditions, firms might stop hiring. Hence, a decrease in EPLP for newly
hired workers would have no effect. In the case of an increase in EPLP, the similar
10In addition, they might try to diminish incumbents with permanent contracts (e.g. through
early retirement) and substitute them with temporary workers. A reform which would not
increase EPLP for incumbents with tenure less than two years might have a slightly less strong
effect on the share of temporary employment as those incumbents would not needed to be
substituted by temporary workers.
11In addition, they might try to reduce incumbents with permanent contracts and substitute
them with new permanent contracts at a lower EPLP level. This substitution, however, does
not affect the share of temporary employment.
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argument would apply.
To the best of our knowledge, recent empirical contributions do not invest-
igate whether effects of symmetric EPLP reforms are symmetric themselves.12
Employing within-country time variation and European individual data, Kahn
(2010) studies the propensity of being a temporary worker and, after controlling
for country-specific trends, does not find significant effects of EPLP reforms in
this respect. In his specification, he assumes that increasing and decreasing re-
forms have a symmetric effect. Nunziata and Staffolani (2007), also exploiting
within-country time variation in Europe, analyze the effect of EPLP on the share
of temporary employment using macro-level data. Controlling for other institu-
tions,13 they find a positive relation between EPLP and the share of temporary
workers. This relation beomes non-significant, however, when they control for eco-
nomic recessions. Applying cross-country variation in EPLP, Dra¨ger and Marx
(2012) show that workload fluctuations at the firm-level increase the propensity
to employ temporary workers only if EPLP is sufficiently large. They control for
several firm-level and institutional variables, e.g. union coverage. Hence, EPLP
has no robust effect on temporary employment in the literature that does not em-
ploy within-country subgroup variation. This literature is known for being prone
to, e.g., ommitted variable bias.
Employing within-country time and subgroup variation in a DID approach
is less demanding in its identifying assumptions, and became a standard tool to
obtain causal evidence on the effect EPLP reforms on objective outcomes. Within-
country subgroup and time variation in EPLP is obtained, for instance, from
reforms in EPLP variation across firm size (e.g. Leonardi and Pica, 2013; Centeno
and Novo, 2012; Cappellari, Dell’Aringa and Leonardi, 2012; Martins, 2009; Kugler
and Pica, 2008; Bauer et al., 2007), or across tenure (Marinescu, 2009). Leonardi
and Pica (2013) combine the DID with a regression discontinuity design. When
it comes to the effect of EPLP on the share of temporary workers, Centeno and
Novo (2012) and Boockmann et al. (2008) are the only studies which investigate
12Next to EPLP, screening, workload fluctuations, or parental leave are important determinants
of temporary employment (e.g. Houseman, 2001; Cahuc et al., 2012; Dra¨ger and Marx, 2012;
Eslava et al., 2014).
13They control for union density, bargaining co-ordination, unemployment benefit replacement
ratios and duration as well as for the tax wedge.
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this identification strategy. Centeno and Novo (2012) employ within-country time
and subgroup variation and find that the share of temporary workers increased by
1.6 percentage points after an increase in Portuguese EPLP. Employing a similar
identification strategy, Boockmann and Hagen (2001) estimate that the decrease in
German EPLP in 1996 decreased the probability of employing temporary workers
at the firm-level. Applying subgroup variation in a regression discontinuity design,
Hijzen et al. (2013) show that firms subject to EPLP employ 2-2.5 percentage
points more temporary workers than firms not subject to EPLP in Italy. Thus,
EPLP has a positive relation with the share of temporary employment. None of
these studies, however, investigated whether effects of symmetric reforms in EPLP
are symmetric. Germany provides the unique opportunity to investigate this in a
quasi-experimental setting.
Although not studying symmetry, several papers have already investigated re-
forms in German EPLP. Verick (2004) shows that the rise in EPLP decreased the
propensity of employment growth and increased the propensity of firms to remain
below the new FTE threshold (IAB Establishment Panel). He concludes, how-
ever, that results might be driven by other factors than the reform. Bauer et al.
(2007) estimate the effect of the 1996 and 1999 EPLP reforms on worker flows
based on social security records provided by the IAB. They find no effects. Bur-
gert (2006) shows that a rise in EPLP decreases hiring of older employees (IAB
Linked-Employee-Employer-Data (LIAB)). Boockmann et al. (2008) find that the
increase in EPLP in 1999 raised the job duration (LIAB), and Boockmann and
Hagen (2001) show that the decrease in EPLP in 1996 decreased the probability
of employing temporary workers. Results indicate that stocks and workers flows
are less affected by reforms in German EPLP but that atypical employment might
be affected.
2.4 Empirical strategy
2.4.1 Identification strategy
To investigate the effects of symmetric EPLP changes on temporary employment,
we rely on variations in how the reforms affected firms of different sizes through
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a difference-in-difference approach. Due to the fact that the reforms changed
the regulations for the threshold at which firms must comply with EPLP, these
changes only affected small firms but not large firms. Thereby, we can compare
the difference over time for small (affected) versus large (not affected) firms with
respect to temporary employment.
We use the conditional difference-in-difference model which is estimated for
each reform separately:
yit = β0 + TGitβ1 +Rtβ2 + TGitRtβ3 +Xitβ4 + it, (2.1)
with yit as the dependent variable of firm i in time t. TGit is defined for
each firm in each period of observation and is one if a firm is in the treatment
group (small firm) and zero if a firm is in the control group (large firm). In the
baseline specification, this dummy is time-variant.14 Hence, it alters with firm
size. Rt is the reform dummy and zero before the reform takes place (1997-1998 or
2002-2003) and one afterwards (1999-2001 or 2004-2006). The coefficient β3 gives
us the reform effect. We allow the error term (it) to include firm fixed effects
(it = αit + ui, with αit as the idiosyncratic term and ui as the firm fixed effect).
The estimated standard errors allow for potential error correlation within firms
and for heteroscedasticity.
In order to estimate whether the reform effect fades or grows and whether
any pre-reform differences between treatment and control group exist, we add
additional reform dummies into a dynamic specification of the DID:
Rt−1 = 1[year ≥ reform yeart−1] (2.2)
Rt+1 = 1[year ≥ reform yeart+1] (2.3)
First, we include a pre-reform dummy (Rt−1) which is zero and turns one in
the year before the reform takes place. The interaction between Rt−1 and TGit is
also added. This measures whether the treatment group has a different pre-reform
trend. If this is the case, the common trend assumption might be violated. Second,
we also include a post-reform dummy (Rt+1), which is zero and turns one in the
14Robustness checks are conducted for other specifications too.
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year after the reform takes place. The interaction with TGit is added and measures
whether the treatment group has a different trend one year after the reform took
place.
The difference-in-difference approach only provides unbiased estimates of the
reform effect if the common trend assumption is met. In other words, control
and treatment group are allowed to differ but these differences are not allowed
to change over time. In order to avoid violation of this assumption, we take
the following steps. First, we generalize the assumption. Differences between
control and treatment are not allowed to change over time under the condition that
we control for time-variant observables and time invariant unobservables. Time-
variant observable firm characteristics (Xit) are the share of blue and white color
workers, share of part-time workers, share of women, industry dummies, federal
state dummies as well as the share of workers in dual apprenticeship.15 Time
invariant firm characteristics are accounted for by estimating firm fixed-effects
(ui). Second, we restrict the sample to firms close to the threshold. Thereby,
we keep the firms as similar as possible. Leonardi and Pica (2013) call this a
combination of a DID with a regression discontinuity design. Third, we conduct
pre-reform trend tests. For the main results, we do not find differences in the
pre-reform trend.
2.4.2 Data
We use the IAB Establishment Panel (IAB EP), which has been conducted since
1993 (Fischer, Janik, Mu¨ller and Schmucker, 2008). Each wave of the IAB EP
consists of around 4,000 to 16,000 observations.16 The IAB EP questionnaire is
answered with reference to June 30th. The population of establishments consists
of all German establishments with at least one employee who is subject to social
insurance contributions. The sample is drawn within size (i.e. employees) and in-
dustry cells. Establishments with large numbers of employees are over-represented.
15Results are robust when we control for temporary agency work (Appendix 2.7.4, Table 2.18).
Due to data limitation, we are only able to conduct this test for the EPLP reform in 2004).
16Observations increase over time (Bellmann, Kohaut and Lahner, 2002): in 1996 from 4,000 to
8,000 cases (survey extension to East Germany), in 2000 from 10,000 to 14,000 (sample size
increase).
CHAPTER 2. EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION, TEMPORARY WORK 34
We chose waves from 1997 to 2006. Data access was provided via on-site use at the
Research Data Centre (FDZ) of the German Federal Employment Agency (BA)
at the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) followed by subsequent remote
data access.
Variables
Dependent variables
We employ different dependent variables which are related to fixed-term workers
(summarized in Table 2.117).18 Fixed-term workers are those who hold a contract
of limited duration with the interviewed establishment.19 The main dependent
variable is the share of fixed-term workers within total employment (ShFTC)20:
ShFTC =
FTC
E
, (2.4)
with E as the total number of employees (i.e. including workers liable to social
security as well as workers not-liable to social security21 and others) and FTC as
the number of fixed-term contract workers. An effect of EPLP on ShFTC could
be due to changes in the number of employees (E), in the number of fixed-term
workers (FTC), or due to changes in both. In order to disentangle the driver,
we estimate in addition the effects of EPLP reforms on the number of employees
(E) and the number of fixed-term workers (FTC), separately. Furthermore, we
analyze the effect of EPLP on the propensity to employ any fixed-term worker
(Any FTC = 1[ShFTC > 0]) - i.e. at the extensive margin - as well as on the
share of fixed-term workers in those companies employing at least one fixed-term
worker (ShFTC if > 0) - i.e. at the intensive margin.
17For an overview of the definitions and the original questions in the IAB EP, see Appendix
2.7.1.
18We refer to fixed-term workers rather than temporary workers as we focus on this type of
temporary workers.
19Establishments might also substitute by hiring temporary agency workers. Results are, how-
ever, robust controlling for temporary agency work in the 2004 reform (Appendix 2.7.4, Table
2.18).
20The IAB EP does not contain the hiring of fixed-term workers for the relevant period.
21For instance, these are workers in a so called ”Mini-Job” in Germany.
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Table 2.1: Dependent variables (yit)
yit Definition
Share of fixed-term workers
(ShFTC)
ShFTC = FTCE
Total number of employees (E) E
Total number of fixed-term contract
workers (FTC)
FTC
Employing at least one fixed-term
worker (Any FTC)
Any FTC =
1[ShFTC > 0]
Share of fixed-term workers in es-
tablishments with at least one fixed-
term worker (ShFTC if > 0)
ShFTC = ShFTC if
Any FTC== 1
Treatment group dummy
The treatment group dummy is based on the number of full-time equivalent workers
(FTE). According to the German EPLP, FTEs are defined as the sum of regular
(excluding workers in training) full-time and weighted part-time employees. As we
do not observe working hours (WH) in the IAB EP, we are not able to calculate the
number of FTEs perfectly as defined by the German EPLP (Table 2.12 (column
2)). We approximate the German EPLP definition by assuming that part-time
workers are equally distributed among the categories within the working hours
listed in Table 2.12 (column 2) and simply apply the average of the working hour
category specific weights (Table 2.12 (column 3)). In order to calculate FTEs, we
subtract trainees from the total number of employees (E) and weight22 the number
of part-time workers according to Table 2.12 (column 3).
FTEs are the sum of regular (excluding workers in training) full-time and
weighted part-time employees. Due to data limitations, we have a minor measure-
ment error in FTEs, which might bias the estimates towards zero. The time-variant
treatment group dummy (TGit) is one (treatment group) if establishments employ
6 to 10 FTEs and zero (control group) if establishments employ 11 to 12 FTEs23.
With 6 to 12 FTEs, we chose a small neighborhood of establishments, which is
22See for a detailed description of how we deal with changes in the weighting key in Appendix
2.7.2.
23We choose larger establishments as the control group because Bauer et al. (2007) show that
small establishments exhibit different dynamics in terms of insolvencies. We conduct, however,
robustness checks with 11 to 15 FTEs and discuss the results in Section 2.5.2.
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common in a regression discontinuity design and which supports keeping the treat-
ment and control groups similar. TGit is defined for each period separately.
Establishments, however, might select the number of FTEs endogenously to
reforms in EPLP. For instance, if some establishments are in the need of high
levels of numerical flexibility in the workforce, these establishments also have a
high share of fixed-term workers in comparison to other establishments. After the
2004 reform, establishments with the need for flexibility and with 11 FTEs might
try to decrease FTEs to 10. Thereby, they could circumvent EPLP but might bias
the negative effect of a decrease in EPLP on fixed-term employment towards zero.
If the selection process is driven by unobserved time invariant heterogeneity or by
observed time-variant heterogeneity, we account for this. If this is, however, not the
case, we do not capture endogenous selection. In order to check whether changes
in the treatment group status after the reform affect our estimates, we define a
time invariant treatment group dummy (TGi). The treatment group dummy is
one if establishments employ 6 to 10 FTEs in the year before the reform and zero
if establishments employ 11 to 12 FTEs in the year before the reform (same vein
as Centeno and Novo (2012) and Kugler and Pica (2008)).
Sample selection
We construct samples for each evaluated reform. For the 1999 reform, the sample
is from 1997 to 2001, and for the 2004 reform, from 2002 to 2006. We do not choose
a longer pre-reform period for the 1999 reform due to the reform in October 1996.
Furthermore, we do not choose a longer post-reform period for the 1999 reform
because of the reform in 2004. For the sake of comparability, we choose the same
length for the 2004 reform sample. We exclude units in the public sector, establish-
ments without any worker who is subject to social insurance contributions,24 units
above the 95th percentile of the share of trainees25 and establishments with major
24We apply this restriction in order to be able to weight the descriptive statistics. The IAB
provides weights, however, only for cross-sections which exclude establishments with no worker
who is subject to social insurance contributions. They also provide weights for longitudinal
data sets which are constructed by the IAB. As we construct our own panel, we rely on cross-
sectional weights for the descriptive statistics.
25These are educational institutions which employ almost only trainees. We excluded those
because they yielded skewed distribution of the number of employees. Results are, however,
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changes to their production function26. Finally, the estimation samples for the
difference-in-difference analyses are restricted to establishments which are either
in the treatment or in the control group, i.e. between 6 to 12 FTEs.
2.5 Empirical results
2.5.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 2.2 presents representative summary statistics of German establishments
employing 6 to 12 FTEs in the periods 1997-2001 (reform in 1999) and 2002-
2006 (reform in 2004).27 On average, in both periods 1997-2001 and 2002-2006,
establishments employed around 8 FTEs. This is consistent with the fact that
around 85% of establishments were in the group of establishments employing 6
to 10 FTEs. The number of employees is higher as part-time workers do not
count fully and trainees do not count at all: Establishments with 6 to 12 FTEs
employ on average around 10 workers with a maximum of 29 workers. Part-time
work increased, on average, in the periods 1997-2001 versus 2002-2006. This is
also reflected in the larger maximum number of employees in the 1997-2001 versus
2002-2006 period (26 versus 29 workers).
On average, the share of fixed-term workers was 3 and 4%, and the median
was zero in both periods. Hence, only a small share of establishments (6 to 12
FTEs) employed at least one fixed-term contract worker - between 13 and 17%.
The trend in employing fixed-term workers is positive. The share of fixed-term
workers at the establishment-level increased over time from 3% to 4%. This is due
to increases at the extensive margin rather than at the intensive margin. The share
of establishments employing at least one fixed-term contract worker increased from
13% to 17%. The share of fixed-term workers in establishments which employ at
least one fixed-term worker decreased from 24% to 22%.
robust when including those cases (Appendix 2.7.4, Table 2.17).
26The establishment number is based on a local production unit. If a unit changes the production,
e.g. from micro-chip production to ice cream production, the establishment number remains
the same; however, the establishment faced fundamental changes. Fischer et al. (2008) do not
consider those cases as IAB EP panel cases. We follow their suggestion.
27Number of observations increased, specifically due to the sample size increase in 2000 from
10,000 to 14,000 (Bellmann et al., 2002).
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics
Reform 1999
Variable Mean Median Min Max SD N
FTE 8.00 8.00 6.00 12.00 1.83 6190.00
TGit 0.87 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.34 6190.00
Employees 9.87 9.00 6.00 26.00 2.80 6190.00
FTC 0.29 0.00 0.00 24.00 1.08 6190.00
Part-time (%) 0.18 0.11 0.00 1.00 0.22 6190.00
Trainees (%) 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.07 6190.00
Wage per head 1771.75 1591.98 89.22 9713.06 896.95 5615.00
ShFTC (%) 0.03 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.11 6190.00
ShFTC if > 0 (%) 0.24 0.14 0.05 1.00 0.23 915.00
Any FTC 0.13 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.33 6190.00
Low qualified (%) 0.25 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.28 6190.00
High qualified (%) 0.58 0.64 0.00 1.00 0.28 6190.00
Reform 2004
Variable Mean Median Min Max SD N
FTE 8.10 8.00 6.00 12.00 1.89 10490.00
TGit 0.85 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.35 10490.00
Employees 10.44 10.00 6.00 29.00 3.22 10490.00
FTC 0.41 0.00 0.00 24.00 1.44 10490.00
Part-time (%) 0.23 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.24 10490.00
Trainees (%) 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.06 10490.00
Wage per head 1932.19 1714.29 133.33 15151.52 1057.20 9058.00
ShFTC (%) 0.04 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.12 10490.00
ShFTC if > 0 (%) 0.22 0.13 0.04 1.00 0.21 2037.00
Any FTC 0.17 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.37 10490.00
Low qualified (%) 0.22 0.11 0.00 1.00 0.27 10490.00
High qualified (%) 0.63 0.70 0.00 1.00 0.27 10490.00
Note: Establishments from 1997-2001 or 2002-2006 of non-public sectors with 6-12 FTEits,
TGit and excluding outliers (share of trainees) and no missing values in model relevant
variables (estimation sample). Cross-sectional weights. Source: Own calculation based on
IAB EP.
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Our estimation sample consists of 6,190 observations for the 1999 reform and
10,490 observations for the 2004 reform. First, Table 2.3 presents how these es-
tablishments are distributed between treatment and control group. Around 80%
of these establishments were in the treatment group. The share of small estab-
lishments is smaller compared to the weighted descriptives. This is due to over
representation of larger establishments in the IAB EP.
Table 2.3: Distribution of TGit in % by year
Reform 1999
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total
Control group (TGit = 0) 18 19 20 20 18 19
Treatment group (TGit = 1) 82 81 80 80 82 81
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Reform 2004
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total
Control group (TGit = 0) 21 20 20 21 20 20
Treatment group (TGit = 1) 79 80 80 79 80 80
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Note: Establishments from 1997-2001 or 2002-2006 of non-public sectors with
TGit and excluding outliers (share of trainees) and no missing values in model
relevant variables (estimation sample). Source: Own calculation based on IAB
EP.
Second, threshold effects in Germany are not confirmed in the literature: Bauer
et al. (2007) do not find EPLP threshold effects on full-time equivalents; Ko¨lling,
Schnabel and Wagner (2001) show that disability law threshold effects on employ-
ment do not exist; Verick (2004) finds a decreased probability for employment
growth for establishments below the EPLP threshold but concludes that this find-
ing might be due to omitted factors. Hence, selection of FTEs due to the EPLP
reforms should not be a major issue.
We show, however, some descriptives on the dynamics in FTE of establishments
with 6 to 10 FTEs. Table 2.4 presents the share of these establishments which
remained in the category of 6 to 10 FTEs (t+1 6-10), decreased FTEs below 6
(t+1 <6), increased FTEs above 10 (t+1 > 10), and the share of establishments in
which FTE was not defined in the next period (other), e.g. due to panel attrition or
missing values. Around 60% of establishments remained in the treatment group.
Concerning the 1999 reform, we observe a lower share of establishments which
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stay in the treatment group in the pre-reform period compared to the post-reform
period. This is also true for the 2004 reform. If selection is the reason, for example,
this could be explained by establishments which aim to avoid EPLP by decreasing
FTEs after the reform and by establishments which avoided EPLP prior to the
1999 reform but grow now. As already mentioned, however, threshold effects were
not confirmed for Germany (e.g. Ko¨lling et al., 2001; Bauer et al., 2007).
Table 2.4: Do firms with 6-10 FTEs change FTEs over time?
Reform 1999
t+1 <6 t+1 6-10 t+1 >10 other Total
1997 15.95 56.98 14.81 12.25 100.00
1998 16.93 53.94 12.47 16.67 100.00
1999 14.65 62.67 12.24 10.44 100.00
2000 17.08 58.69 11.62 12.62 100.00
2001 15.30 58.18 10.72 15.80 100.00
Total 15.99 58.25 12.04 13.72 100.00
Reform 2004
t+1 <6 t+1 6-10 t+1 >10 other Total
2002 12.73 56.61 10.34 20.31 100.00
2003 12.37 62.37 12.15 13.10 100.00
2004 15.47 62.29 11.06 11.18 100.00
2005 16.57 60.99 10.10 12.35 100.00
2006 10.53 66.46 11.22 11.79 100.00
Total 13.56 61.76 10.99 13.68 100.00
Note: Share of establishments which remained in the category
of 6 to 10 FTEs (t+1 6-10), decreased FTEs below 6 (t+1 <6),
increased FTEs above 10 (t+1 > 10), and the share of establish-
ments in which FTE was not defined in the next period (other).
Establishments from 1997-2001 or 2002-2006 of non-public sectors
with 6-12 FTEits, TGit and excluding outliers (share of train-
ees) and no missing values in model relevant variables (estimation
sample). Source: Own calculation based on IAB EP.
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2.5.2 Difference-in-difference results
Main results
The main result is that the almost perfectly symmetric increase in 1999 and de-
crease in 2004 in EPLP have symmetric effects on the share of fixed-term employ-
ment in terms of sign, but they have asymmetric effects in terms of economic and
statistical significance.28 The direction of the effects is as expected. The increase
in EPLP in 1999 increased the share of fixed-term contract workers significantly,
both statistically and economically. The effect of the decrease in EPLP in 2004
was less economically and statistically significant. Table 2.5 presents the reform ef-
fects of the standard specification (β3) - the interaction between treatment group
dummy and reform dummy. Table 2.6 presents the dynamic specification with
pre-reform effects and post-reform dynamics.
Standard DID specification
The increase in EPLP in 1999 gave rise to the share of fixed-term workers by 1.73
percentage points in the post-reform period compared to the pre-reform period
(Table 2.5, column 1). This is similar to Centeno and Novo (2012) who also
employ within-country subgroup and time variation in EPLP. They found that
EPLP increased fixed-term employment by 1.6 percentage points. The increase in
Table 2.5 is not only statistically but also economically significant. The share of
fixed-term workers in the estimation sample is 3%, thus, an increase of 58% of the
mean.
In order to disentangle the effect of EPLP on the share of fixed-term workers
(ShFTC), we estimate the effect of the EPLP reforms on the number of employees
(column 2, E) as well as on the number of fixed-term workers (column 3, FTC).
The effect on ShFTC seems to be driven by FTC. The policy coefficient for
the total number of employees (0.6% of employees) is economically less significant
compared to the effect on the number of fixed-term workers (58% of the mean).
They are, however, not statistically significant. The policy coefficient for the binary
decision to employ any fixed-term worker and for the share of fixed-term workers
28Full models are presented in Appendix 2.7.3.
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Table 2.5: EPLP effect on fixed-term work
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ShFTC E FTC Any FTC ShFTC if > 0
Reform 1999
Reform x Treat 0.0173∗∗ 0.0595 0.169 0.0400 0.0811
(2.00) (0.53) (1.44) (1.21) (1.62)
N 6190 6190 6190 6190 915
R2 0.031 0.487 0.027 0.021 0.092
Mean yit 0.03 9.87 0.29 0.13 0.24
Reform 2004
Reform x Treat -0.00447 0.133∗ -0.160∗ -0.00103 -0.0185
(-0.79) (1.95) (-1.93) (-0.04) (-0.78)
N 10490 10490 10490 10490 2037
R2 0.014 0.411 0.023 0.013 0.037
Mean yit 0.04 10.44 0.41 0.17 0.22
Note: Fixed effect estimators with clustered standard errors; Dependent variables: share of
fixed-term workers (ShFTC), establishment employs any fixed-term worker (Any FTC),
ShFTC in establishments which employ at least one fixed-term worker (ShFTC if > 0),
number of employees (E), number of fixed-term employees (FTC); Controls: TG dummy,
reform dummies, share of low qualified, high qualified, part-time workers, female workers and
trainees, branch and federal state dummies; Establishments from 1997-2001 or 2002-2006 of
non-public sectors with 6-12 FTEits, TGit and excluding outliers (share of trainees) and no
missing values in model relevant variables (estimation sample); t statistics in parentheses; ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2.6: EPLP effect on fixed-term work
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ShFTC E FTC Any FTC ShFTC if > 0
Reform 1999
Reform[t-1] x Treat -0.00313 0.00816 -0.141 -0.0404 0.0437
(-0.25) (0.06) (-1.01) (-0.80) (0.86)
Reform x Treat 0.0325∗∗ -0.0151 0.304∗ 0.0948∗∗ 0.0958
(2.48) (-0.11) (1.66) (2.10) (1.32)
Reform[t+1] x Treat -0.0230∗∗∗ 0.118 -0.128 -0.0630∗ -0.0488
(-2.79) (0.97) (-0.92) (-1.72) (-1.01)
N 6190 6190 6190 6190 915
R2 0.033 0.487 0.028 0.022 0.098
Mean yit 0.03 9.87 0.29 0.13 0.24
Reform 2004
Reform[t-1] x Treat 0.0108 0.104 0.115 0.0299 0.0496
(1.23) (1.02) (1.05) (0.93) (1.54)
Reform x Treat -0.0128∗ 0.100 -0.258∗∗ -0.0143 -0.0448
(-1.66) (1.29) (-2.26) (-0.47) (-1.40)
Reform[t+1] x Treat 0.00690 -0.0135 0.0889 0.00249 0.0164
(1.03) (-0.19) (0.89) (0.10) (0.57)
N 10490 10490 10490 10490 2037
R2 0.014 0.411 0.024 0.013 0.041
Mean yit 0.04 10.44 0.41 0.17 0.22
Note: Fixed effect estimators with clustered standard errors; Dependent variables: share of
fixed-term workers (ShFTC), establishment employs any fixed-term worker (Any FTC),
ShFTC in establishments which employ at least one fixed-term worker (ShFTC if > 0),
number of employees (E), number of fixed-term employees (FTC); Controls: TG dummy,
reform dummies, share of low qualified, high qualified, part-time workers, female workers and
trainees, branch and federal state dummies; Establishments from 1997-2001 or 2002-2006 of
non-public sectors with 6-12 FTEits, TGit and excluding outliers (share of trainees) and no
missing values in model relevant variables (estimation sample); t statistics in parentheses; ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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in establishments with at least one fixed-term worker is positive but not significant
in statistical terms.
The decrease in EPLP in 2004 had no statistically significant effect on ShFTC
(Table 2.5). Also, the economic significance is less strong compared to the 1999
reform: The policy coefficient is only around 11% of the mean (compared to 58%
of the mean in 1999). The number of fixed-term workers decreased by 0.16, which
is 39% of the mean. This is less significant in economic terms compared to the
1999 reform (58% of the mean). At the same time, employment increased, but
only by 1% of the mean which is economically less relevant. All other coefficients
are negative but not significant.
Dynamic specification
The dynamic specification is presented in Table 2.6. For the 1999 reform, the
EPLP effect in the year of the reform is quite substantial for the share of fixed-
term workers. When EPLP increased, establishments employed significantly more
fixed-term employees (3.25 percentage points), which is also significant in economic
terms (108% of the mean). This is again due to the increase in the total number
of fixed-term workers (0.304 persons), which is significant statistically and eco-
nomically (105% of the mean). Furthermore, it was 9.48 percentage points more
likely that an establishment employed any fixed-term worker six months after the
reform than in the pre-reform year. The increase in EPLP does not seem to have
affected the share of fixed-term workers in establishments employing at least one
fixed-term worker. The effect is positive but not significant. As the number of
observations is quite small, however, the standard errors are quite high.
Effects on the share of fixed-term workers and on the propensity to employ at
least one fixed-term worker, however, decrease 1.5 years after EPLP increased. In
comparison to six months after the reform, the share of fixed-term employment
increased by 2.3 percentage points. This could be explained by fixed-term employ-
ment being used as a screening device. In this case, after the increase in EPLP,
establishments hire fixed-term workers rather than permanent workers. Then after
one year, they transform the fixed-term contract into a permanent contract if the
match quality is good.
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The decline in EPLP in 2004 (lower panel) decreased the share of fixed-term
employment six months after the reform significantly by 1.28 percentage points
compared to the previous year. This is a decrease by 32% of the mean, which
is much smaller compared to the 108% from the 1999 reform. The effect of the
decrease in EPLP on the share of fixed-term workers is driven by the decrease in
the total number of fixed-term workers: They increased by 0.258 persons, which is
63%. The effect in 1999 was economically more significant (105% of the mean), but
the total number of employees is not significantly affected. Similar to the standard
DID specification, the propensity to employ any fixed-term worker as well as the
share of fixed-term workers in establishments with at least one fixed-term worker
do not show any significant effects. The effect on the share of fixed-term workers
does not fade.
Symmetry of reforms
Overall, we consider the reforms to be almost perfectly symmetric. We discuss,
however, potential challenges, which are shown to be less relevant for our main
conclusion on the asymmetric effects of EPLP reforms. First, concerning parallel
reforms, we chose a small neighborhood in order to avoid very different estab-
lishments and violations of the common trend assumption. Therefore, we do not
expect that parallel reforms are crucial in our case. Furthermore, if the reforms
would be relevant, the main conclusion of asymmetry would be not affected. In
2001, liberalizing reforms of fixed-term employment took place. Thus, if large es-
tablishments have in general more positive trends in the share of FTCs, the reform
could had have strengthened the trend difference. In such a case, we would actu-
ally underestimate the positive effect of the increase in EPLP on the fixed-term
employment.
In 2004, fixed-term work was liberalized parallel to the EPLP reform. One
could argue again that large establishments employ more fixed-term workers and
that reforms might result in a more positive trend in fixed-term employment for the
control group. In this case, the small negative effect of the EPLP increase in 2004
would again be overestimated in absolute terms. To summarize, the two reforms
would result in an underestimation of the asymmetry of the effects. Therefore, our
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main conclusion concerning the asymmetry is still valid even if parallel reforms
were relevant.
Second, EPLP reforms might have negligible effects in economic downturns as
firms might stop to hire new workers. Although the second reform in 2004 took
place in a period of an economic downturn, firms hired in both reform periods
workers. Firms with 6-10 (11-12) FTEs hired, on average, 0.6 (0.7) persons in the
first half of each year between 1997-2001 and 0.9 (1.07) persons between 2002-
2006.29 Thus, the economic conditions on the establishment is considered to be
not problematic in our case.
Robustness
Larger control group size
We diverge now from the DID in a regression discontinuity design, by increasing the
neighborhood for the control group. Establishments are defined to be in the control
group if they employ 11 to 15 FTEs rather than 11 to 12 FTEs. The signs of the
policy effects on the share of fixed-term employment, however, are as expected,
and the asymmetric effects in terms of statistical and economic significance are
confirmed. This is, specifically, the case in the dynamic specification (Table 2.8).
After the increase in EPLP in 1999, establishments employed significantly 2.08
percentage points more fixed-term contract workers, while the decrease in EPLP
in 2004 did not result in a significant decrease. Furthermore, the policy effect on
the number and share of fixed-term workers of the increase in EPLP is economically
more relevant (69% versus 10% and 44% versus 12%), which is also true for the
standard DID specification of the share of fixed-term workers (19% versus 2% of
the mean).
In the standard DID specification, no policy effect on the share and number of
fixed-term contracts for the 1999 reform is significant (Table 2.7). This, however, is
consistent with a negative pre-reform trend difference in the share and the number
of fixed-term contract workers (Table 2.8). The trend in the share of fixed-term
contract workers in the control group seems to be more strongly positive, which
is supported by a stronger unconditional trend for establishments with 13 to 15
29Source: Own calculation based on IAB EP. Annual data are not available.
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Table 2.7: EPLP effect on fixed-term work: larger control group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ShFTC E FTC Any FTC ShFTC if > 0
Reform 1999
Reform x Treat 0.00572 -0.000549 -0.0529 0.0241 -0.0108
(0.90) (-0.01) (-0.56) (0.98) (-0.33)
N 7907 7907 7907 7907 1302
R2 0.025 0.536 0.026 0.023 0.148
Mean yit 0.03 10.01 0.33 0.14 0.23
Reform 2004
Reform x Treat 0.000602 0.130∗ -0.0159 -0.0141 0.0101
(0.15) (1.94) (-0.24) (-0.87) (0.63)
R2 0.011 0.452 0.024 0.011 0.036
N 13057 13057 13057 13057 2707
R2 0.011 0.452 0.024 0.011 0.036
Mean yit 0.04 10.00 0.46 0.18 0.21
Note: Fixed effect estimators with clustered standard errors; Dependent variables: share of
fixed-term workers (ShFTC), establishment employs any fixed-term worker (Any FTC),
ShFTC in establishments which employ at least one fixed-term worker (ShFTC if > 0),
number of employees (E), number of fixed-term employees (FTC); Controls: TG dummy,
reform dummies, share of low qualified, high qualified, part-time workers, female workers and
trainees, branch and federal state dummies; Establishments from 1997-2001 or 2002-2006
of non-public sectors with 6-15 FTEits (TGit) excluding outliers (share of trainees) and no
missing values in model relevant variables (estimation sample); t statistics in parentheses; ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2.8: EPLP effect on fixed-term work: larger control group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ShFTC E FTC Any FTC ShFTC if > 0
Reform 1999
Reform[t-1] x Treat -0.0151 0.131 -0.359∗∗ -0.0330 -0.0117
(-1.57) (1.06) (-2.46) (-0.94) (-0.25)
Reform x Treat 0.0208∗∗ -0.0162 0.144 0.0695∗∗ -0.00524
(2.44) (-0.14) (1.23) (2.11) (-0.14)
Reform[t+1] x Treat -0.0154∗∗ -0.0672 -0.0840 -0.0553∗∗ -0.00409
(-2.30) (-0.65) (-0.84) (-2.02) (-0.14)
N 7907 7907 7907 7907 1302
R2 0.028 0.536 0.029 0.024 0.148
Mean yit 0.03 10.01 0.33 0.14 0.23
Reform 2004
Reform[t-1] x Treat 0.00311 0.0405 -0.0298 0.00403 0.00248
(0.57) (0.46) (-0.38) (0.19) (0.12)
Reform x Treat -0.00385 0.109 -0.0555 -0.0229 -0.00268
(-0.78) (1.48) (-0.68) (-1.10) (-0.14)
Reform[t+1] x Treat 0.00546 0.00823 0.0880 0.0122 0.0206
(1.20) (0.12) (1.26) (0.63) (1.29)
N 13057 13057 13057 13057 2707
R2 0.011 0.452 0.025 0.011 0.038
Mean yit 0.04 10.00 0.46 0.18 0.21
Note: Fixed effect estimators with clustered standard errors; Dependent variables: share of
fixed-term workers (ShFTC), establishment employs any fixed-term worker (Any FTC),
ShFTC in establishments which employ at least one fixed-term worker (ShFTC if > 0),
number of employees (E), number of fixed-term employees (FTC); Controls: TG dummy,
reform dummies, share of low qualified, high qualified, part-time workers, female workers and
trainees, branch and federal state dummies; Establishments from 1997-2001 or 2002-2006
of non-public sectors with 6-15 FTEits (TGit) excluding outliers (share of trainees) and no
missing values in model relevant variables (estimation sample); t statistics in parentheses; ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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FTEs compared to 11 to 12 FTEs. These results show that a small neighborhood
is an important feature in our case with establishment-level data.
Time invariant TGi
In order to check whether dynamics endogenous to the reforms play a funda-
mental role, the time invariant definition of the treatment group dummy (TGi)
is employed. Such a test is also conducted by, e.g., Centeno and Novo (2012).30
For this purpose, the sample is restricted to establishments with 6-12 FTEs in the
year prior to the reform. Overall, the direction of the effects of EPLP reforms is as
expected, and the asymmetry is confirmed in the dynamic specification again. The
share of fixed-term contract workers increased significantly by 2 percentage points
after the increase in EPLP in 1999, which is 67% of the mean (Table 2.10) and
statistically and economically stronger compared to the decrease in EPLP in 2004
(not significant and 33% of the mean). This picture is repeated for the number
of fixed-term contract workers (114% of the mean (significant) versus 38% of the
mean (not significant)). Hence, selection induced by the reforms might not play a
fundamental role for the dynamic specification.
The effects in the standard DID specification (Table 2.9) are as expected in
terms of the sign of the policy effects, but they do not confirm the asymmetry.
This is due to a negative pre-reform effect in the sample for the 1999 reform (Table
2.10). Prior to the increase in EPLP in 1999, establishments which employed 6-10
FTEs in 1998 decreased the share in fixed-term workers in relation to the control
group. Anticipation could explain this because, before the reform, establishments
might have tried to stay below 11 FTEs in order to circumvent EPLP but then
grow after expecting the reform to begin. Threshold effects on employment could,
however, not be confirmed (Ko¨lling et al., 2001; Verick, 2004; Bauer et al., 2007).
Overall, we prefer the estimation sample with the time-variant treatment group
dummy as the common trend assumption seems to be better met.
30Pleas see Section 2.4.2.
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Table 2.9: EPLP effect on fixed-term work: time invariant TGi
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ShFTC E FTC Any FTC ShFTC if > 0
Reform 1999
Reform x Treat 0.00361 0.829∗ 0.133 0.00705 -0.0193
(0.43) (1.74) (0.80) (0.24) (-0.66)
N 3643 3643 3643 3643 552
R2 0.028 0.140 0.012 0.018 0.163
Mean yit 0.03 9.93 0.25 0.11 0.24
Reform 2004
Reform x Treat -0.00879 0.721 -0.202∗ -0.0181 -0.0138
(-1.55) (1.35) (-1.66) (-0.83) (-0.61)
N 8623 8623 8623 8623 1595
R2 0.010 0.058 0.014 0.011 0.029
Mean yit 0.03 10.32 0.36 0.16 0.20
Note: Fixed effect estimators with clustered standard errors; Dependent variables: share of
fixed-term workers (ShFTC), establishment employs any fixed-term worker (Any FTC),
ShFTC in establishments which employ at least one fixed-term worker (ShFTC if > 0),
number of employees (E), number of fixed-term employees (FTC); Controls: TG dummy,
reform dummies, share of low qualified, high qualified, part-time workers, female workers
and trainees, branch and federal state dummies; Sample is restricted to establishments
observed in the year before the reform either in the control or in the treatment group;
Time invariant TGi: TG is kept constant based on the observation in the year before the
reform; Establishments from 1997-2001 or 2002-2006 of non-public sectors excluding outliers
(share of trainees) and no missing values in model relevant variables (estimation sample); t
statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2.10: EPLP effect on fixed-term work: time invariant TGi
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ShFTC E FTC Any FTC ShFTC if > 0
Reform 1999
Reform[t-1] x Treat -0.0189∗ 0.968 -0.0616 -0.0711∗ -0.0389
(-1.74) (1.51) (-0.17) (-1.71) (-0.71)
Reform x Treat 0.0200∗∗ 0.528 0.284∗ 0.0553 0.0234
(2.03) (1.42) (1.90) (1.39) (0.57)
Reform[t+1] x Treat -0.0153 -0.174 -0.222 -0.0336 -0.0668
(-1.23) (-0.32) (-1.05) (-0.92) (-1.12)
N 3643 3643 3643 3643 552
R2 0.030 0.142 0.013 0.020 0.172
Mean yit 0.03 9.93 0.25 0.11 0.24
Reform 2004
Reform[t-1] x Treat -0.00183 0.839 -0.188 0.0355 -0.0331
(-0.28) (1.13) (-1.17) (1.35) (-1.19)
Reform x Treat -0.0100 0.506 -0.138 -0.0401 -0.00436
(-1.50) (1.50) (-1.27) (-1.49) (-0.20)
Reform[t+1] x Treat 0.00332 -0.214 0.0211 0.0128 0.00681
(0.50) (-1.03) (0.22) (0.52) (0.27)
N 8623 8623 8623 8623 1595
R2 0.010 0.059 0.014 0.011 0.031
Mean yit 0.03 10.32 0.36 0.16 0.20
Note: Fixed effect estimators with clustered standard errors; Dependent variables: share of
fixed-term workers (ShFTC), establishment employs any fixed-term worker (Any FTC),
ShFTC in establishments which employ at least one fixed-term worker (ShFTC if > 0),
number of employees (E), number of fixed-term employees (FTC); Controls: TG dummy,
reform dummies, share of low qualified, high qualified, part-time workers, female workers
and trainees, branch and federal state dummies; Sample is restricted to establishments
observed in the year before the reform either in the control or in the treatment group;
Time invariant TGi: TG is kept constant based on the observation in the year before the
reform; Establishments from 1997-2001 or 2002-2006 of non-public sectors excluding outliers
(share of trainees) and no missing values in model relevant variables (estimation sample); t
statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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2.6 Conclusion and discussion
This paper studies for the first time wether the impact of an almost perfectly
symmetric increase and decrease in employment protection legislation for perman-
ent workers (EPLP) has a symmetric effect on the share of fixed-term contract
workers at the establishment-level. The particular structure of reforms in Ger-
man EPLP offer the unique opportunity to evaluate an increase and a decrease in
EPLP in a quasi-experimental approach. Reforms in Germany increased EPLP in
1999 and then decreased EPLP in 2004 for small establishments almost perfectly
symmetric, while large establishments were not affected. Therefore, a difference-in-
difference approach in a regression discontinuity design based on within-country
time and subgroup variation can be employed. We account for observable and
time-invariant unobservable establishment characteristics. Pre-reform trend tests
support the common trend assumption for our main results.
The main result is that the effect of the EPLP reforms on the share of fixed-
term workers is symmetric in its sign but asymmetric with regard to its economical
and statistical significance. The direction of the EPLP effects is as expected and
is in line with Cahuc et al. (2012) and (Boeri, 2011). The share of fixed-term
workers increased by 1.7 percentage points (58% of the mean) due to the increase
in EPLP in 1999, while the decrease of EPLP in 2004 had no significant effect. In
the dynamic specification, this asymmetric pattern is repeated. The increase in
EPLP in 1999 increased the share of fixed-term contract workers by 3 percentage
points 6 months after the reform (108% of the mean), while the decrease in EPLP
in 2004 decreased the share by only 1.3% (32% of the mean). Concerning the
1999 reform, the effect decreased by 2 percentage points, which might be due to
fixed-term contracts being used as a screening device. The effect on the share
of fixed-term workers can be explained by changes in the number of fixed-term
workers. The asymmetry of the increase and decrease in EPLP is relatively robust
to different definitions of the treatment group dummy and to larger control groups.
The asymmetry might contribute to explain why empirical studies which as-
sume symmetry do not find a robust relation between EPLP and temporary em-
ployment. Further research can built upon these findings. The potential mech-
anism, for instance, remains subject to future research. Potential explanations
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for the asymmetry could be that employing permanent workers is not beneficial
compared to employing temporary workers, or that the reform sequence (decrease,
increase, decrease) plays a role. Finally, the magnitude of the asymmetry requires
further research, too. For instance, the magnitude might depend on the share of
incumbents affected by an increase in EPLP.
This study provides new insights into the symmetry of EPLP effects. Up
to now, there has been no paper which has investigated whether symmetric in-
creases and decreases in EPLP have symmetric effects. There are studies em-
ploying within-country time and subgroup variation which already showed that an
increase in EPLP has a substantial effect on the share of fixed-term employment at
the establishment-level. For policy purposes, however, it is highly relevant whether
reforms which increase EPLP have similar effects as reforms that decrease EPLP
on the share of fixed-term employment because decreasing EPLP is often advoc-
ated as a tool to decrease temporary employment in labor markets. We showed,
however, that the effect of an almost perfectly symmetric increase and decrease
in EPLP was asymmetric in its magnitude. Hence, reforms which revoke previous
increases in EPLP do not necessarily have similarly strong effects on the share of
fixed-term work at the establishment-level. This should be considered by policy
makers when liberalizing EPLP.
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2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Definition of fixed-term employment variables
Table 2.11: Definition of fixed-term employment variables
yit Definition IAB EP Question
Number of em-
ployees (E)
E E: ”How many persons, categorized according
to the employment groups listed, were employed
by this establishment/office on 30 June 1999
[...]? Employees liable to social security (Work-
ers and employees, Trainees/ apprentices), Em-
ployees not liable to social security (Civil ser-
vants incl. candidates for civil service, Working
Proprietors and unpaid family workers), Others
(E.g. marginal part time workers, 630 DM job
holders)”
Number of
fixed-term
employees
(FTC)
FTC FTC: ”Does the total number of employees
mentioned in Question 47 also include [...] b.
Fixed-term employment? [...] If so, please indic-
ate the total number of fixed-term employment
[...]”
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2.7.2 Definition of full-time equivalents
The weighting key for part-time workers changed with the reform of German EPLP
in October 1996 and January 1999. Table 2.12 shows that the part-time worker
weights after the reform in 1999 (FTE1999) are smaller compared to those after
the reform in 1996 (FTE1996). Hence, establishments’ FTEs decreased after the
reform even when regular part-time and full-time workers remained the same.
Therefore, the time-variant treatment group dummy (TGit) for the 1999 reform is
defined to be 1 if an establishment employs between 6 FTE1999 and 10 FTE1996
and 0 if an establishment employs 11 or 12 FTE1996. If we would employ FTE1999
for the threshold at 10 FTEs, the control group would include establishments which
actually faced a change in EPLP.
Table 2.12: Full-time equivalent workers (FTEs)
German EPLP Chosen weights
FTE1996
(since 1.10.1996)
Weights:
WH < 11 − > 0,25
WH < 20 − > 0,5
WH < 30 − > 0,75
WH > 29 − > 1
Weights:
part-time workers − > 0,5
full-time workers − > 1
FTE1999
(since 1.1.1999)
Weights:
WH < 11 − > 0
WH < 20 − > 0,5
WH < 30 − > 0,75
WH > 29 − > 1
Weights:
part-time workers − > 0,436
full-time workers − > 1
Note: WH is working hours.
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2.7.3 Full models
Table 2.13: EPLP effect on fixed-term work (Reform 1999)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ShFTC E FTC Any FTC ShFTC if > 0
Reform x Treat 0.0173∗∗ 0.0595 0.169 0.0400 0.0811
(2.00) (0.53) (1.44) (1.21) (1.62)
TG -0.0121 -2.902∗∗∗ -0.312∗∗∗ -0.0560∗ -0.00647
(-1.30) (-25.71) (-2.75) (-1.83) (-0.18)
Low Qualified (%) 0.00902 3.905∗∗∗ 0.112 0.134 0.126
(0.25) (6.46) (0.29) (1.10) (0.75)
High Qualified (%) 0.0230 3.679∗∗∗ 0.291 0.150 0.179
(0.76) (6.22) (0.92) (1.31) (1.16)
Part-Time (%) 0.0107 5.017∗∗∗ 0.529 0.0811 -0.00976
(0.73) (14.66) (1.53) (1.35) (-0.15)
Women (%) 0.00659 -0.271 0.110 -0.0119 -0.0731
(0.33) (-1.06) (0.55) (-0.21) (-0.40)
Trainees (%) -0.0816 11.50∗∗∗ -0.415 -0.107 -0.152
(-1.53) (14.27) (-0.85) (-0.64) (-0.48)
Public Trainees (%) 0.0500 2.455∗∗ 0.948∗ 0.147
(1.10) (2.16) (1.79) (0.55)
Year -0.000218 -0.0539∗ -0.00844 -0.00151 -0.00391
(-0.10) (-1.90) (-0.28) (-0.18) (-0.32)
1997 (reference)
1998 0.0134∗∗∗ 0.0817 0.137∗∗∗ 0.0527∗∗∗ 0.0553∗∗
(2.93) (1.41) (2.66) (2.97) (2.42)
1999 0.00835∗ 0.0219 0.0841 0.0311∗ -0.00235
(1.68) (0.33) (1.24) (1.67) (-0.08)
2000 0.000216 0.0321 -0.00604 -0.00823 -0.00310
(0.06) (0.72) (-0.15) (-0.63) (-0.18)
Constant 0.311 116.5∗∗ 16.11 2.901 7.876
(0.07) (2.05) (0.27) (0.17) (0.32)
Branch Dummies yes yes yes yes yes
State Dummies yes yes yes yes yes
N 6190 6190 6190 6190 915
R2 0.031 0.487 0.027 0.021 0.092
Note: Fixed effect estimators with clustered standard errors; Dependent variables: share of fixed-
term workers (ShFTC), establishment employs any fixed-term worker (Any FTC), ShFTC in es-
tablishments which employ at least one fixed-term worker (ShFTC if > 0), number of employees
(E), number of fixed-term employees (FTC); Controls: TG dummy, reform dummies, share of low
qualified, high qualified, part-time workers, female workers and trainees, branch and federal state
dummies; Establishments from 1997-2001 or 2002-2006 of non-public sectors with 6-12 FTEits,
TGit and excluding outliers (share of trainees) and no missing values in model relevant variables
(estimation sample); t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2.14: EPLP effect on fixed-term work (Reform 2004)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ShFTC E FTC Any FTC ShFTC if > 0
Reform x Treat -0.00447 0.133∗ -0.160∗ -0.00103 -0.0185
(-0.79) (1.95) (-1.93) (-0.04) (-0.78)
TG -0.00206 -2.487∗∗∗ -0.157∗∗ -0.0243 -0.0147
(-0.41) (-32.89) (-2.35) (-1.14) (-0.71)
Low Qualified (%) 0.0860∗∗∗ 5.213∗∗∗ 0.994∗∗∗ 0.247∗∗∗ 0.188∗
(3.18) (10.85) (3.01) (2.60) (1.85)
High Qualified (%) 0.0850∗∗∗ 4.796∗∗∗ 0.975∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗ 0.191∗
(3.20) (10.16) (3.13) (2.15) (1.82)
Part-Time (%) 0.0149 4.402∗∗∗ 0.810∗∗∗ 0.0524 0.0144
(1.23) (17.64) (3.22) (1.17) (0.37)
Women (%) 0.0182 -0.196 0.212 0.0210 0.0290
(1.47) (-0.98) (1.43) (0.46) (0.48)
Trainees (%) 0.0203 13.19∗∗∗ 0.723∗ 0.0445 -0.168
(0.57) (22.44) (1.81) (0.30) (-1.10)
Public Trainees (%) 0.0513 13.97∗∗∗ 1.144∗∗ -0.104 -0.170
(0.89) (7.44) (2.15) (-0.32) (-1.07)
Year 0.00109 -0.0714∗∗∗ 0.0343 0.000839 0.00175
(0.70) (-3.91) (1.55) (0.14) (0.28)
2002 (reference)
2003 0.000768 -0.0587∗ -0.00184 0.0222∗∗ -0.0152
(0.28) (-1.68) (-0.06) (2.07) (-1.28)
2004 0.00538 -0.0790∗ 0.138∗∗ 0.0277∗ 0.00574
(1.41) (-1.79) (2.47) (1.92) (0.36)
2005 0.00619∗∗ -0.0952∗∗∗ 0.0752∗∗ 0.0331∗∗∗ -0.00939
(2.30) (-2.82) (2.14) (2.98) (-0.80)
Constant -2.263 149.1∗∗∗ -69.59 -1.743 -3.571
(-0.73) (4.07) (-1.57) (-0.14) (-0.29)
Branch Dummies yes yes yes yes yes
State Dummies yes yes yes yes yes
N 10490 10490 10490 10490 2037
R2 0.014 0.411 0.023 0.013 0.037
Note: Fixed effect estimators with clustered standard errors; Dependent variables: share of fixed-
term workers (ShFTC), establishment employs any fixed-term worker (Any FTC), ShFTC in es-
tablishments which employ at least one fixed-term worker (ShFTC if > 0), number of employees
(E), number of fixed-term employees (FTC); Controls: TG dummy, reform dummies, share of low
qualified, high qualified, part-time workers, female workers and trainees, branch and federal state
dummies; Establishments from 1997-2001 or 2002-2006 of non-public sectors with 6-12 FTEits,
TGit and excluding outliers (share of trainees) and no missing values in model relevant variables
(estimation sample); t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2.15: EPLP effect on fixed-term work (Reform 1999): dynamic specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ShFTC E FTC Any FTC ShFTC if > 0
Reform[t-1] x Treat -0.00313 0.00816 -0.141 -0.0404 0.0437
(-0.25) (0.06) (-1.01) (-0.80) (0.86)
Reform x Treat 0.0325∗∗ -0.0151 0.304∗ 0.0948∗∗ 0.0958
(2.48) (-0.11) (1.66) (2.10) (1.32)
Reform[t+1] x Treat -0.0230∗∗∗ 0.118 -0.128 -0.0630∗ -0.0488
(-2.79) (0.97) (-0.92) (-1.72) (-1.01)
TG -0.00888 -2.914∗∗∗ -0.222∗ -0.0288 -0.0396
(-0.87) (-20.05) (-1.79) (-0.69) (-0.80)
Low Qualified (%) 0.00909 3.904∗∗∗ 0.108 0.133 0.114
(0.25) (6.46) (0.28) (1.09) (0.63)
High Qualified (%) 0.0230 3.679∗∗∗ 0.282 0.148 0.165
(0.76) (6.21) (0.90) (1.29) (1.01)
Part-Time (%) 0.0103 5.019∗∗∗ 0.532 0.0812 -0.0110
(0.70) (14.66) (1.52) (1.35) (-0.17)
Women (%) 0.00695 -0.274 0.105 -0.0128 -0.0640
(0.34) (-1.07) (0.53) (-0.23) (-0.36)
Trainee (%) -0.0819 11.50∗∗∗ -0.428 -0.111 -0.133
(-1.54) (14.27) (-0.88) (-0.66) (-0.42)
Public Trainee (%) 0.0364 2.526∗∗ 0.890 0.115
(0.76) (2.23) (1.59) (0.42)
Year 0.00208 -0.0648∗ 0.0193 0.00864 -0.00586
(0.89) (-1.83) (0.61) (0.82) (-0.57)
1997 (reference)
1998 0.0137 0.0856 0.225∗ 0.0758∗ 0.0220
(1.34) (0.78) (1.85) (1.83) (0.57)
1999 -0.00630 0.0988 0.0328 -0.00131 -0.0463
(-0.90) (0.92) (0.25) (-0.04) (-0.98)
2000 0.00227 0.0225 0.0200 0.00116 -0.00604
(0.62) (0.47) (0.52) (0.08) (-0.35)
Constant -4.289 138.2∗ -39.34 -17.39 11.88
(-0.91) (1.95) (-0.62) (-0.82) (0.58)
Branch Dummies yes yes yes yes yes
State Dummies yes yes yes yes yes
N 6190 6190 6190 6190 915
R2 0.033 0.487 0.028 0.022 0.098
Note: Fixed effect estimators with clustered standard errors; Dependent variables: share of fixed-
term workers (ShFTC), establishment employs any fixed-term worker (Any FTC), ShFTC in es-
tablishments which employ at least one fixed-term worker (ShFTC if > 0), number of employees
(E), number of fixed-term employees (FTC); Controls: TG dummy, reform dummies, share of low
qualified, high qualified, part-time workers, female workers and trainees, branch and federal state
dummies; Establishments from 1997-2001 or 2002-2006 of non-public sectors with 6-12 FTEits,
TGit and excluding outliers (share of trainees) and no missing values in model relevant variables
(estimation sample); t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2.16: EPLP effect on fixed-term work (Reform 2004): dynamic specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ShFTC E FTC Any FTC ShFTC if > 0
Reform[t-1] x Treat 0.0108 0.104 0.115 0.0299 0.0496
(1.23) (1.02) (1.05) (0.93) (1.54)
Reform x Treat -0.0128∗ 0.100 -0.258∗∗ -0.0143 -0.0448
(-1.66) (1.29) (-2.26) (-0.47) (-1.40)
Reform[t+1] x Treat 0.00690 -0.0135 0.0889 0.00249 0.0164
(1.03) (-0.19) (0.89) (0.10) (0.57)
TG -0.00845 -2.547∗∗∗ -0.225∗∗ -0.0416 -0.0460
(-1.06) (-24.83) (-2.19) (-1.46) (-1.42)
Low Qualified (%) 0.0855∗∗∗ 5.209∗∗∗ 0.989∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ 0.194∗
(3.17) (10.84) (2.99) (2.59) (1.90)
High Qualified (%) 0.0847∗∗∗ 4.793∗∗∗ 0.971∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗ 0.195∗
(3.19) (10.15) (3.13) (2.14) (1.84)
Part-Time (%) 0.0145 4.402∗∗∗ 0.806∗∗∗ 0.0520 0.0141
(1.19) (17.64) (3.20) (1.16) (0.37)
Women (%) 0.0188 -0.193 0.218 0.0221 0.0326
(1.51) (-0.97) (1.48) (0.48) (0.54)
Trainees (%) 0.0205 13.19∗∗∗ 0.725∗ 0.0443 -0.161
(0.58) (22.43) (1.81) (0.30) (-1.05)
Public Trainees (%) 0.0504 13.97∗∗∗ 1.133∗∗ -0.105 -0.164
(0.87) (7.45) (2.13) (-0.32) (-1.03)
Year -0.000823 -0.0831∗∗∗ 0.0126 -0.00306 -0.00620
(-0.40) (-3.42) (0.44) (-0.40) (-0.78)
2002 (reference)
2003 -0.00611 -0.132∗ -0.0739 0.00176 -0.0463∗∗
(-0.96) (-1.77) (-0.91) (0.07) (-1.98)
2004 0.00713 -0.114∗ 0.166 0.0219 0.00244
(1.05) (-1.68) (1.56) (0.88) (0.08)
2005 0.00429 -0.107∗∗∗ 0.0536 0.0292∗∗ -0.0172
(1.43) (-2.86) (1.37) (2.43) (-1.37)
Constant 1.546 172.8∗∗∗ -26.37 5.869 12.45
(0.37) (3.55) (-0.46) (0.38) (0.78)
Branch Dummies yes yes yes yes yes
State Dummies yes yes yes yes yes
N 10490 10490 10490 10490 2037
R2 0.014 0.411 0.024 0.013 0.041
Note: Fixed effect estimators with clustered standard errors; Dependent variables: share of fixed-
term workers (ShFTC), establishment employs any fixed-term worker (Any FTC), ShFTC in es-
tablishments which employ at least one fixed-term worker (ShFTC if > 0), number of employees
(E), number of fixed-term employees (FTC); Controls: TG dummy, reform dummies, share of low
qualified, high qualified, part-time workers, female workers and trainees, branch and federal state
dummies; Establishments from 1997-2001 or 2002-2006 of non-public sectors with 6-12 FTEits,
TGit and excluding outliers (share of trainees) and no missing values in model relevant variables
(estimation sample); t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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2.7.4 Robustness: outliers and temporary agency workers
Table 2.17: EPLP effect on fixed-term work: outliers in share of trainees included
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ShFTC E FTC Any FTC ShFTC if > 0
Reform 1999
Standard Specification
Reform x Treat 0.0155∗ 0.221 0.107 0.0407 0.0785
(1.87) (0.32) (0.88) (1.28) (1.60)
R2 0.031 0.077 0.024 0.019 0.138
Dynamic Specification
Reform[t-1] x Treat -0.00871 -1.220 -0.302∗ -0.0614 0.00635
(-0.69) (-1.41) (-1.70) (-1.26) (0.08)
Reform x Treat 0.0298∗∗ -0.400 0.248 0.0920∗∗ 0.0904
(2.38) (-0.64) (1.40) (2.11) (1.35)
Reform[t+1] x Treat -0.0175∗∗ 1.865 -0.0227 -0.0418 -0.0249
(-2.23) (1.19) (-0.16) (-1.18) (-0.58)
R2 0.033 0.078 0.025 0.020 0.139
N 6559 6559 6559 6559 988
Reform 2004
Standard Specification
Reform x Treat -0.00641 0.401 -0.185∗∗ -0.0113 -0.0182
(-1.19) (0.80) (-2.32) (-0.51) (-0.85)
R2 0.013 0.061 0.023 0.012 0.031
Dynamic Specification
Reform[t-1] x Treat 0.00832 0.540 0.0917 0.0187 0.0441
(1.01) (0.89) (0.89) (0.61) (1.48)
Reform x Treat -0.0132∗ 0.668∗∗ -0.257∗∗ -0.0135 -0.0455
(-1.78) (2.07) (-2.35) (-0.46) (-1.55)
Reform[t+1] x Treat 0.00584 -0.815 0.0617 -0.00893 0.0187
(0.93) (-1.62) (0.65) (-0.36) (0.71)
R2 0.013 0.062 0.023 0.012 0.035
N 11128 11128 11128 11128 2176
Note: Fixed effect estimators with clustered standard errors; Dependent variables: share of fixed-term
workers (ShFTC), establishment employs any fixed-term worker (Any FTC), ShFTC in establish-
ments which employ at least one fixed-term worker (ShFTC if > 0), number of employees (E), num-
ber of fixed-term employees (FTC); Controls: TG dummy, reform dummies, share of low qualified,
high qualified, part-time workers, female workers and trainees, branch and federal state dummies;
Establishments from 1997-2001 or 2002-2006 of non-public sectors with 6-15 FTEits (TGit) exclud-
ing outliers (share of trainees) and no missing values in model relevant variables (estimation sample);
t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2.18: EPLP effect on fixed-term work: controlling for temporary agency work
(TAW)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ShFTC E FTC Any FTC ShFTC if > 0
Reform 2004: not controlling for TAW
Standard Specification
Reform x Treat -0.00487 0.126∗ -0.167∗∗ -0.00380 -0.0219
(-0.86) (1.84) (-2.00) (-0.16) (-0.94)
R2 0.011 0.409 0.023 0.012 0.038
Dynamic Specification
Reform[t-1] x Treat -0.00871 -1.220 -0.302∗ -0.0614 0.00635
(-0.69) (-1.41) (-1.70) (-1.26) (0.08)
Reform x Treat 0.0298∗∗ -0.400 0.248 0.0920∗∗ 0.0904
(2.38) (-0.64) (1.40) (2.11) (1.35)
Reform[t+1] x Treat -0.0175∗∗ 1.865 -0.0227 -0.0418 -0.0249
(-2.23) (1.19) (-0.16) (-1.18) (-0.58)
R2 0.033 0.078 0.025 0.020 0.139
N 10399 10399 10399 10399 2019
Reform 2004: controlling for TAW
Standard Specification
Reform x Treat -0.00507 0.127∗ -0.170∗∗ -0.00466 -0.0218
(-0.89) (1.85) (-2.03) (-0.20) (-0.93)
TAW 0.00496∗ -0.0112 0.0670∗∗ 0.0215∗∗ -0.000564
(1.92) (-0.42) (1.97) (2.38) (-0.09)
R2 0.011 0.409 0.024 0.013 0.038
Dynamic Specification
Reform[t-1] x Treat 0.0108 0.0976 0.115 0.0276 0.0528∗
(1.23) (0.96) (1.04) (0.86) (1.66)
Reform x Treat -0.0129 0.0954 -0.263∗∗ -0.0152 -0.0475
(-1.64) (1.22) (-2.26) (-0.49) (-1.47)
Reform[t+1] x Treat 0.00633 -0.0132 0.0858 0.000765 0.0130
(0.92) (-0.18) (0.83) (0.03) (0.44)
TAW 0.00487∗ -0.0114 0.0658∗ 0.0214∗∗ 0.000139
(1.90) (-0.43) (1.94) (2.36) (0.02)
R2 0.011 0.409 0.023 0.012 0.042
N 10399 10399 10399 10399 2019
Note: Fixed effect estimators with clustered standard errors; Dependent variables: share of fixed-term
workers (ShFTC), establishment employs any fixed-term worker (Any FTC), ShFTC in establish-
ments which employ at least one fixed-term worker (ShFTC if > 0), number of employees (E), num-
ber of fixed-term employees (FTC); Controls: TG dummy, reform dummies, share of low qualified,
high qualified, part-time workers, female workers and trainees, branch and federal state dummies;
Establishments from 1997-2001 or 2002-2006 of non-public sectors with 6-15 FTEits (TGit) exclud-
ing outliers (share of trainees) and no missing values in model relevant variables (estimation sample);
t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Chapter 3
The effect of shocks on temporary
employment conditional on EPLP
3.1 Introduction
Temporary employment accounts for a considerable part of the EU27 workforce -
around 14 per cent, 60 per cent of which is involuntary (Eurostat, 2012). Work-
ers on temporary contracts are one of the most vulnerable groups to economic
downturns (Boeri, 2011, p. 1207), which implies a large risk of unemployment in-
curring well-being losses (Clark et al., 2008; Lucas, 2007; Frey and Stutzer, 2002).
Moreover, temporary employment has a direct negative impact on well-being com-
pared to permanent workers, as it comes with fewer training opportunities, lower
wages and lower job satisfaction (Booth et al., 2002; De Cuyper, De Jong, De
Witte, Isaksson, Rigotti and Schalk, 2008). Hence, gaining deeper insights into
the mechanisms that generate temporary employment is relevant for policy mak-
ing.
This paper contributes to such insights by studying firms’ demand for tem-
porary workers induced by product demand shocks in different institutional con-
texts. Studying the firm-level is important for two reasons. First, firms’ shocks in
product demand are a main reason for the use of temporary workers: Houseman
(2001) presents evidence on the motivation to employ temporary workers based
on employer interviews; Morikawa (2010) shows a positive relation between firms’
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volatility in sales growth on the share of non-standard employment; Eslava et al.
(2014) present a positive relation between job destruction and construction on
changes in the share of temporary employment at the plant-level. Second, firm-
level product demand shocks are positively related to macro-economic business
cycle volatilities (Buch et al., 2008). Hence, in the aftermath of the 2007 financial
crisis, macro-economic volatilities increased in many European countries, which
might have raised volatilities at the firm-level too. Thereby, the employment of
temporary workers might have increased generally in its importance.
Firm-level shocks in product demand, however, do not determine the use of
temporary employment in isolation. Research shows that labor market institu-
tions, such as regulations of temporary work (e.g. Cappellari et al., 2012; Kahn,
2010; Boeri and Garibaldi, 2007; Blanchard and Landier, 2002) are an import-
ant determinant of temporary employment. Employment protection legislation
for permanent workers also matters: Applying within-country subgroup and time
variation, EPLP was shown to have a positive effect on employing temporary work-
ers (Centeno and Novo, 2012; Boockmann and Hagen, 2001); Colombian within-
country increase in EPLP had a similar effect (Eslava et al., 2014); focusing on
within-country time variation, however, the results of cross-country studies are less
clear (Kahn, 2010; Nunziata and Staffolani, 2007).
Furthermore, research has shown that real shocks interact with institutions
in determining (temporary) employment. At the firm-level, Eslava et al. (2014)
show that temporary workers are shock absorbers and that the share of tempor-
ary workers became more responsive to job construction (destruction) when non-
wage labor costs for permanent workers increased in Colombia after institutional
changes; focusing on employment rather than temporary employment, Bentolila
and Saint-Paul (1992) find for Spanish firms that employment elasticities to firms’
real shocks, which are measured via changes in sales, are higher after the liberal-
ization of legislation for temporary workers. At the country-level, results are less
clear. Nunziata and Staffolani (2007) show that the decrease in the aggregated
share of temporary workers is to a statistically non-significant extent stronger in
a macro-economic recession when employment protection for permanent workers
is high.
Building upon this literature, this paper asks: Is the effect of shocks in product
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demand on firms’ decision to employ temporary workers stronger in countries that
impose strict rules on the dismissal of permanent workers? In line with a recent
search and matching model by Cahuc et al. (2012), we expect that firms are more
likely to employ temporary workers, when they face workload shocks of short
duration. The effect, however, depends on sufficiently high employment protection
for permanent workers.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first study to investigate the impact
of the duration of shocks on employing temporary workers conditional on employ-
ment protection empirically from a cross-country establishment-level perspective.
Hence, our contribution to the literature is threefold: First, compared to Eslava
et al. (2014), who employ firm-level data and are closest related to our study, we
can add a broad cross-country perspective. Second, in comparison to Nunziata
and Staffolani (2007), Eslava et al. (2014) and Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992), we
employ a different measure of shocks that is more closely related to the theoretical
model by Cahuc et al. (2012). The model emphasizes the role of the duration
of shocks. Our measure captures information on the duration. Thereby, we are
the presenting the role of the duration of shocks for temporary employment and
present their distribution in Europe for the first time. Third, compared to Nun-
ziata and Staffolani (2007), who use macro-data, we add the micro-perspective
by combining institutional data with establishment-level data, thus accounting for
composition effects.
Our empirical strategy uses novel data from two waves of the European Com-
pany Survey (each wave with around 18,000 establishments) clustered in up to
20 European countries in combination with macro-data. We rely on cross-country
variation in employment protection legislation (Boeri and Jimeno, 2005). Although
the cross-sectional character clearly limits our analyzes, the broad international
scope of our data represents an almost unique opportunity to analyze firms’ hiring
decisions in different institutional contexts. Acknowledging the non-negligible lim-
itations of our empirical strategy, we discuss the issue of correlations versus effects
in detail.
We estimate a binary choice model on the pooled data, with clustered stand-
ard errors and country dummies. Our main result is that establishments normally
facing workload fluctuations within a year in flexible regimes are not more likely to
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employ temporary workers compared to establishments without fluctuations. In
countries with a sufficient high level of employment protection legislation, however,
establishments are significantly more likely to employ temporary workers (70 per
cent versus 78 per cent). This is also true for the subgroups of temporary agency
and fixed-term contract workers. Our results are robust if we account for differen-
tial enforcement of employment protection. Furthermore, they are also robust in
different country subsamples, years of observation, and model specifications.
We begin with our theoretical argument based upon labor demand and search
and matching models (Section 3.2). From this, we derive our empirical model and
discuss the empirical strategy in Section 3.3. After describing data sources and
central concepts (Section 3.4), we present our results and discuss endogeneity as
well as robustness issues in Section 3.5. In the final Section 3.6, we conclude.
3.2 Theoretical and empirical background
Our interest is in shocks interacted with employment protection for permanent
workers as determinants on temporary employment. European labor markets are
characterized by heterogeneous employment protection for permanent and tempor-
ary workers. Thereby, employers face different adjustment costs for temporary and
permanent workers. Importantly, temporary contracts can be terminated at no (or
low) costs if the contract ends after pre-specified period, while permanent contracts
are costly in their termination. Protection for temporary and permanent work-
ers are typically modeled as workforce adjustment costs in either dynamic labor
demand models under uncertainty (e.g. Boeri and Garibaldi, 2007; Nunziata and
Staffolani, 2007; Hamermesh, 1996; Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 1992)1 or search and
matching models (e.g. Bentolila, Cahuc, Dolado and Le Barbanchon, 2012; Blan-
chard and Landier, 2002; Cahuc and Postel-Vinay, 2002).
With these kind of models, the effect of two-tier labor market reforms, i.e.
liberalization of temporary work, on economic outcomes such as average employ-
ment and unemployment levels (e.g. Blanchard and Landier, 2002) but also on the
distribution of permanent and temporary jobs (e.g. Boeri and Garibaldi, 2007).
1Labor demand models with heterogeneous workers are often based upon the classical labor
demand model developed by Bentolila and Bertola (1990).
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As Berton and Garibaldi (2012) note, the literature on two-tier labor market re-
forms in rigid labor markets often assumes (or implies) that after reforms at the
margin, firms rely on temporary employment exclusively when filling vacancies.2
It is, however, more realistic to assume a continuing coexistence of permanent
and temporary contracts. For employers, the choice between contract types en-
tails a trade-off: Permanent contracts may exhibit a higher job-filling rate, but
temporary contracts provide flexibility in case of productivity shocks (Berton and
Garibaldi, 2012). Given that employers continue to hire permanent workers, the
important question is what determines employers’ choice between permanent and
temporary employment contracts when filling vacancies.
Cahuc et al. (2012) and Eslava et al. (2014) explicitly model the choice between
contract types. Cahuc et al. (2012, p. 2) point to the relevance of the ”heterogen-
eity of expected duration of jobs” for the choice. In general, search and matching
models or labor demand models include stochastic shocks modeled for instance as
Geometric Brownian motion (Lotti and Viviano, 2012), but not heterogeneity in
the duration of jobs. Intuitively, the choice of employment contracts is most likely
based upon the durability of a product demand shock. Permanent contracts are
associated with high firing costs, while temporary contracts can be terminated -
after a pre-determined duration - at no cost. If dismissal protection imposes suffi-
ciently high turnover costs on permanent workers and employers have jobs which
are limited in time, temporary contracts are chosen. When employment protec-
tion is low for permanent workers, permanent contracts are always chosen - even
for jobs with a low duration. Hence, firing costs and the probability of a worker
becoming unproductive (the job’s shock arrival rate) interact in determining the
choice of employment contracts.
The above mentioned model on the use of temporary work points to the para-
mount importance of the duration of shocks in interaction with institutional fea-
tures determining firing costs. Taking the view of the firm3 (and leaving workers’
2Theoretical model, however, do not necessarily imply that the stock of permanent contracts
is completely crowded-out over time, because they allow for the conversion of temporary into
permanent contracts (e.g. Nunziata and Staffolani, 2007; Blanchard and Landier, 2002).
3We use the words firms and establishments interchangeable. Thereby, we assume that firms
with more than one establishment operate these establishments independently when it comes
to employment decisions.
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decisions aside)4, we can formulate the following hypothesis for the choice to em-
ploy temporary workers: Firms’ propensity to offer temporary contracts increases
with the existence of jobs which become unproductive with a higher shock arrival
rate conditional upon sufficiently high adjustment costs for permanent workers.
Empirical research analyzing this specific interaction at the firm-level in a cross-
country design does not exist, but empirical studies have already shown that shocks
are important and that firing costs are relevant for the impact of shocks on the
workforce. First, single-country firm-level studies on the use of temporary work
show that shocks in product demand are important to determine firms’ choice
whether to (at least partially) hire on temporary contracts (Eslava et al., 2014;
Morikawa, 2010; Houseman, 2001; Abraham and Taylor, 1996) or to determine the
size of the workforce (Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 1992). This is in line with Cahuc
et al. (2012), as workers become unproductive with production opportunities of
different lengths.
Second, in the vein of Cahuc et al. (2012), some studies support that adjust-
ment costs are relevant for the effect of firm-level shocks or cyclical elements on
employment. Eslava et al. (2014) show that when Colombian firms create (destroy)
jobs the share of temporary workers increases (decreases) and that this relation is
stronger when firing costs for permanent workers increased after 2001. Bentolila
and Saint-Paul (1992) find for Spain in the 1980s that firm-level cyclical elasticity
to sales increased with the availability of temporary contracts. At the aggreg-
ated level, Nunziata and Staffolani (2007) show that temporary employment rates
vary more strongly over the business cycle than permanent employment rates and
that this cyclical response is even stronger when temporary agency workers are
well protected. The cyclical elasticity of temporary employment, however, does
only change to a minor extent with protection for permanent workers at the ag-
gregated level. While these papers are strongly related to ours, we add a broad
cross-country perspective compared to Eslava et al. (2014), the measurement of
duration of shocks in comparison to all three papers, and the firm-level compared
to Nunziata and Staffolani (2007).
4As most temporary contracts are involuntary, we expect firms to be the more powerful actor
in the bargaining process, and hence we focus on their behavior. In the EU27, 60.4 per cent of
temporary workers preferred a permanent job over a temporary job in 2009 (Eurostat, 2012).
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In order to assess our hypotheses, we require variation in employment protec-
tion legislation for permanent workers as well as the duration of shocks at the firm-
level.5 This has two implications for the empirical research on the choice of em-
ploying temporary workers. First, to obtain variation in firing costs, cross-country
or within-country variation can be exploited (Boeri and Jimeno, 2005). There is
major cross-country variation in employment protection even within Europe. In
comparison, within-country time variance is relatively small, because employment
protection legislation is historically grown, and specifically for permanent work-
ers, it has been quite stable in Europe. Furthermore, subgroup variation exists
and comes from the variable enforcement of employment protection for permanent
workers across firm size, for instance, in Germany and Italy. There is an important
literature on employing within-country time and subgroup variation (e.g. Leonardi
and Pica, 2013). Second, aggregated (e.g. national) data disguises heterogeneity
in shock arrival rates across sectors and firms. Hence, we meet these requirements
by employing a relatively new data set of European firms (protection varies across
countries, shocks across firms) with the limitation of not having job-specific but
firm-specific shocks.
3.3 Empirical specification
Our hypothesis is that firms’ propensity to offer temporary contracts is high when
the job-specific shock is of a relatively short duration and employment protection
for permanent workers is sufficiently high. To link our theoretical argument to
an empirical model, we make simplifying arguments that are partly driven by
pragmatic reasons and data availability (see Section 3.4). The propensity to offer
temporary contracts is ideally measured with flow data - the composition of hiring -
and the duration of a productive job refers to job-specific characteristics - aspects
of jobs that can differ within firms. For this, we would need linked employer-
employee data, although such indicators are difficult to obtain in a comparative
5Theoretically, the shock arrival rate is specific to jobs not to firms. This makes sense, since
temporary and permanent work coexist in many firms. As we argue below, however, character-
istics determining choice of employment contract are easier to observe at the firm-level than at
the level of specific jobs. Estimating job-specific shock arrival rates would require comparable
linked employer-employee data.
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framework. Hence, we use the binary variable concerning whether establishments
employ at least one temporary worker in our main analyzes and for additional
analyzes the composition of the stock of employees by contract type. We utilize
workload fluctuations of different duration at the firm-level. Finally, adjustment
costs are partly determined by employment protection legislation for permanent
workers at the national level. This allows us to rephrase our hypothesis as follows:
Firms’ likelihood of having temporary workers in their workforce is higher (ceteris
paribus) if the firm is exposed to workload fluctuations of short duration and this
is only the case if the costs for dismissal of permanent contracts (as stipulated by
law or collective agreement) are sufficiently high.
In our baseline specification, we assume that the profit of firm i in country j
employing at least one temporary worker (yij) can be characterized by a latent
variable (y∗ij):
y∗ij = β0 + β1EPLPj ∗WFij + β2WFij + β′3C +Rij + Uj (3.1)
with
yij = 1[y
∗
ij > c] (3.2)
yij = 0 otherwise (3.3)
with employment protection legislation for permanent workers EPLPj, short-
term workload fluctuation WFij, a vector of controls C, and the error term com-
ponents Rij and Uj.
There is at least one temporary worker in the workforce of a firm (yij), when
the profit of employing the worker exceeds the threshold c. We also replace the de-
pendent variable by fixed-term contract and temporary agency workers, to which
our theoretical argument similarly applies. Finally, we extend the analysis by em-
ploying the share of fixed-term contract workers at the date of the interview as a
dependent variable. For this purpose, we estimated a two-component model ac-
counting for corner solutions and different processes for the intensive and extensive
margin (Eslava et al., 2014; Cameron and Trivedi, 2009, pp. 538).
The main variable of interest is the effect of WFij in different institutional con-
texts (employment protection legislation for permanent workers) on the propensity
CHAPTER 3. PROTECTION, SHOCKS, TEMPORARY WORK 70
that a firm employs temporary workers. For this, we require variation on the in-
stitutional level. As already mentioned above, there are two options: within and
between country variance (Boeri and Jimeno, 2005). Due to data limitations, we
are mainly restricted to variation of EPLP across countries rather than within
countries.
Concerning our estimation strategy, due to cross-sectional data (see Section
3.4), we are unable to control for firm fixed-effects. Any national unobserved dif-
ference, however, in the propensity to employ temporary workers is dealt with
by including country fixed-effects in some models (Uj). Furthermore, firms are
clustered within countries, and hence, the firm-specific error terms might be cor-
related within countries. We correct for this by estimating cluster-robust standard
errors at the country-level in each model (Cameron and Miller, 2015). Thereby, we
follow Kahn (2007) who employs the similar structure of data while investigating
the effect of EPL on temporary employment. He pools cross-sectional individual
data from seven countries.6 Furthermore, we estimate a battery of robustness
checks for different subsamples and specifications. Overall, the results are quite
robust, which is specifically true for annual fluctuations.
The vector C includes several controls at the firm-level, such as firm size and
industry dummies as well as country-level variables and country dummies, de-
pending on the specification. First, for the firm-level, various strands of literature
argue that workplace representation may have an impact on the use of temporary
jobs (Salvatori, 2012; Bo¨heim and Zweimu¨ller, 2012; Bentolila and Dolado, 1994).
Empirical results, however, are ambiguous, and it is theoretically unclear in which
direction the effect of workplace representation proceeds. Given that works coun-
cils are not at the core of our argument, we refrain from making an explicit the-
oretical claim, but include a control dummy variable measuring whether there is
workplace representation in the establishment. Second, Houseman (2001) found in
a company survey that temporary workers are employed to fill positions of absent
6In order to deal with clustered data, Cameron and Miller (2015) propose OLS with cluster-
robust standard errors, feasible generalized least squares or hierarchical models which, e.g.,
allow for random slopes. Hierarchical models are often referred to as multilevel models which
are extensively applied in social science. For a methodological background, see Rabe-Hesketh
and Skrondal (2012) or Snijders and Bosker (2012). We provide robustness checks in Appendix
3.7.6 but follow Kahn (2007) in the main analyses.
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regular workers who are sick on family leave or vacation, or to screen employees
for regular workers. Therefore, we control for the rates of absent workers and new
workers (increased number of workers). Third, in empirical labor demand models,
labor costs, costs of intermediate goods, capital stocks and performance indicators
are usually controlled for (Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 1992). We include the change
in the number of employees. For the others, we control indirectly by firm size and
economic sector. Fourth, further controls are the rate of female and high-skilled
employees in the workforce, since these groups differ in their likelihood of holding
temporary contracts (Kahn, 2007). Finally, and similar to Kahn (2007) in his
individual-level studies, we control for gender and skill level, as well as whether
the firm makes use of flexible working time.
Depending on whether we included country dummies, we also include control
variables at the country-level. First, it is argued in the literature that wage rigidity
exacerbates the effect of employment protection legislation, since higher turnover
costs cannot be compensated for by lower wage costs (Lazaer, 1990). Empirical
studies on wage rigidity found that downward real wage rigidity depends on labor
market institutions such as collective bargaining (e.g. Babecky´, Du Caju, Kosma,
Lawless, Messina and Ro˜o˜m, 2010). Therefore, we include the proportion of eligible
workers covered by collective agreements (collective bargaining coverage rate) in
our model (single and in interaction with EPL for permanent and EPL for tempor-
ary workers as well as in interaction with annual workload fluctuations). Second,
high EPLP often goes hand-in-hand with high EPL for temporary workers, and
high EPL for temporary workers decreases the probability of being a temporary
worker (Kahn, 2010). Therefore, we control for EPL for temporary workers and its
interaction with annual workload fluctuation, as well as its interaction with EPLP.
Finally, we control for the national unemployment rate to account for higher pres-
sure for job seekers to accept temporary jobs (Polavieja, 2005).
3.4 Stylized facts and data sources
We utilize establishment-level data with around 18,000 establishments in up to 20
European countries for two years and merge them with country-level data. The
European Company Survey (ECS) provides our data at the establishment-level
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(Eurofound, 2010a; Gensicke, Hajek and Tschersich, 2009; Eurofound, 2006).7
The ECS [former Establishment Survey on Working Time (ESWT)] started in
2004/2005 and is comparable across countries.8 It is conducted every four years
by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Condi-
tions (Eurofound). Our analysis mainly focuses on the most recent wave, with data
collected in spring 2009, although we provide robustness analyzes with data collec-
ted starting in autumn 2004 and ending in spring 2005.9 The 2004/2005 and the
2009 ECS are representative for establishments with more than ten employees.10
The original 2009 ECS comprises around 27,000 establishments from 30 European
countries. A considerable number of countries had to be excluded due to miss-
ing data on either the micro-level or the institutional level.11 The final sample
comprises 20 European countries and 18,407 establishments.12 The 2004/2005
ECS is employed for robustness checks across years. In the original 2004/2005
ECS, 21,031 establishments from 21 European countries participated.13 The final
sample comprises 17 countries and 17,923 establishments.14
To the best of our knowledge, only one data source at the establishment-level
exists that is comparable to the ECS in its broad coverage of European estab-
lishments in combination with the details on contract types. This is the purely
7The unit of observation in the European Company Survey (ECS) is the establishment. Estab-
lishments are local production sites and firms may consist of multiple local production sites.
8Comparability over country for the ECS 2009 is large regarding questionnaire translation and the
fieldwork period but the sampling frame differs slightly with regard to large firms for Belgium,
Denmark, Greece, France, Luxembourg, Hungary, Poland and Turkey (Eurofound, 2011).
9Data for 2013 were not available at the time of the empirical analyzes.
10The survey covers all relevant sectors (NACE Rev. 1.1), excluding NACE A (agriculture,
hunting, forestry), NACE B (fishing), NACE P (private household with employed persons)
and NACE Q (extra-territorial organizations and bodies).The latter two sectors are both of
negligible size (Eurofound, 2010b, p. 3).
11Since the loss in countries and observations is considerable, we provide a detailed description of
the original sample, as well as the reason for dropping countries and observations in Appendix
3.7.3.
12Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden,
Turkey and the United Kingdom.
13Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom.
14The OECD EPL indicator for January 2004 was not available for Cyprus, Latvia, Luxembourg
and Slovenia. Hence, we restricted the sample to the other 17 countries. Excluding observations
with missing values in the relevant variables.
73 CHAPTER 3. PROTECTION, SHOCKS, TEMPORARY WORK
cross-sectional firm survey of the Wage Dynamics Network (Bertola et al., 2012).
It covers 14 countries and 15,235 responses in total. In comparison to this survey,
the advantage of the ECS is a larger sample of countries and of establishments. A
second advantage is that the unit of observations is establishments. This provides
us with a much disaggregated perspective and a broader sample. Other firm-level
databases such as the AMADEUS also cover a broad sample and provide inform-
ation on the stock of the overall workforce, although variables on the composition
of the workforce are not available. One possible limitation of the ECS is that the
sampling procedure excludes agriculture and forestry and these are sectors with
major seasonal fluctuation, which is one of our main variables. We, however, do
not believe that this biases our results, although we lose important observations
and thus the estimates are less precise.
3.4.1 Establishment-level variables
The ECS asks separately whether temporary agency workers or fixed-term work-
ers were employed within the last 12 months by the establishment, i.e. between
spring 2008 and spring 2009 in the case of the 2009 sample and between autumn
2003 and spring 2005 in the case of the 2004/2005 sample. Temporary agency
workers (TAWs) are workers who signed a contract with an employment agency.
Establishments can hire these workers on a fixed-term basis as a third party. Next
to TAWs, establishments can employ workers directly on a fixed-term (FTCs). In
this case, the establishment has a contract with the worker. We code a dummy
variable Temp, which is zero when the establishment employs neither FTC nor a
TAW. The dummy variable FTC (TAW) is one, when the establishment employs
at least one FTC (TAW) and zero otherwise.
Furthermore, the 2009 survey includes the proportion of employees holding a
fixed-term contract in the respective establishment.15 The question is: ”About
what proportion of your employees is holding a fixed-term contract?”. We, how-
ever, do not expect the mediating role of EPL for permanent workers to be as clear
as in the case of the variables Temp, FTC and TAW, for the following reasons.
First, the variable on the share of FTCs refers to the date of the interview, but
15Unfortunately, the share of FTCs is not available for the 2004/2005 sample.
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our main explanatory variable (annual workload fluctuation) does not provide any
information on the workload at the date of the interview. Second, our main ex-
planatory variable is also binary and thus less suitable for predicting precise shares
of temporary contracts in an establishment. Third, data was collected in spring
2009, during which time most countries experienced a severe economic crisis. The
precise share of fixed-term contracts is arguably more sensitive to asymmetric ad-
justments of staff levels in the crisis than the binary variable. Fourth, the wording
of the question from which our binary dependent variable is derived refers to the
entire previous year rather than only the time of the interview. Therefore, it should
be less affected by the crisis (Eurofound, 2010b, p. 2).
The descriptives for both variables are shown in Figure 3.1 and Table 3.1.16
In our sample, around 61 per cent of the establishments use temporary contracts,
although the value strongly differs across countries. It varies from 27 per cent in
Slovakia to almost 85 per cent in the Netherlands (Figure 3.1). Around 53 per
cent of establishments employ FTCs, although only 22 per cent use TAWs. Fur-
thermore, TAWs have only a minor share in the total workforce - less than 3 per
cent of total employment in Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands,
and Sweden around 2002 (Eurofound, 2007b). Hence, FTCs is what drives the
results. The average share of fixed-term workers at the establishment-level (in-
cluding establishments without any such contracts) is 10 per cent, ranging from
2.7 per cent in Austria to 19 per cent in Poland.
According to our theoretical argument, firms facing shocks of short duration in
the productivity of jobs anticipate that some workers will become unproductive,
and thus, hire (partly) on temporary contracts. In labor demand models shocks
are usually modeled as stochastic processes (e.g. Geometric Brownian motion).
One can distinguish between uncertainty of product demand and actual shocks in
product demand. First, some empirical work or calibrations focus on the uncertain
part of shocks such as Lotti and Viviano (2012) (squared difference of upper and
lower bound of expected output) or Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1994) (variance of
the stochastic process of the shock). Second, a major part of the empirical work
proxies shocks in labor demand models by real shocks such as Bentolila and Saint-
16Summary statistics of establishment-level variables of the original ECS 2009 sample are presen-
ted in Appendix 3.7.3.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics of establishment characteristics (2009)
Variable Mean SD Min Max N
If any temp 0.61 0.49 0 1 18450
If any TAW 0.22 0.42 0 1 18450
If any FTC 0.53 0.50 0 1 18450
Share of FTC 9.80 21.63 0 100 18036
If any WF daily 0.32 0.47 0 1 18450
If any WF weekly 0.44 0.50 0 1 18450
If any WF annual 0.64 0.48 0 1 18450
If any freelancer 0.19 0.39 0 1 18407
If any works council 0.37 0.48 0 1 18450
No. of workers increased between 2006 and 2009 0.34 0.47 0 1 18450
No. of workers decreased between 2006 and 2009 0.22 0.42 0 1 18450
If high absenteeism and/or sickness rates (absent) 0.14 0.34 0 1 18450
Gender share (centered) 5.59 31.82 -41 59 18450
High-skilled share (centered) 0.94 29.70 -24 76 18450
If flexible working time schemes 0.57 0.50 0 1 18450
Establishment size (1-10) 1.90 1.51 1 10 18450
NACE C-E 0.19 0.39 0 1 18450
NACE F 0.07 0.26 0 1 18450
NACE G 0.19 0.40 0 1 18450
NACE H 0.04 0.21 0 1 18450
NACE I 0.05 0.21 0 1 18450
NACE J 0.03 0.16 0 1 18450
NACE K 0.13 0.34 0 1 18450
NACE L 0.05 0.22 0 1 18450
NACE N 0.09 0.29 0 1 18450
NACE O 0.06 0.24 0 1 18450
Note: Source is ECS 2009 (Eurofound, 2010b). Descriptive statistics with employer weights. Temporary workers
(temp), temporary agency worker (TAW), fixed-term contract worker (FTC), workload fluctuation (WF), number
(no.). Centered variables are centered based upon summary statistics of the sample without employer weights.
High absenteeism means that an establishment encounters a human resource problem due to absenteeism and/or
sickness. The share of high-skilled means the proportion of employees working in high-skilled jobs which usually
require an academic degree. NACE Rev. 1.1: C-E Manufacturing and energy; F Construction; G Wholesale and
retail trade, repair of goods; H Hotels and restaurants; I Transport and communication; J Financial intermediation;
K Real estate and business activities; L Public administration; M Education; N Health and social work; O Other
community, social and personal services.
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Figure 3.1: To what extent do European establishments employ temporary and fixed-
term contract workers?
Note: Source is ECS 2009 (Eurofound, 2010b). Temporary workers (temp),
fixed-term contract workers (FTC), temporary agency workers (TAW). De-
scriptive statistics with employer weights.
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Paul (1992) (change in sales) or Nunziata and Staffolani (2007) (Hodrick-Prescott-
Filter based GDP recession measure). If a firm faces an actual positive shock but
is highly uncertain about its duration, the firm would prefer hiring temporary
workers, too. Our hypothesis, however, is stronger related to the notion of real
shocks - and their duration - rather than to uncertainty about shocks.
The ECS contains an item that can be directly related to the duration of shocks
at the establishment-level. The survey question asks: ”Does your establishment
normally have to cope with major variations of the workload 1) within a day, 2)
within a week or 3) within a year?”. Thereby, our variable provides information on
the duration of a shock which is relatively certain in its occurrence (”normally”).
The measure does not provide any information about the uncertainty - upper and
lower bound - of the shock in the future. Hence, we interpret this measurement
to be closer related the concept of real shocks - and the duration - rather than to
uncertainty.
We include all three variables as dummies in the model. FTC and TAW,
however, should be more relevant for fluctuations within a year than for fluctu-
ations within days and weeks. TAW might be a little more important for weekly
fluctuation, because establishments can obtain staff at short notice (the typical
recruitment procedures for FTCs should not allow being responsive to unforeseen
weekly fluctuations). Fluctuations within a week or a day, however, should be
dealt with by hiring on part-time or relying on flexible working time rather than
temporary contracts.
Figure 3.2 shows that workload variations within a year are the dominant form
of fluctuations in most countries. In our sample, 64 per cent of the establishments
have to deal with such fluctuations, while the values range from 42 per cent in
Turkey to 76 per cent in Finland. Yearly fluctuations are specifically strong in
sectors that have to deal with seasonal variations, such as hotels and restaurants,
construction and other community, social and personal activities. They are less
relevant in sectors with a constant workload, such as health, social work, education
and manufacturing and energy.
In countries with low shares of establishments facing yearly fluctuation such
as Turkey and Slovakia, high shares of establishments are active in sectors C-E,
involving activities such as manufacturing and energy. For instance in Turkey, the
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Figure 3.2: Which workload fluctuations dominate in Europe?
Note: Source is ECS 2009 (Eurofound, 2010b). Descriptive statistics with
employer weights.
textile industry might play a crucial role and textile production is probably less
affected by seasonal fluctuation. By contrast, hotels and restaurants, as well as
other community, social and personal activities, play a stronger role in Finland and
Germany but less so in Slovakia and Turkey. Overall, in Slovakia and Turkey the
industry sector plays a more relevant role in relation to the service sector compared
to Finland and Germany, where the structural change towards the service sector
is already more progressed. Hence, the structural change might explain at least
some of the variation in the share of establishments facing yearly fluctuation.
3.4.2 Country-level variables
The effect of fluctuation on the likelihood of employing temporary contracts should
be conditional upon sufficiently high firing costs for permanent workers. Hence,
we need data on EPLP which is modeled as firing costs in economic models. For
this purpose, we employ the well-established OECD indicator on the strictness of
employment protection legislation for 2004 and 2008 (Venn, 2009). Venn (2009)
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provides an in depth overview of the indicator.17 The indicator has various subcom-
ponents measuring how strictly different contract types are regulated. In our case,
the main important indicator is the sub-indicator for dismissal of employees on
permanent contracts (EPLP). We also include the sub-indicator for the strictness
of regulation of temporary contracts, which we call the employment protection for
temporary workers (EPL temp). This is necessary, because it has been shown to
interact with regulation of permanent contracts (Nunziata and Staffolani, 2007).
We, however, expect the effect of institutions to be dominated by regulation of
permanent contracts. Even if temporary contracts are strictly regulated by com-
parison, they are usually still more flexible than permanent contracts. Hence,
irrespective of their level of regulation, temporary contracts should be attractive
if firing costs for permanent workers are high.
Figure 3.3: How strong are European permanent workers and temporary workers pro-
tected?
Note: Source is EPL 2008 (OECD, 2012). EPL for permanent workers
(EPLP), EPL for temporary workers (EPL temp).
The OECD sub-indicator for EPL for temporary worker is an aggregate of
two sub-sub-indicators: EPL for fixed-term contracts (EPL FTC) and EPL for
17Bentolila, Cahuc, Dolado and Le Barbanchon (2012) recently criticized the OECD indicator
for Spain for being too high for regulations on temporary contracts and too lax for regulations
on permanent contracts. To the best of our knowledge, however, this indicator is the most
commonly employed for comparative studies.
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temporary agency work (EPL TAW). Fixed-term contracts are those that are
signed between the worker and the establishment, while temporary work refers to
contracts between agencies and workers. The EPL FTC is a summary indicator of
measures of the maximum number of successive contracts and cumulated duration,
for instance. The EPL TAW summaries indicators such as equal treatment issues,
maximum cumulated duration and types of work for which TAW is legal.
Table 3.2: Summary statistics for country-level variables (2009)
Variable Mean SD Min Max
EPLP (centered) 0 0.563 -1.193 1.147
EPL temp (centered) 0 1.147 -1.940 2.650
EPL FTC (centered) 0 1.370 -1.663 2.338
EPL TAW (centered) 0 1.320 -2.213 2.954
Bargaining coverage rate (centered) 0 30.374 -51.580 37.120
Unemployment rate (centered) 0 2.079 -3.815 3.785
N countries 20
N establishments 18450
Note: Temporary workers (temp), temporary agency worker (TAW), fixed-term contract
worker (FTC), EPL for permanent workers (EPLP), EPL for temporary workers (EPL temp),
EPL for temporary agency workers (EPL TAW), EPL for fixed-term workers (EPL FTC).
Data sources: EPL 2008 from OECD (2012), national unemployment rate in the first quarter
of 2009 Eurostat (2012), bargaining coverage rate Hayter and Stoevska (2011) and Eurofound
(2007a).
The OECD indicator for January 2008 is shown in Figure 3.3 and Table 3.2 for
EPL for temporary and permanent workers across Europe.18 Typically, southern
European countries such as Portugal are relatively strong regulated for perman-
ent workers, while Ireland and United Kingdom are quite flexible. High EPL for
temporary workers means that the employment of temporary workers is very re-
strictive. Countries with low restrictions are again Anglo Saxon countries such
as United Kingdom and Ireland. Some countries with high EPLP decreased EPL
temp to make their labor markets more flexible. The pattern, however, remains
similar with Portugal and France having relative high protection in both dimen-
sions and with the Anglo Saxon countries having relatively low protection. Overall,
there is a positive and significant correlation between EPLP and EPL temp in our
sample. Furthermore, EPL FTC is lowest in Slovakia and highest in Greece, while
EPL TAW is lowest in United Kingdom and highest in Turkey.
18Summary statistics of country-level variables of the original ECS 2009 sample are presented in
Appendix 3.7.3.
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3.5 Empirical results
3.5.1 Workload fluctuation and temporary contracts
Temporary workers
Theoretically, we expect establishments facing workload fluctuations of short dur-
ation to be more likely to hire temporary workers than establishments without
such fluctuations. This effect, however, should be conditional upon sufficiently
high employment protection legislation for permanent workers (EPLP). The res-
ults presented in Table 3.3 largely confirm this for our binary choice model.19
Concerning specifications, Table 3.3 shows models for different covariates. All
Models [(1) to (3)] are logistic regressions with cluster-robust standard errors at the
country-level (Cameron and Miller, 2015).20 Model (1) allows for unobserved coun-
try fixed effects by including country dummies while Model (2) explicitly models
theoretical relevant country-level variables for temporary employment. Thereby,
the latter is more directly related to theoretical arguments (Section 3.3). Method-
ologically, Model (2) is similar to Kahn (2007). Model (3) is nested in Model (1),
while the former excludes establishment size and sector dummies.
The coefficients on annual workload fluctuation and the interaction between
annual workload fluctuation and EPLP are both quiet robust with respect to dif-
ferent covariates.21 First, comparing models with country dummies but different
covariates [Model (1) and Model (3)], workload fluctuation within a year as well
as the interaction between EPLP and annual fluctuation are both positively signi-
ficant and quite similar in terms of the magnitude. Second, comparing Models (1)
and (2), annual fluctuation is again robust positively related to the decision to em-
ploy at least one temporary worker. The odds of employing at least one temporary
19The full model is presented in Appendix 3.7.1 in Table 3.4.
20Based on Cameron and Miller (2015), we provide estimations of different strategies which deal
with clustered data. We present a logistic model with cluster-robust standard errors, a feasible
generalized least square model (FGLS) with cluster-robust standard errors and a random slope
model in Appendix 3.7.6. Coefficients differ not fundamentally, although FGLS and the random
slope model have a smaller estimate on EPLP ∗WF annual and standard errors are smaller.
For the main analyses, we follow Kahn (2007) who investigates an EPLP question with similar
data to ours.
21Model (2) is robust to the use of employer weights. See Appendix 3.7.2.
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Table 3.3: Do workload fluctuations increase odds ratios (logistic model) of hiring
Temps?
Dependent variable If any temporary worker
(1) (2) (3)
WF annual 1.329*** 1.316*** 1.241***
(6.25) (3.95) (4.92)
WF weekly 1.148* 1.198* 1.076
(2.07) (2.26) (1.22)
WF daily 0.895 0.857* 0.846**
(-1.94) (-2.16) (-2.82)
EPLP* WF annual 1.144* 1.283* 1.129*
(2.13) (2.35) (2.21)
EPLP 1.349
(0.9)
Establishment variables yes yes yes
Establishment size fixed
effect
yes yes no
Sectors fixed effect yes yes no
Cross-level interactions yes yes yes
Country fixed effect yes no yes
Country variables no yes no
Establishments 18407 18407 18407
Countries 20 20 20
LL -8612 -9213 -9299
Note: *** significant at 0.1 per cent, ** significant at 1 per cent, * significant at 5 per
cent. Coefficients are reported as odds ratios and are from logistic regression mod-
els with clustered standard errors, z-values in parentheses. Continuous variables are
centered. Temps is temporary workers. WF stands for workload fluctuation; EPLP
is employment protection legislation for permanent workers. Country variables: EPL
for temporary workers, bargaining coverage, EPLP*bargaining coverage, EPL for
temporary workers*bargaining coverage, EPLP*EPL for temporary workers, unem-
ployment rate. Establishment variables: freelancer, works council, number of workers
increased, number of workers decreased, high absenteeism and/or sickness rates (i.e.
absenteeism and/or sickness causes human resource problems) , gender share, share
of high-skilled workers (i.e. the proportion of employees working in high-skilled jobs
which usually require an academic degree), flexible working time. Interaction between
country and establishment variables: WF annual*EPL for temporary workers, WF
annual*bargaining coverage. Establishment-level variables described in Table 3.1.
Country-level variables described in Table 3.2.
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worker are 32 [Model (2)] to 33 [Model (1)] per cent higher for establishments with
annual fluctuations. As the coefficients are quite similar, we do not expect that
the estimate on workload fluctuation in Model (2) captures much unobserved het-
erogeneity at the country-level. Furthermore, for both models, the odds are higher
when EPLP increases. EPLP ∗WF annual is in both specifications positive and
statistically significant, although accounting for unobserved country heterogeneity
yield slightly smaller odds. Interpreting the differences between Model (1) and
Model (2) as minor, we prefer Model (2) as it is more directly related to theoret-
ical arguments.
In detail, Model (2) shows that the odds of employing at least one temporary
worker are 32 per cent higher for establishments with annual fluctuations when
EPLP is held constant at the mean. This effect is highly significant and shows
that shocks are a main motive to employ temporary workers in Europe (Houseman,
2001; Boockmann and Hagen, 2001). In line with our argument, the odds ratio is
even higher when EPLP increases by one unit (1.69).22
As expected, other types of fluctuation have little or no effect on the likeli-
hood of employing temporary workers. While annual fluctuation is robust, this
is less true for weekly and daily fluctuation. Establishments with weekly (daily)
fluctuation have a significant higher probability of employing temporary workers
in Model (1) and Model (2) [Model (2) and (3)] but not in Model (3) [Model (1)].
This pattern is also revealed in subsample estimations and individual country23
regressions, which find robust positive coefficients for annual fluctuation but not
for daily and weekly fluctuation. This is in line with the argument that estab-
lishments adjust for weekly and daily fluctuations by part-time or working time
accounts.
22This interpretation is corroborated by the average marginal effects depicted in Figures 3.5 and
3.6. Presented in odds ratios, the interaction term in this model tells us by how much the
effect differs, but they do so in a multiplicative way (Buis, 2010, p. 87). Hence, the relevant
odds ratio for annual fluctuation is obtained by multiplying its odds ratios with the coefficient
of the interaction term (Buis, 2010).
23Results are available upon request.
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Figure 3.4: Do workload fluctuations increase the probability of hiring Temps and does
this relation even becomes stronger with an increase in EPLP?
Note: Average of predicted probabilities, Model (2), calculated at zero for all
institutions (EPL for temporary workers (Temps), bargaining coverage rate),
except EPL permanent.
To present the substantive effect of our explanatory variables, Figure 3.4 plots
the average of predicted probabilities of employing at least one temporary worker
at different values of EPL for permanent workers (broken down by establishments
with and without annual fluctuations).24 These predicted probabilities are based
upon Model (2) in Table 3.3. The figure confirms that the gap between the two
types of establishments increases with strictness of EPLP and that this gap is
relevant in substantive terms. In a flexible regime such as in the United Kingdom,
establishments employ temporary workers to 59 per cent- the establishment types
do not differ. In rigid regimes, however, we find that the probability of employ-
ing temporary workers is 78 per cent for establishments with annual fluctuations,
compared to 70 per cent for those without fluctuations.
Are the differences between the two types of establishments significant? To
answer this question, we calculated the average marginal effects of annual work-
load fluctuation on the probability of employing at least one temporary worker
24Confidence intervals are not presented here, as the significance of the average marginal effect
of workload fluctuation on the probability to employ temporary workers is presented in the
Figure 3.5.
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at different values of EPL for permanent workers and at the mean of the other
interaction terms, as well as their confidence intervals:25
DP = P (yij = 1|WF = 1, EPL = x) − P (yij = 1|WF = 0, EPL = x) (3.4)
The results are plotted in Figure 3.5 against the level of EPL for permanent
workers. Irrespective of the level of protection for temporary workers, the average
marginal effect of annual workload fluctuation requires a sufficient level of EPL for
permanent workers to become significant. In rigid labor markets, the probability
is 8 percentage points higher for establishments with annual workload fluctuation
fluctuations. In average regimes (such as in Finland), these two groups of estab-
lishments still differ by 5 percentage points. In both cases, probability differences
between establishment types are significant. In flexible labor markets, however,
workload fluctuations cease to make a significant difference in the probability of
hiring temporary workers.
As marginal effects in logistic models depend on covariates, we calculated DP
for low, and high values (one standard deviation difference from the mean) of
employment protection for temporary workers (Figure 3.6), whereby increasing
DP with EPL for permanent workers also holds for low and high employment
protection for temporary workers. Interestingly, we find that the threshold for
EPL for permanent workers, where DP becomes significantly different from zero,
is higher when temporary work is strongly regulated. Furthermore, DP becomes
largest when EPL for temporary workers is low. This result is quite intuitive: The
less it costs to hire and terminate temporary workers, the more often they are used
to circumvent the numerical adjustment to production shocks by firing permanent
workers.
Overall, we find that the effect of workload fluctuations on establishments’ de-
mand for temporary workers depends on employment protection for permanent
workers. This is in line with the results of Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992), who
study whether the impact of sales shocks on employment differs with the availab-
25We sometimes refer to the average marginal effect as the difference in the predicted probabilities
of establishments with annual fluctuation versus establishments without fluctuation.
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Figure 3.5: Does the positive relation of fluctuation with the probability of employing
Temps differ significantly with EPLP?
Note: Difference in the predicted probabilities of employing
at least one temporary worker of establishments with annual
fluctuation versus establishments without fluctuation, Model
(2), calculated at zero for all institutions (EPL for tempor-
ary workers (Temps), bargaining coverage rate), except EPL
permanent. 95% confidence interval (C.I.) presented with the
lower bound (l.b.) and upper bound (u.b.).
Figure 3.6: Does the positive relation of fluctuation with the probability of employing
Temps differ significantly with EPLP even for different values of EPL temporary?
Note: Difference in the predicted probabilities of employing
at least one temporary worker of establishments with annual
fluctuation versus establishments without fluctuation, Model
(2), calculated at zero for all institutions (bargaining coverage
rate), except EPL permanent and EPL for temporary workers
(Temps) (+/- one standard deviation from zero). 95% confid-
ence interval (C.I.) presented with the lower bound (l.b.) and
upper bound (u.b.).
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ility of temporary workers. They find - similar to lower firing costs for permanent
workers - an increased pro-cyclical response to sale shocks when temporary work-
ers are available. While our study evidently differs in terms of the dependent
and independent variables, in both studies institutions change the impact of labor
demand shocks (either measured as sales shocks or as the ”normal” duration of
shocks) on employment. This is also in line with results from Eslava et al. (2014)
who find job destruction (creation) to be stronger related to changes in the share
of temporary employment when employment protection for permanent workers in-
creased. In contrast, our findings differ slightly in comparison to Nunziata and
Staffolani (2007). They find a significant negative impact of recessions on the
aggregated share of temporary employment, although employment protection for
permanent workers does not change this effect strongly. The divergence from our
results is not very surprising. First, the micro-composition of the economy is not
accounted for by macro-data. Second, we employed different concepts in the sense
that we study the impact of the duration of ”normal” workload fluctuations and
not the impact of the current state of the economy.
Fixed-term contract and temporary agency workers
In this paper, temporary workers are distinguished between FTCs and TAWs. We
examined the probability of employing at least one FTC or TAW in the establish-
ment, and hence, this time controlling for EPL FTC and EPL TAW instead of EPL
Temp. One might be concerned about high correlations between indicators with
only 20 countries. Correlations, however, seem relatively modest between EPLP
and EPL FTC (0.31) or EPL TAW (0.43). The estimation results are shown in
Appendix 3.7.1 in Table 3.5. The focus is on Model (5) and Model (8).26
Theoretically, we do not expect differences between these two subgroups con-
cerning the impact of annual fluctuation at different levels of rigidity. We generally
find this to be the case. The direct effect of annual workload fluctuation on em-
ploying TAW or FTC is positive significant in Model (5) and Model (8). For
TAWs, the annual workload effect is slightly lower, which might be due to the
fact that TAWs play a minor macro-economic role. Another explanation is that
26See Section 3.5.1.
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annual workload fluctuations measures mainly fluctuations that were foreseeable
and hence FTCs could be employed. TAWs might be more relevant in the case
of unforeseeable fluctuations. Concerning weekly and daily fluctuation, we do not
find a strong and robust effect which is as expected. Part-time workers and flexible
working time should be more relevant for these kinds of variation.
Figure 3.7: Do workload fluctuations increase the probability of hiring FTCs (or TAWs)
and does this relation become even stronger with an increase in EPLP?
Note: Predicted probabilities of employing at least one
TAW/FTC of establishments with annual fluctuation against
establishments without fluctuation, Model (5) and (8) in Table
3.5 (Appendix 3.7.1), calculated at zero for all institutions
(bargaining coverage rate, EPL for fixed-term contract (FTC)
workers, EPL for temporary agency workers (TAW)), except
EPL permanent.
We, however, are mainly interested in the marginal effect of workload fluctu-
ations in different institutional contexts. We expect the impact of annual fluctu-
ation to differ at different levels of rigidity. This is also what we find, with the
probabilities of employing TAWs or FTCs significantly higher for establishments
with annual workload fluctuations given a sufficiently strong regulation for per-
manent workers (Figures 3.7 and 3.8). The results, however, seem to be more
strongly driven by FTCs rather than TAWs. Again, this could be explained by
the relatively small macro-economic relevance of TAWs. The other explanation
was that annual workload fluctuations mainly measures fluctuations that were
foreseeable and that TAWs might be more relevant to cope with unforeseeable
fluctuations.
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Figure 3.8: Does the positive relation of fluctuation with the probability of employing
FTCs (or TAWs) differ significantly with EPLP?
Note: Difference in the predicted probabilities of employing at
least one TAW/FTC of establishments with annual fluctuation
versus establishments without fluctuation, Model (5) and (8)
in Table 3.5 (Appendix 3.7.1), calculated at zero for all insti-
tutions (bargaining coverage rate, EPL for fixed-term contract
(FTC) workers, EPL for temporary agency workers (TAW)),
except EPL permanent. 95% confidence interval (C.I.) presen-
ted with the lower bound (l.b.) and upper bound (u.b.).
Share of fixed-term workers
Finally, we estimate the share of FTCs at the date of the interview as the dependent
variable. The share of FTCs cumulates at zero. Following the idea of different
processes for the extensive and intensive margin (e.g. Eslava et al., 2014), we
estimate a two-component model [probit model and OLS model (subsample with
values in the share of FTCs larger than zero].27 We find robust and expected
relations for the extensive margin but to a lesser extent for the intensive margin.
Establishments in rigid labor markets with annual fluctuations are more likely to
employ at least one FTC at the date of the interview compared to establishments
without annual fluctuation (Figure 3.9). This is not observed in flexible labor
markets.
In terms of the share of FTCs, the rigidity does not seem to play a fundamental
role in the relation between workload fluctuation and the share of FTCs (Figure
3.9).28 The non-significant result at the intensive margin can be explained by the
27Estimation results are available upon request.
28This is independent of whether we control for establishment weights. Results with establish-
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measurement period. The share of FTCs refers to the date of the interview, while
the dummy variable of annual workload fluctuation refers to a time period. The
fluctuation dummy does not provide any information about the workload at the
date of the interview. As the precise share of FTCs at the date of the reform is
expected to be much more sensitive to the workload at a specific point of time
compared to the decision to employ any FTC, the non-significant result is less
surprising.
Figure 3.9: Do the relations of fluctuation with the probability and the share of employ-
ing FTCs at the interview date differ significantly with EPLP in 2009?
Note: Difference in the predicted probabilities of employing
at least one FTC (Graph 1) or FTC shares at the date of
the interview (Graph 2) of establishments with annual fluc-
tuation versus establishments without fluctuation, Model (2)
with different dependent variables and estimators (Graph 1:
dummy for employing at least one FTC at the date of the
interview, probit model; Graph 2: share of FTC at the date
of the interview for firms with at least one FTC, OLS model)
without employers’ weight, calculated at zero for all institu-
tions (bargaining coverage rate, EPL for fixed-term contract
(FTC) workers), except EPL permanent. 95% confidence in-
terval (C.I.) presented with the lower bound (l.b.) and upper
bound (u.b.).
3.5.2 Correlation versus effect
In summary, establishments facing annual fluctuations are more likely to employ
temporary workers, and the likelihood increases with EPL for permanent workers.
To what extent, however, can we talk about effects rather than correlations? Our
ment weights are available upon request.
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identifying assumption is that workload fluctuation and employment protection
legislation for permanent workers are pre-determined to the hiring behavior of es-
tablishments. Given that our empirical identification is relatively weak, we discuss
in the following the extent to which our estimators could be interpreted as effects
rather than correlations. We discuss three issues: endogeneity of workload fluctu-
ations, endogeneity of EPL for permanent workers and omitted unobservables at
the country-level.
Endogeneity of workload fluctuations
Concerning expected workload fluctuations, we assume that workload fluctuations
are exogenous to hiring temporary workers. We interpret workload fluctuation as
being a characteristic of the product (1) itself, but also induced by macro-economic
variations (2). First, considering the product characteristic, for instance, the work-
load in restaurants fluctuates with peaks in the summer, while hotels also face
workload fluctuation due to seasonal fluctuations in demand. The establishment
also might invest in another product, although this is relatively costly compared
to hiring and firing decisions. Therefore, the product characteristic component of
workload fluctuation is interpreted as being pre-determined to hiring decisions.
Second, next to the product characteristic, workload fluctuation might also
change due to macro-economic variations (B). In this case, reversed causality might
be an issue. Recent matching models (Sala, Silca and Toledo, 2012; Costain, Ji-
meno and Thomas, 2010) show that a dual labor market structure - including high
shares of temporary workers - yields higher unemployment volatility. This, in turn,
might jeopardize private domestic demand. Increased volatility in private domestic
demand results in more workload volatility at the firm-level for firms producing for
the domestic sector. To assess the potential relevance of this mechanism, Figure
3.10 shows the share of establishments employing at least one temporary worker
by sector. The highest share is observed in the sector of education (M), health and
social work (N) and public administration (L). Domestic private demand might
play a role for sector N (health and social work), as well as sector M (educa-
tion). Public domestic demand and export, however, induced demand also play
a crucial role: Demand for health and social work (N), as well as public admin-
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istration is predominantly induced by the public (L); research for export-oriented
establishments might induce demand for higher education (M). Therefore, the use
of temporary workers is not restricted to private domestic demand and concerns
about reversed causality are at least weakened.
In addition, the notion that workload variations determine and motivate the
hiring of temporary workers and not solely reverse is also supported by Lotti and
Viviano (2012), as well as Houseman (2001). Lotti and Viviano (2012) show that
the positive relation between uncertainty of product demand shocks as a covari-
ate and the share of temporary employment on overall workforce remains when
uncertainty is lagged over more than one year. Finally, Houseman (2001) finds in
her survey that a main motive to employ temporary workers in American estab-
lishments is expected variation in the workload (40 per cent on average). Overall,
we do not rule out reversed causality, although it seems to be of limited relev-
ance in our case. Hence, we account for this by interpreting the positive workload
fluctuation estimator on temporary employment as an upper bound estimate.
Figure 3.10: Share of establishments’ employing at least one temporary worker by sector
Note: Source is ECS 2009 (Eurofound 2010a). NACE Rev.
1.1: C-E Manufacturing and energy; F Construction; G
Wholesale and retail trade, repair of goods; H Hotels and
restaurants; I Transport and communication; J Financial in-
termediation; K Real estate and business activities; L Public
administration; M Education; N Health and social work; O
Other community, social and personal services.
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Endogeneity of EPL for permanent workers
We do not employ exogenous variation in EPL for permanent workers to test our
hypothesis on the conditioning effect of EPL for permanent workers. Thereby,
reversed causality could be an issue. Reversed causality means that the hiring
behaviour of establishments would have an effect on EPL for permanent work-
ers. We, however, argue that plausible reversed causality would even underline
our interpretation of the results. First, for France, Marx (2012) found that chan-
ging hiring behaviour of employers - an increase in hiring of temporary workers
- yielded a decrease in EPL for temporary workers. If this mechanism was also
applicable to EPL for permanent workers, EPLP would be negatively correlated
to the employment of temporary workers. Hence, our positive significant relation
between EPLP and employing temporary workers would be underestimated, thus
reflecting a lower bound estimate.
Second, Bentolila, Dolado and Jimeno (2012) point to the relation between
the share of outsiders in a country and reforms in EPL for permanent workers -
while outsiders are those workers who are in flexible contracts and not in open-
end contracts like insiders (Saint-Paul, 1996a). The higher the share of temporary
workers is, the higher the share of the so-called outsiders, who are assumed to
benefit - or at least not to suffer - from lower EPLP. This argument is related
to Saint-Paul (1996b). Therefore, liberalizing reforms are more likely when the
share of temporary workers is high. This again implies that our positive estimator
between EPLP and the employment of temporary workers suffers from a downward
bias. In sum, reversed causality between hiring temporary workers and EPL for
permanent workers leads to a lower bound estimate of our positive estimator.
Omitted variables at the country-level
Third, concerning unobserved heterogeneity at the country-level, we argue to con-
trol for relevant other factors. For instance, employment protection for permanent
workers is positively correlated to the protection of temporary workers in our
estimation sample and EPL for temporary workers is negatively related to the
employment of temporary workers. Therefore, we include the interaction between
workload fluctuation and employment protection for temporary workers in our re-
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gressions. This rules out the notion that the increase in the effect of workload
fluctuation with employment protection for permanent workers is not attenuated
by employment protection legislation for temporary workers.
3.5.3 Robustness analyses
Our results for annual workload fluctuation and the interaction term between fluc-
tuation and EPL for permanent workers are quite robust with respect to differential
enforcement of EPL for permanent workers, country subsample estimations, and
different year of observation.
Differential enforcement of EPL for permanent workers
EPL for permanent workers might be differentially enforced across firm size. First,
more than half of the countries in our sample face some kind of exemptions from
EPL for permanent workers for small firms (Venn, 2009).29 Controlling for estab-
lishment size dummies in Model (2) does not account for this. Hence, we estimate
Model (2) (without controlling for establishment size dummies) for subsamples
that exclude one establishment size category. No major differences in the estim-
ates, however, are observed when small establishments are excluded (Figure 3.11).
Second, it was found that differential enforcement due to governance differ-
ences is relevant for the effect of EPL in samples of industrialized and devel-
oping countries and thus it is often accounted for in EPL analyses (Micco and
Pages, 2007; Haltiwanger et al., 2014). We employ governance indicators (govern-
ment effectiveness, rule of law, control of corruption) as proxies for the enforcement
of regulations (Micco and Pages, 2007; Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2004).30
Figure 3.12 shows that the relation does not significantly differ between countries
with high and low respective levels of enforcement. We explain this by the fact that
in European countries these indicators are relatively high and that enforcement is
specifically relevant in developing countries (Venn, 2009). For instance, Micco and
Pages (2007) found that their EPL indicator had no effect on job flows in countries
29Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Portugal, Slov-
enia, Sweden and Turkey.
30A description of the governance indicators can be found in Appendix 3.7.4.
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Figure 3.11: Is the relevance of EPLP for the relation of fluctuation with the probability
of employing Temps in 2009 underestimated due to small firm exemptions from EPL?
Note: Difference in the predicted probabilities of employing at least one temporary worker of establishments with
annual fluctuation versus establishments without fluctuation, Model (2) without firm size dummies, calculated at
zero for all institutions (bargaining coverage rate, EPL for temporary workers (Temps)), except EPL permanent.
Samples exclude (excl.) firms with the size of employees mentioned in the title. 95% confidence interval (C.I.)
presented with the lower bound (l.b.) and upper bound (u.b.).
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with low scores in the rule of law indicator. The mean in their sample of industrial
and developing countries is around -0.18, with a minimum at -1.27, while the mean
in our sample of non-developing countries is at 1.26, with a minimum at 0.13.
Figure 3.12: Differential enforcement: Does the positive relation of fluctuation with the
probability of employing Temps differ significantly with EPLP in 2009?
Note: Difference (diff.) in the average of predicted probabilities of employing at least one
temp of establishments with annual fluctuation against establishments without fluctuation,
Model (2), calculated at zero for all institutions (bargaining coverage rate, EPL for temporary
workers (Temps)), except EPL permanent. 95% confidence interval (C.I.) presented with
the lower bound (l.b.) and upper bound (u.b.). High (low) enforcement means sample is
restricted to firms in countries with governance indicators larger than (smaller or equal to)
the mean.
Other robustness analyses
In terms of subsample estimations, one might be concerned that the results are
driven by a single country. Therefore, we provide subgroup estimations. Figure
3.13 presents the average marginal effect of annual workload fluctuation on the
probability to employ at least one temporary worker and their confidence inter-
vals. Figure 3.13 is based upon Model (2) in Table 3.3, albeit for subsamples,
i.e. excluding one country from the sample. For each subsample, the average
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marginal effect of annual workload fluctuation requires a sufficient level of EPL
for permanent workers to be significant. Hence, the results are not driven by one
specific country.31 Furthermore, we checked whether results differ with sectors and
conclude that they are not driven by a specific sector too (Appendix 3.7.5).
Figure 3.13: Is the relevance of EPLP for the relation of fluctuation with the probability
of employing Temps in 2009 driven by one specific country?
Note: Difference in the predicted probabilities of employing at least one temporary worker of establishments with
annual fluctuation versus establishments without fluctuation, Model (2), calculated at zero for all institutions
(bargaining coverage rate, EPL for temporary workers (Temps)), except EPL permanent. Samples exclude the
country which is mentioned in the title. 95% confidence interval (C.I.) presented with the lower bound (l.b.) and
upper bound (u.b.).
The survey for the main analyses was conducted in spring 2009, when most
European countries were experiencing a severe economic crisis. Results might be
sensitive to this. Therefore, we estimated Model (2) in Table 3.3 with establish-
ment data of the 2004/2005 ECS. Figure 3.14 shows that the relation is as expected
31The results for employing at least one TAW or FTC are similarly robust.
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for temporary workers. Examining FTCs and TAWs separately, it becomes evid-
ent that the relation is driven by FTCs and not by TAWs. This is similar to the
2009 data.32 The expected relationship is less clear when Germany is included,
which is unsurprising, considering that extensive German labor market reforms,
e.g. temporary agency work, took place between 2003 and 2006.
Figure 3.14: Does the positive relation of fluctuation with the probability of employing
Temps (or FTCs, TAWs) differ significantly with EPLP in 2004/2005?
Note: Difference in the predicted probabilities of employing at least one temp (FTC or TAW)
of establishments with annual fluctuation versus establishments without fluctuation, Model
(2), (5) and (8) but with the 2004/2005 sample with employers’ weight, calculated at zero for
all institutions (bargaining coverage rate, EPL for temporary workers (Temps) (Model (2)),
EPL for fixed-term contract (FTC) workers, EPL for temporary agency workers (TAW)),
except EPL permanent. Sample excludes Germany. 95% confidence interval (C.I.) presented
with the lower bound (l.b.) and upper bound (u.b.).
Concerning the measurement of EPL, the difference between EPL for perman-
ent and temporary workers might be the more relevant measure rather than EPL
for permanent workers itself. Taking the difference indicates that establishments in
Ireland and United Kingdom face higher incentives to employ temporary workers
compared to establishments in France. The share of temporary workers in France,
32The results of the 2004/2005 ECS are a bit more sensitive to employer weights compared to
results of the 2009 sample.
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however, is higher compared to Ireland and United Kingdom. Controlling for other
institutions and establishments-level variables, we do not find a clear positive role
of the difference for the relation between workload fluctuations and the probability
of employing temporary workers.33 Hence, even when temporary work is relatively
high regulated, temporary workers still seem to be more attractive compared to
permanent workers in highly regulated countries concerning permanent workers.
While we do not conclude that relative costs do not play any role, in our case they
are less relevant.
3.6 Conclusions
The intention of our paper was to bring in the interaction between shocks of short
duration and employment protection as an important element explaining firms’
demand for temporary work in Europe. This is pressing as the financial crisis in
2007 increased macro-economic fluctuations, which are positively related to firm-
level fluctuations. Therefore, shocks at the firm-level became even more relevant
for the use of temporary work. In line with recent theories, we have hypothesized a
higher propensity to hire temporary workers if a firm is exposed to shocks of short
duration. But we have expected this effect to be conditioned by the regulatory
framework. Shocks should only matter if firing costs for workers with permanent
contracts are sufficiently high.
We constructed a novel data set combining establishment-level variables of
around 18,000 establishments from up to 20 European countries with institutional
variables for 2004/2005 and 2009. The establishment-level data provide the unique
opportunity to investigate the duration of labor demand shocks and temporary
employment at the same time. Furthermore, these data offer the novel opportunity
to investigate labor demand shocks at the establishment-level within a broad cross-
country study. The data, however, are limited in terms of controlling for firm
fixed-effects. Due to the demanding assumptions of our identification strategy, we
extensively discuss the issue of correlations versus effects.
Using cross-country establishment data, we were able to confirm our hypothesis
33The results are available upon request.
CHAPTER 3. PROTECTION, SHOCKS, TEMPORARY WORK 100
across a number of robustness checks, having extensively discussed potential endo-
geneity issues. First, we are able to generalize results from single country studies
to European countries (Eslava et al., 2014): Our main result is that establish-
ments with workload fluctuation within a year are more likely to hire workers
on temporary contracts, with this effect being conditional upon a certain level of
employment protection legislation - our measure of firing costs. The results are
not only statistically significant, but they also matter in substantive terms. While
we do not observe a significant effect of workload fluctuations in flexible labor
markets, the difference between establishments with and without fluctuations is
eight percentage points in heavily regulated labor markets. This is also true for
the employment of fixed-term and temporary agency workers, although to a lesser
extent for the latter. This might be explained by a still minor macro-economic role
of agency workers in Europe. Another explanation is that agency workers might
be more used to cope with uncertain shocks, while our shock measure emphasizes
the short duration of a shock and not the uncertainty of a shock.
Second, we provide first evidence on the relevance of the duration of labor
demand shocks for temporary employment: While annual fluctuation is robust
positively related to employing temporary workers, this is less true for weekly and
daily fluctuation. Firms might adjust for weekly and daily fluctuations by part-
time or working time accounts but less by temporary workers. Finally, we are the
first who descriptively show that annual workload fluctuation is widely spread in
Europe: 64 per cent of establishments in 20 European countries had to deal with
annual fluctuations in the workload in 2008 and was the dominant form (compared
to weekly and daily).
Future research could built up on this by investigating adjustment mechanisms
for weekly and daily fluctuations in more detail as well as by studying hetero-
geneity in fluctuations which take longer than one year. To investigate motives
for the differences in the use of temporary agency work versus fixed-term con-
tracts as a buffer seems to be a fruitful task, too. Employing different methods
in order to mitigate remaining concerns about reversed causality (fluctuation and
temporary employment) would be beneficial in order to cross-validate these find-
ings. Moreover, generally speaking, our results are in line with initial findings
that labor market institutions mediate the effect of firm-characteristics. Bringing
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the different levels together is a fruitful task for future research. Depending on
the research question, the data for this would be readily available. More difficult,
regarding data requirements, would be to analyse the link between institutions,
establishments and workers’ characteristics. The improved availability of linked
employer-employee data sets may make this possible in the future.
As we have shown, firing costs encourage the use of temporary contracts for
establishments with yearly workload fluctuations. Our descriptive results indicate
that annual workload fluctuations are widely spread in Europe, and thereby, that
the need for flexibility is inherent to some establishments’ production processes.
Reforms ignoring the fundamental role of economic volatilities in the context of
sufficiently large EPLP for temporary employment might produce a strengthening
of segmented labor markets.
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3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Full models
Table 3.4: Are workload fluctuations associated with higher odds ratios (logistic model)
of hiring Temps and does this relation become even stronger with an increase in EPLP?
Dependent variable If any temporary worker
(1) (2) (3)
Establishment controls
WF annual 1.329*** 1.316*** 1.241***
(6.25) (3.95) (4.92)
WF weekly 1.148* 1.198* 1.076
(2.07) (2.26) (1.22)
WF daily 0.895 0.857* 0.846**
(-1.94) (-2.16) (-2.82)
Freelancer 1.830*** 1.814*** 2.067***
(7.08) (4.51) (7.83)
Works council 1.416*** 1.833*** 2.892***
(5.1) (3.74) (13.62)
Number of workers up 1.305*** 1.350*** 1.575***
(7.48) (7.14) (12.2)
Number of workers down 0.987 1.016 1.067
(-0.25) (0.26) (1.15)
Absent 1.474*** 1.624*** 1.805***
(5.87) (5.33) (8)
Gender share 1.004** 1.004** 1.006***
(3.06) (3.16) (3.88)
High-skilled share 1.001 1 1.003
(0.48) (0.05) (1.81)
Flexible working time 1.206*** 1.290*** 1.204***
(3.92) (4.39) (3.59)
Cross-level interactions
EPLP*WF annual 1.144* 1.283* 1.129*
(2.13) (2.35) (2.21)
EPL temp*WF annual 1.019 0.946 1.026
(0.65) (-0.98) (1.18)
Bargainin*WF annual 0.999 0.996 1.000
Continued on next page
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Table 3.4 – Continued from previous page
Dependent variable If any temporary worker
(1) (2) (3)
(-0.78) (-1.26) (-0.20)
Country controls
EPLP 1.349
(0.9)
Bargaining coverage 0.994
(-0.53)
EPLP*bargaining 1.016
-1.4
Unemployment rate 0.859
(-1.45)
EPL temp 0.704
(-1.26)
EPLP*EPL temp 0.745
(-0.91)
EPL temp*bargaining 1.006
-1.45
Establishment size fixed effect yes yes no
Sectors fixed effect yes yes no
Country fixed effect yes no yes
Establishments 18407 18407 18407
Countries 20 20 20
LL -8612 -9213 -9299
Note: *** significant at 0.1 per cent, ** significant at 1 per cent, * significant at 5 per
cent. Coefficients are reported as odds ratios and are from logistic regression models with
clustered standard errors, z-values in parentheses. Continuous variables are centered. Temps
is temporary workers. WF stands for workload fluctuation; EPLP is employment protection
legislation for permanent workers. Country variables: EPL for temporary workers, bargain-
ing coverage, EPLP*bargaining coverage, EPL for temporary workers*bargaining coverage,
EPLP*EPL for temporary workers, unemployment rate. Establishment variables: freelancer,
works council, number of workers increased, number of workers decreased, high absenteeism
and/or sickness rates (i.e. absenteeism and/or sickness causes human resource problems) ,
gender share, share of high-skilled workers (i.e. the proportion of employees working in high-
skilled jobs which usually require an academic degree), flexible working time. Interaction
between country and establishment variables: WF annual*EPL for temporary workers, WF
annual*bargaining coverage. Establishment-level variables described in Table 3.1. Country-
level variables described in Table 3.2.
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Table 3.5: Are workload fluctuations associated with higher odds ratios (logistic model)
of hiring FTCs (or TAWs) and does this relation become even stronger with an increase
in EPLP?
Dependent variable If any FTC If any TAW
(4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Establishment controls
WF annual 1.316*** 1.319*** 1.225*** 1.126* 1.163** 1.078
(6.11) (3.73) (4.91) (2.07) (3.01) (1.21)
WF weekly 1.085 1.137* 1.018 1.05 1.116* 1.006
(1.44) (2.03) (0.37) (1.06) (2.29) (0.13)
WF daily 0.968 0.949 0.95 0.902 0.861* 0.802**
(-0.56) (-0.84) (-0.86) (-1.40) (-1.96) (-2.75)
Freelancer 1.596*** 1.603*** 1.747*** 1.666*** 1.503*** 1.835***
(6.54) (4.92) (8.2) (7.32) (4.43) (8.21)
TAW 1.822*** 2.020*** 2.238***
(5.94) (6.12) (7.04)
FTC 1.855*** 2.011*** 2.290***
(5.57) (6.02) (7.02)
Works council 1.333*** 1.563*** 2.589*** 1.281** 1.504*** 1.961***
(3.31) (3.32) (10.7) (2.67) (4.05) (7.95)
Number of workers up 1.208*** 1.233*** 1.398*** 1.151*** 1.165*** 1.353***
(4.2) (4.51) (7.42) (3.6) (3.99) (8.489)
Number of workers down 0.973 1.028 1.011 0.985 0.951 1.186**
(-0.47) (0.45) (0.19) (-0.27) (-0.81) (3.02)
Absent 1.346*** 1.454*** 1.613*** 1.252*** 1.288** 1.447***
(5.02) (5.66) (7.21) (3.32) (2.79) (5.58)
Gender share 1.007*** 1.007*** 1.011*** 0.996* 0.995** 0.991**
(5.64) (6.15) (7.72) (-2.54) (-2.99) (-3.20)
High-skilled share 1.001 1 1.004* 1.002 1.002 0.999
(0.4) (0.13) (2.34) (1.15) (1.16) (-0.35)
Flexible working time 1.210*** 1.259*** 1.211*** 1.103 1.128* 1.173*
(5.15) (4.22) (4.73) (1.6) (1.98) (2.11)
Cross-level interactions
EPLP*WF annual 1.087 1.181 1.112 1.027 1.072 1.043
Continued on next page
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Table 3.5 – Continued from previous page
Dependent variable If any FTC If any TAW
(4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(1.16) (1.41) (1.59) (0.37) (1.24) (0.54)
EPL FTC*WF annual 0.984 0.989 1.019 1.031 1.022 1.034
(-0.49) (-0.23) (0.58) (0.6) (0.42) (0.65)
EPL TAW*WF annual 0.999 0.945 0.968 1.069 1.091* 1.062
(-0.04) (-1.26) (-1.10) (1.73) (2.47) (1.75)
Bargaining*WF annual 0.997 0.994* 0.997 0.999 0.997 0.999
(-1.95) (-2.14) (-1.56) (-0.54) (-1.74) (-0.42)
Country controls
EPLP 1.515 2.16
(1.1) (1.76)
Bargaining coverage 0.999 1.030***
(-0.13) (6.24)
EPLP*bargaining 1.038** 0.942***
(2.72) (-3.69)
Unemployment rate 0.862 1.02
(-1.49) (0.25)
EPL FTC 0.976 0.770*
(-0.15) (-2.27)
EPL TAW 1.097 0.705**
(0.59) (-2.74)
EPLP*EPL FTC 0.589 4.441***
(-1.38) (3.6)
EPLP*EPL TAW 0.775 1.268
(-1.23) (1.45)
EPL FTC*bargaining 1.007 0.997
(1.57) (-0.87)
EPL TAW*bargaining 0.996 1.007*
(-1.01) (2.29)
Establishment size yes yes no yes yes no
Sectors yes yes no yes yes no
Country dummies yes no yes yes no yes
Establishments 18407 18407 18407 18407 18407 18407
Countries 20 20 20 20 20 20
Continued on next page
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Table 3.5 – Continued from previous page
Dependent variable If any FTC If any TAW
(4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
LL -9060 -9601 -9703 -8340 -8623 -8880
Note: *** significant at 0.1 per cent, ** significant at 1 per cent, * significant at 5 per cent. Coefficients are
reported as odds ratios and are from logistic regression models with clustered standard errors, z-values in parentheses.
Continuous variables are centered. WF stands for workload fluctuation; EPLP is employment protection legislation
for permanent workers; EPL TAW is employment protection for temporary agency workers; EPL FTC is employment
protection for fixed-term contract workers; no. workers up means that the number of workers increased; no. workers
down means that the number of workers decreased; absent means that the level of absenteeism and/or sickness
causes human resource problems; high-skilled share means the proportion of employees working in high-skilled jobs
which usually require an academic degree, flexible working time. Establishment-level variables described in Table
3.1. Country-level variables described in Table 3.2.
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3.7.2 Robustness: employer weights
Figure 3.15: Does the positive relation of fluctuation with the probability of employing
Temps (or FTCs, TAWs) differ significantly with EPLP in 2009 using employer weights?
Note: Difference in the predicted probabilities of employing at least one temp (FTC or TAW)
of establishments with annual fluctuation versus establishments without fluctuation, Model
(2), (5) and (8) with employers weight, calculated at zero for all institutions (bargaining
coverage rate, EPL for temporary workers (Temps) (Model (2)), EPL for fixed-term contract
(FTC) workers, EPL for temporary agency workers (TAW)), except EPL permanent. 95%
confidence interval (C.I.) presented with the lower bound (l.b.) and upper bound (u.b.).
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3.7.3 Description of the original sample and the estimation
sample
Comparing the original 2009 ECS with the selected sample, we drop a major share
of observations. Therefore, we provide a full description of data availability for the
30 initial countries in the 2009 ECS. Establishment data are presented in for the
original sample in Table 3.6 and for the estimation sample in Table 3.7. We explain
in detail why we lost observations. The initial number of establishments is 27,160
out of 30 countries which are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Italy, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the United King-
dom and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
Out of 27,160 establishments, there are 73 and 64 establishments with missing
values in FTC and TAW and 142 (210, 201) establishments with missing values
in yearly fluctuation (weekly, daily). This leaves us with 26,649 establishments.
EPL TAW and EPL FTC is not available in 2008 for Bulgaria, Cyprus, Lithuania,
Malta, Romania, Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. This
leaves us with 22,802 observations. Furthermore, the variables on temporary em-
ployment are not comparable for Spain and Italy (Eurofound, 2010b), which are
1,509 and 1,502 establishments, respectively. Hence, 20 countries and 19,791 es-
tablishments are left. Excluding the public owned establishments makes 19,711
observations. Excluding missing values in the other micro-variables further reduces
the sample to 18,407 observations. The majority of missing values (approximately
1,000) relate to the variables on the gender and high-skilled share.
This leaves us with only one-third of the original ECS countries. One might
be worried that the resulting variation of EPL remains sufficient to identify the
coefficients. Although, we are left with only 20 countries, we fortunately do not
suffer in terms of variation in EPL. The maximum and the minimum of the EPL
indicators do not change when the ten countries are dropped (see Tables 3.8 and
3.9). Standard deviation even increases for EPL for permanent workers, EPL for
temporary workers and EPL for fixed-term workers.
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Table 3.6: Summary statistics for establishment-level variables (2009): original sample
Variable Mean SD Min Max N
If any temp 0.65 0.48 0 1 27160
If any TAW 0.27 0.44 0 1 27096
If any FTC 0.58 0.49 0 1 27087
Share of FTC 8.39 18.81 0 100 26169
If any WF daily 0.31 0.46 0 1 26950
If any WF weekly 0.42 0.49 0 1 26959
If any WF annual 0.63 0.48 0 1 27018
If any freelancer 0.23 0.42 0 1 27031
If any works council 0.50 0.50 0 1 27160
No. of workers increased between 2006 and 2009 0.34 0.47 0 1 27160
No. of workers decreased between 2006 and 2009 0.27 0.44 0 1 27160
If high absenteeism and/or sickness rates (absent) 0.16 0.37 0 1 27035
Gender share (centered) 41.41 30.09 0 100 26347
High-skilled share (centered) 24.67 28.81 0 100 26126
If flexible working time schemes 0.55 0.50 0 1 26986
Establishment size (1-10) 3.43 2.78 1 10 27160
NACE C-E 0.31 0.46 0 1 27160
NACE F 0.10 0.30 0 1 27160
NACE G 0.15 0.35 0 1 27160
NACE H 0.04 0.18 0 1 27160
NACE I 0.05 0.21 0 1 27160
NACE J 0.02 0.14 0 1 27160
NACE K 0.09 0.29 0 1 27160
NACE L 0.06 0.24 0 1 27160
NACE N 0.07 0.25 0 1 27160
NACE O 0.04 0.20 0 1 27160
Note: Source is ECS 2009 (Eurofound, 2010b). Descriptive statistics with employer weights. Temporary workers
(temp), temporary agency worker (TAW), fixed-term contract worker (FTC), workload fluctuation (WF), number
(no.). High absenteeism means that an establishment encounters a human resource problem due to absenteeism
and/or sickness. The share of high-skilled means the proportion of employees working in high-skilled jobs which
usually require an academic degree. NACE Rev. 1.1: C-E Manufacturing and energy; F Construction; G Wholesale
and retail trade, repair of goods; H Hotels and restaurants; I Transport and communication; J Financial intermedi-
ation; K Real estate and business activities; L Public administration; M Education; N Health and social work; O
Other community, social and personal services.
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Table 3.7: Summary statistics for establishment-level variables (2009): estimation
sample
Variable Mean SD Min Max N
If any temp 0.67 0.47 0 1 18407
If any TAW 0.30 0.46 0 1 18407
If any FTC 0.60 0.49 0 1 18407
Share of FTC 8.77 18.97 0 100 17995
If any WF daily 0.30 0.46 0 1 18407
If any WF weekly 0.42 0.49 0 1 18407
If any WF annual 0.63 0.48 0 1 18407
If any freelancer 0.22 0.42 0 1 18407
If any works council 0.49 0.50 0 1 18407
No. of workers increased between 2006 and 2009 0.36 0.48 0 1 18407
No. of workers decreased between 2006 and 2009 0.27 0.44 0 1 18407
If high absenteeism and/or sickness rates (absent) 0.17 0.38 0 1 18407
Gender share (centered) 40.53 30.12 0 100 18407
High-skilled share (centered) 23.73 28.30 0 100 18407
If flexible working time schemes 0.57 0.49 0 1 18407
Establishment size (1-10) 3.42 2.81 1 10 18407
NACE C-E 0.32 0.47 0 1 18407
NACE F 0.10 0.30 0 1 18407
NACE G 0.14 0.35 0 1 18407
NACE H 0.03 0.18 0 1 18407
NACE I 0.05 0.21 0 1 18407
NACE J 0.02 0.14 0 1 18407
NACE K 0.10 0.30 0 1 18407
NACE L 0.06 0.23 0 1 18407
NACE N 0.08 0.26 0 1 18407
NACE O 0.04 0.20 0 1 18407
Note: Source is ECS 2009 (Eurofound, 2010b). Descriptive statistics with employer weights. Temporary workers
(temp), temporary agency worker (TAW), fixed-term contract worker (FTC), workload fluctuation (WF), number
(no.). High absenteeism means that an establishment encounters a human resource problem due to absenteeism
and/or sickness. The share of high-skilled means the proportion of employees working in high-skilled jobs which
usually require an academic degree. NACE Rev. 1.1: C-E Manufacturing and energy; F Construction; G Wholesale
and retail trade, repair of goods; H Hotels and restaurants; I Transport and communication; J Financial intermedi-
ation; K Real estate and business activities; L Public administration; M Education; N Health and social work; O
Other community, social and personal services.
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Table 3.8: Summary statistics for country-level variables (2009): original sample
Variable Mean SD Min Max N
EPLP 2.309 0.545 1.170 3.510 24786
EPL temp 2.374 1.153 0.290 4.880 24786
EPL FTC 2.018 1.312 0.250 4.250 23215
EPL TAW 2.805 1.359 0.333 5.500 23215
Bargaining coverage rate 63.831 28.646 10.000 100.000 26291
Unemployment rate 6.837 2.747 2.500 14.600 26640
Note: Temporary workers (temp), temporary agency worker (TAW), fixed-term contract worker (FTC), EPL for
permanent workers (EPLP), EPL for temporary workers (EPL temp), EPL for temporary agency workers (EPL
TAW), EPL for fixed-term workers (EPL FTC). Data sources: EPL 2008 from OECD (2012), national unemployment
rate in the first quarter of 2009 Eurostat (2012), bargaining coverage rate Hayter and Stoevska (2011) and Eurofound
(2007a).
Table 3.9: Summary statistics for country-level variables (2009): estimation sample
Variable Mean SD Min Max N
EPLP 2.344 0.565 1.170 3.510 18407
EPL temp 2.290 1.165 0.290 4.880 18407
EPL FTC 1.925 1.367 0.250 4.250 18407
EPL TAW 2.653 1.336 0.333 5.500 18407
Bargaining coverage rate 63.754 28.780 11.300 100.000 18407
Unemployment rate 6.299 1.948 2.500 10.100 18407
Note: Temporary workers (temp), temporary agency worker (TAW), fixed-term contract worker (FTC), EPL for
permanent workers (EPLP), EPL for temporary workers (EPL temp), EPL for temporary agency workers (EPL
TAW), EPL for fixed-term workers (EPL FTC). Data sources: EPL 2008 from OECD (2012), national unemployment
rate in the first quarter of 2009 Eurostat (2012), bargaining coverage rate Hayter and Stoevska (2011) and Eurofound
(2007a).
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3.7.4 Description of the governance indicators
Three governance indicators of the World Bank (Kaufmann et al., 2004) were
chosen to capture the degree of enforcement of EPL for permanent workers due
to differences in governance: government effectiveness, rule of law and control of
corruption. They are aggregated indicators on perceptions of governance. Govern-
ment effectiveness as an aggregated indicator includes the quality of public service
provision, as well as the independence of civil services from political pressure and
the trustworthiness of the government’s commitment to rules. Rule of law is an
aggregated measure of the confidence in rules; for instance, the enforceability of
contracts is included. All three indicators are normally distributed and range from
around -2.5 to 2.5.
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3.7.5 Robustness: sectors
We check whether our results are robust with reference to different sectors. We do
not find that the results are driven by one specific sector (Figure 3.16). Sector-
specific estimates are less robust, although these estimates partly suffer from a
small number of observations (around 300).34
Figure 3.16: Does the positive relation of fluctuation with the probability of employing
Temps differ significantly with EPLP in 2009?
Note: Difference (diff.) in the average of predicted probabilities of employing at least one temp of establishments
with annual fluctuation against establishments without fluctuation, Model (2), calculated at zero for all institutions
(bargaining coverage rate, EPL for temporary workers (Temps)), except EPL permanent. 95% confidence interval
(C.I.) presented with the lower bound (l.b.) and upper bound (u.b.). Samples exclude firms of the sector mentioned
in the title. C-E Manufacturing and energy; F Construction; G Wholesale and retail trade, repair of goods; H Hotels
and restaurants; I Transport and communication; J Financial intermediation; K Real estate and business activities;
L Public administration; M Education; N Health and social work; O Other community, social and personal services.
34Results are available upon request.
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3.7.6 Comparison of strategies to deal with clustering
Table 3.10: Comparison of strategies to deal with clustering based on Cameron and
Miller (2015)
Dependent variable If any temporary worker
Logit FGLS ML RS
WF annual 1.316*** 1.329*** 1.335***
(3.95) (6.24) (5.17)
WF weekly 1.198* 1.150* 1.148***
(2.26) (2.09) (2.87)
WF daily 0.857* 0.894* 0.895*
(-2.16) (-1.96) (-2.16)
EPLP*WF annual 1.283* 1.147* 1.161
(2.35) (2.16) (1.43)
EPLP 1.349 1.294 1.277
(0.90) (0.68) (0.62)
Establishment variables yes yes yes
Establishment size fixed effect yes yes no
Sectors fixed effect yes yes no
Cross-level interactions yes yes yes
Country fixed effect yes no yes
Country variables no yes no
Establishments 18407 18407 18407
Countries 20 20 20
LL -9213 -8662 -8655
Note: Logistic regression models with clustered standard errors in Logit and FGLS, FGLS
indicates feasible GLS estimation, ML RS indicates a Multilevel model with random slopes.
*** significant at 0.1 per cent, ** significant at 1 per cent, * significant at 5 per cent. Coeffi-
cients are reported as odds ratios, z-values in parentheses. Continuous variables are centered.
Temps is temporary workers. WF stands for workload fluctuation; EPLP is employment
protection legislation for permanent workers. Country variables: EPL for temporary work-
ers, bargaining coverage, EPLP*bargaining coverage, EPL for temporary workers*bargaining
coverage, EPLP*EPL for temporary workers, unemployment rate. Establishment variables:
freelancer, works council, number of workers increased, number of workers decreased, high
absenteeism and/or sickness rates (i.e. absenteeism and/or sickness causes human resource
problems) , gender share, share of high-skilled workers (i.e. the proportion of employees
working in high-skilled jobs which usually require an academic degree), flexible working
time. Interaction between country and establishment variables: WF annual*EPL for tem-
porary workers, WF annual*bargaining coverage. Establishment-level variables described in
Table 3.1. Country-level variables described in Table 3.2.
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Chapter 4
Employment protection reform
effects on well-being
4.1 Introduction
Employment protection legislation for permanent contracts (EPLP) is a potential
source of a high incidence of temporary employment and of youth unemployment
(Kahn, 2007). In order to decrease adverse effects, liberalizing reforms in EPLP
were proposed in the public debate in the aftermath of the 2007 financial crisis.
Following this discussion, policy makers liberalized EPLP between 2008 and 2013,
e.g., in Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece (OECD, 2013b). Such reforms are
considered to be politically harmful because powerful permanent workers would
suffer, while less powerful temporary workers would benefit (e.g. Rueda, 2005).
Previous research on the effects of EPLP, however, suggests that the effect of
EPLP on well-being is not as clear. Search and matching models predict that job
destruction and construction of permanent jobs increases when EPLP decreases.
Marinescu (2009) and Boockmann et al. (2008) show that job stability might de-
crease. In moral hazard situations, a decrease in EPLP could decrease monitoring,
as dismissals can be applied as disciplinary advices, and thereby, decreases stress
(Lepage-Saucier and Wasmer, 2012). Hence, for permanent workers less job stabil-
ity must be weighed against the reduced stress. Due to increased job construction,
temporary workers could benefit from a more likely access into permanent jobs
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(Centeno and Novo, 2012). Booth et al. (2002) showed that temporary work is
associated with lower training, lower wages and less job satisfaction compared to
permanent work. Workers, however, who remain in a temporary job after a reduc-
tion in EPLP might suffer due to the comparison to colleagues who transitioned
into a permanent job.
In order to improve our understanding on effects of EPLP on well-being, I
evaluate the effect of an increase and a decrease in German EPLP on life satisfac-
tion as a proxy for well-being. The identification strategy relies on German EPLP
reforms which changed EPLP for small firms only. Due to this subgroup and time
variation, I am able to employ the reforms as quasi-experiments in a difference-
in-difference approach (DID). As a major share of permanent workers was almost
not affected by the reforms in EPLP, the focus is on temporary workers. Using
the longitudinal German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), I account for individual
fixed effects.
A major drawback of the GSOEP, however, is that the treatment group can
not be measured precisely, and hence, incorporates measurement errors. It is,
therefore, likely that the estimates of the effect of EPLP on well-being are biased
towards zero. This has to be kept in mind when interpreting the results. Import-
antly, in order to address potential violation of the common trend assumption and
worker selection, I control for both observables and time-invariant unobservables
and conduct placebo tests as well as pre-treatment trend tests. If the reforms in-
duce selection, I capture for this, if the process can be explained by observables or
time-invariant unobservables. When interpreting the results, this has to be kept
in mind.
This paper contributes to the growing literature which employs evaluation tech-
niques to study effects of labor market institutions and policies on well-being (e.g.
Hamermesh, Kawaguchi and Lee, 2014; Dorsett and Oswald, 2014). Within this
literature and to the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first that combines
standard evaluation techniques for the effect of reforms in employment protection
on objective outcomes1 with the literature on determinants of life satisfaction.2
1For instance, Leonardi and Pica (2013), Scoppa (2010), Martins (2009), Kugler and Pica (2008),
Boockmann et al. (2008), and Bauer et al. (2007).
2For instance, Frey and Stutzer (2012), Clark and Senik (2010), Kassenboehmer and Haisken-
DeNew (2009), and Clark et al. (2008).
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Boarini et al. (2013) and Ochsen and Welsch (2012) analyze the relation between
employment protection and life satisfaction based on within-country variation of
employment protection and pooled cross-sectional data but do not investigate
within-country subgroup variation.3 Thereby, they cannot easily rule out concerns
about unobserved confounding and reversed causality.4 Busk et al. (2015) (DID
with propensity score matching), Lepage-Saucier and Wasmer (2012) (DID) and
Kuroki (2012) (DID) are exceptions in the literature of employment protection and
well-being. They examine the effect of employment protection on stress (Lepage-
Saucier and Wasmer, 2012) and job satisfaction (Busk et al., 2015; Kuroki, 2012)
but not on life satisfaction.
Furthermore, this paper is the first to study the effect of employment protec-
tion for permanent workers on life satisfaction. Boarini et al. (2013) and Ochsen
and Welsch (2012) do not differentiate between protection for permanent versus
temporary contracts. Other studies on employment protection and well-being
which account for this difference investigate job satisfaction, perceived job secur-
ity and stress but not life satisfaction (Lepage-Saucier and Wasmer, 2012; Sal-
vatori, 2010; Clark and Postel-Vinay, 2009; Kuroki, 2012). Lastly, this paper
investigates effect heterogeneity and discusses potential mechanisms for the effect
of employment protection legislation on life satisfaction.
The main finding is that the decrease in EPLP in 1996 decreased life satisfac-
tion of temporary workers by 6% of the mean in life satisfaction. An explanation
for this is that temporary workers who remain in a temporary job suffer from the
comparison to colleagues who successfully transitioned into a permanent job after
the decrease in EPLP. This interpretation is in line with the finding of Centeno
and Novo (2012) that EPLP adversely affects transition probabilities from tem-
porary to permanent work and is in line with the literature on social comparison
(e.g. Clark and Senik, 2010). Selection of workers is accounted for as long as
this is due to unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity or observed heterogeneity.
Unobserved time-variant heterogeneity might remain an issue. Pre-reform trend
3Salvatori (2010) and Clark and Postel-Vinay (2009) investigate employment protection and job
satisfaction or job security but do not investigate within-country subgroup variation, too.
4Reversed causality is a potential crucial issue as, for instance, workers who are worried about
job security demand, as a consequence, higher EPLP from political actors (Clark and Postel-
Vinay, 2009).
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tests, however, do not reject that control and treatment group follow a common
trend controlling for above mentioned heterogeneity. Furthermore, I find that less
employable workers are specifically strong affected by a decrease in EPLP. The
negative effect returns back to zero after one year which might be explained by
adaptation (e.g. Clark et al., 2008). I find no effect of the increase in EPLP (1999)
on temporary workers which could be explained by the notion that losses are val-
ued stronger than gains (e.g. Boyce, Wood, Banks, Clark and Brown, 2013). As
the majority of permanent workers were not strongly affected by the EPLP re-
form, I do not expect effects on their well-being. Indeed, I do not find any. Due
to the measurement error in the treatment status, however, all effects should be
considered as lower bounds.
The paper is organized as follows: The next section develops hypotheses on the
effect of employment protection on well-being. Following that, I present the institu-
tional background in Section 4.3. The fourth Section introduces the identification
strategy and data. Section 4.5 presents the results of the empirical analyses, and
in the final section, I conclude.
4.2 Related literature
Employment protection regulations regulate the hiring and firing of workers with
temporary contracts and/or with permanent contracts. A temporary contract
finishes after a specified period of time, while a permanent contract is open-ended
in its duration. These employment protection regulations are based on formal
legislation, collective bargaining, and court interpretation of legislation. In this
paper, I focus on formal employment protection legislation for permanent contracts
(EPLP), regulating issues like the period of notice for termination, specific forms of
dismissal, or severance payments. Thereby, stronger EPLP increases adjustment
costs of the workforce at the firm level.
In labor economics, firm-level adjustment costs are often modeled in dynamic
labor demand models (e.g. Boeri and Garibaldi, 2007; Nunziata and Staffolani,
2007) and in search and matching models (e.g. Cahuc et al., 2012; Boeri and van
Ours, 2013; Boeri, 2011; Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004). This literature suggests
that employment protection has an effect on job destruction and creation, flows
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into and out of employment, but an ambiguous effect on employment levels.5
Relying on labor economics and the empirical literature on well-being, I derive
hypotheses on the effect of EPLP on well-being.6 Well-being is considered to be
a function of current income, expected income, and relative social status. The
expected well-being from a permanent job is assumed to be higher than from
a temporary job as workers in a temporary job exhibit a higher probability of
becoming unemployed in the future.
4.2.1 Employment flows
Search and matching models incorporate employment protection via firing costs,
which alter the profit function of firms. Boeri (2011) models the effects of an
increase in firing costs for permanent workers in a labor market which allows the
existence of temporary and permanent contracts in his model. An increase in firing
costs yields a decrease in job destruction of permanent workers and a decrease in
the conversion of temporary jobs to permanent jobs. Employing micro-level data
and reforms which increased EPLP, Kugler and Pica (2008) find that separation
from and access to permanent work decreases, Centeno and Novo (2012) show that
transition probabilities decreased, Boockmann et al. (2008) show that job stability
increased, and Marinescu (2009) finds a decrease in the firing hazard.
Based on these findings, a change in EPLP could affect well-being in several
ways. Some temporary workers might benefit from a decrease in EPLP by actu-
ally transitioning from a temporary into a permanent job where expected income is
higher.7 Workers who remain in a temporary job might benefit from higher prob-
ability of access into a permanent job in terms of employment prospects which
may then increase the expected income of temporary jobs. I refer to this positive
effect of a decrease in EPLP on well-being as the transition hypothesis. Temporary
5For an overview of the literature, see Boeri and van Ours (2013), OECD (2013b), Cahuc and
Koeniger (2007), and Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004). Furthermore, a reduction in EPLP might
have an effect on productivity (Cappellari et al., 2012) and might either increase (Lazaer, 1990)
or decrease (Lindbeck and Snower, 2001) the wages of permanent workers.
6See Appendix 4.7.7 for channels via job security and job satisfaction. Due to less convincing
common trend assumptions (Appendix 4.7.2), results are not part of the main paper and no
implications are derived from the analyses.
7Booth et al. (2002) show that temporary compared to permanent jobs are associated with lower
wages, job satisfaction and training opportunities.
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workers also, however, might suffer from a decrease in EPLP because the protec-
tion of their future job decreases (Salvatori, 2010): anticipation hypothesis. Due
to the decrease in EPLP, permanent workers might perceive an increase in both
the probability of separation from their jobs and the probability of transitioning
into unemployment or into a temporary job so that the expected income of per-
manent jobs would decrease.8 I refer to this negative effect on permanent workers’
well-being of a decrease in EPLP as the insecurity hypothesis.
Relative social status might change as well. The relative status, e.g. in terms
of relative income, is a crucial determinant of well-being, which was shown in the
empirical literature on well-being and in behavioral economics (e.g. Karacuka and
Zaman, 2012; Clark et al., 2008; Luttmer, 2005; Falk and Knell, 2004). A milestone
in the literature on well-being and relative positions was the seminal article of
Easterlin (1974). Despite substantial increases in wealth and the finding that
income is positively related to well-being across countries and across individuals
within countries, he finds no substantial increase in happiness within countries.9
In order to explain this ”paradox”, social comparison and adaptation are discussed
as potential explanations. Concerning social comparison, Clark and Senik (2010)
show that income comparison is highly relevant for well-being and that people often
compare themselves with their colleagues. When EPLP decreases, an increased
amount of temporary colleagues might improve their status by moving into a
permanent job. Hence, temporary workers who remain in a temporary job after
the reform are worse off than former temporary colleagues who transitioned into a
permanent job. Thus, a decrease in EPLP could decrease the temporary workers’
well-being who remained in a temporary job through the mechanism of comparison.
In the following, I refer to this argument as the comparison hypothesis.
8Perceived job security might decrease, too. For the positive relation between perceived job
security and life satisfaction in economics, see: Praag, Frijters and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2003),
Geishecker (2012), Green (2011), Campbell, Carruth, Dickerson and Green (2007). For the
relation between job security and life satisfaction in psychology, see: Cheng and Chan (2008),
De Witte (2005) and Sverke, Hellgren and Na¨swall (2002).
9For recent controversial discussion on this ”paradox”, see Easterlin, McVey, Switek, Sawangfa
and Zweig (2010) and Stevenson and Wolfers (2008).
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4.2.2 Moral hazard and monitoring
EPLP might also change monitoring of permanent workers. In a moral hazard
situation between permanent workers and employers, dismissals can serve as dis-
ciplinary devices. Higher employment protection makes these devices more costly,
and employers dismiss less often. Thereby, the value of jobs for shirkers increases
in efficiency wage models. In this situation, the employer might raise monitoring
in order to avoid shirking. A decrease in EPLP, therefore, might decrease monit-
oring, and hence, stress.10 Indeed, Lepage-Saucier and Wasmer (2012) show that
EPLP is positively related with stress. Hence, permanent workers might benefit
in terms of well-being: monitoring hypothesis.
4.2.3 Employability as a loss multiplier?
Previous research shows that perceived employability is an important mediator
of the effect of unemployment and perceived job insecurity on well-being (Green,
2011). Individuals who perceive themselves as less employable - measured as low
expectations to find a good job - suffer more from unemployment and perceived
job insecurity. Psychologist explain this by the degree of perceived dependency on
the current job, which is higher when perceived employability is low.
In this study, I explore whether changes in EPLP affect workers differently
depending on their perceived employability. For instance, temporary workers who
perceive their employability as low might have much stronger preferences for a
permanent job than others because they expect to face major difficulties in finding
a new job. Hence, when they do not manage to transition, even though the
propensity to do so increased, they could suffer even stronger when comparing to
colleagues who transitioned. The same applies to permanent workers.
10Furthermore, less monitoring (personal control) is positively related to job satisfaction (Warr,
2003). For the relation between job satisfaction and life satisfaction in economics, see (Praag
et al., 2003). For the effect of job satisfaction on life satisfaction in psychology, see Warr (2003),
Iverson and Maguire (2000) and Judge and Locke (1993).
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4.3 Institutional background
4.3.1 Employment protection in Germany
In international comparison, Germany’s dismissal protection for permanent con-
tracts ranked among the top five of OECD countries in 2013 (Venn, 2009; OECD,
2015). Hence, it ranks similarly to Portugal and France, but much higher com-
pared to United Kingdom and United States. German EPLP is regulated in the
Protection Against Dismissal Act, in the Civil Code, and in laws for specific groups
such as disabled workers. The latter two regulations apply to all firms and define
minimum criteria for a fair dismissal (e.g. written form, specific period of notifica-
tion, and application of good faith, basic rights). In the case of an unfair dismissal,
the court decides over severance payments.
The Protection Against Dismissal Act, in contrast, only applies to firms that
pass a threshold in terms of the number of employees and defines stricter rules
which have to be met for a fair dismissal. Dismissals are only considered fair under
EPLP regulations if: 1) the cause lies in the worker (e.g. long-term incapacity),
2) the worker’s behavior is deemed damaging or unacceptable (e.g. theft), or 3)
it is an economic necessity. A dismissed worker has the right to bring the case to
court but only if s/he did not forgo this right by accepting severance payments.
In case of an unfair dismissal, the worker has the right to return to the firm or to
claim severance payments. Hence, the Protection Against Dismissal Act increases
adjustment costs in terms of transfers, e.g. severance payments, and taxes, e.g.
procedural costs of dismissals, only for firms above a specific threshold. In the
following, I refer to this German legislation as EPLP.
4.3.2 Reforms in employment protection
This paper investigates variation in EPLP across firm size (threshold regulation)
and variation across time (reforms in 1996 and 1999). Figure 4.1 shows which firms
depending on firm size size [measured in full time equivalent employees (FTE)]
are required to meet regulations of the EPLP between 1995 and 2000. Before
the reform in 1996, all workers in firms with more than 5 FTE were covered by
the EPLP. The Christian Democrat/Liberal government decided on reforms in
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order to increase the flexibility of the labor market. On the 1st of October in
1996, the minimal number of FTE was increased from 5 to 10 FTE for newly
hired permanent workers, i.e. contracts were signed after the 30th of September
in 1996.11 This means that small firms with less than 10 FTE did not have to
apply the EPLP for newly hired permanent workers anymore. From this date on,
newly hired permanent workers in small firms could be dismissed much more easily.
Incumbents who signed the permanent contract before the reform took place (1st
of October in 1996), however, were exempted from the reform until September
1999. For these workers only a decrease in future EPLP (September in 1999)
became effective on the 1st of October in 1996. Thereby, incumbent permanent
workers faced no direct change in EPLP on the reform date.
The second reform took place on the 1st of January in 1999. In this reform,
the Social Democrat/Green government re-regulated the law and returned to the
old threshold.12 Thereby, newly hired permanent workers, i.e. whose contracts
were signed after the 30th of September 1996, who were employed in firms with 6
to 10 FTE faced an increase in employment protection on the 1st of January in
1999. Incumbent workers, i.e. whose contracts were signed before the 1st October
in 1996, the reform in 1996 did not change EPLP. Only incumbents who signed
the contract after September in 1996 faced an increase in EPLP. According to
OECD (2015), the share of workers with a job tenure more than three years in
total employment was 27.9 percent in 1999. Including temporary and permanent
workers, however, this figure indicates that only a small share of permanent workers
were affected by the increase in EPLP. Therefore, the policy effects for permanent
workers should be understood as a lower bound estimates. The 1999 reform took
place after elections in September 1998, in which this reform was already strongly
discussed (Bauer et al., 2007). Therefore, I discuss anticipation of the reform in
the empirical analyses (Section 4.5).
Finally, for identification issues, it is important whether parallel reforms took
place. On the 1st of October in 1996, the regulation of fixed-term work was
liberalized (increasing the maximum duration from 18 to 24 months and allowing
11Social selection criteria in the case of economic redundancies were loosened. The FTE calcu-
lation changed.
12The FTE calculation changed slightly and the selection criteria were strengthened.
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renewals up to three times).13 These reforms, however, apply to all firms and
workers.
Figure 4.1: EPLP reforms in Germany from 1996 to 2005
FTE
11
6
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
EPLP
No- EPLP
Note: Own presentation; FTE: full-time equivalent workers;
EPLP: employment protection legislation for permanent workers.
4.4 Empirical strategy
4.4.1 Identification strategy
The effect of EPLP on well-being is identified by exploiting variable enforcement
across firm-size and within-country time variation of EPLP (Boeri and Jimeno,
2005). Employing these kinds of variations in a difference-in-difference approach
13Furthermore, in 1997 temporary agency work was liberalized and in 2001 fixed-term work as
well as temporary agency work was liberalized.
125 CHAPTER 4. EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION, WELL-BEING
became a standard tool for causality analyzes of the effect of EPL reforms on
objective outcomes (e.g. Leonardi and Pica, 2013; Martins, 2009; Kugler and Pica,
2008; Bauer et al., 2007; Boeri and Jimeno, 2005).
The threshold regulation reforms in 1996 and 1999 in Germany serve as quasi-
experiments. These reforms in German EPLP were already evaluated in their
effects on, for instance, employment dynamics (Bauer et al., 2007), job duration
(Boockmann et al., 2008), temporary employment (Boockmann and Hagen, 2001).
Figure 4.1 shows that the reforms generated a subgroup of firms which faced a
change in EPLP and a subgroup of firms, for whom EPLP did not change. Workers
who are employed in firms with 6-10 FTE are defined to be treated (the treatment
group), while workers in firms above 10 FTE serve as controls (the control group).
I compare the change in well-being for the treatment group to that of the control
group. The difference-in-difference estimator is the effect of EPLP on well-being
if the identifying assumption of a common trend is true.
The effect of EPLP is estimated by the following empirical specification:
Yit = γ1TGi + γ2TGiRt + γ3Rt + β
′Xit + it (4.1)
Rt = 1[year ≥ reform yeart] (4.2)
it = uit + ai (4.3)
Yit is the dependent variable which is measured at the level of individual i
in time t, TGi is the dummy for being in the treatment group or not, Rt is the
reform dummy, Xit represents a vector of covariates and it is the error term.
Xit contains determinants which are important for well-being equations with well-
being proxied by life satisfaction. In the baseline model, TGi is time-invariant. It
equals one if an individual works in a small firm at the time of the reform and zero
if an individual works in a large firm (TGi).
14 TGi captures group specific time-
invariant differences between the treatment and the control group which are not
linked to the reform. The coefficient of the interaction between the reform dummy
(Rt) and the treatment group dummy (TGi) is the main measure of interest: the
14In other specifications, TGi is time-variant and equals one if an employee works in a small firm
in the year of observation but zero otherwise (TGit).
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policy effect (γ2).
In order to check whether there are pre-treatment trend differences and whether
the policy effect fades or grows, I add pre-reform and post-reform policy effects
similar to Autor (2003). The additional included reform dummies are coded as
follows
Rt−1 = 1[year ≥ reform yeart−1] (4.4)
Rt+1 = 1[year ≥ reform yeart+1] (4.5)
The error term it contains a time-invariant individual fixed effect ai and an
idiosyncratic component uit. Individual fixed effects are very important for well-
being equations since time-invariant personality traits have a large effect on well-
being (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004). It is assumed that Yit is cardinal.
According to Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004), the cardinality versus ordinal-
ity assumption is relatively unimportant for well-being measured as life satisfaction
on a 0 to 10 scale.15 I estimate a variance-covariance matrix, which accounts for
the possible correlation of the errors at the individual-level as well as for heteros-
cedasticity.
The identifying assumption for DID analyzes is the common trend assumption.
The treatment and control group are allowed to differ in terms of the outcome,
but this difference is not allowed to change over time. The assumption fails if
the composition of treatment and control group change, if groups differed in their
time varying covariates, or if a constantly different composition induced diverging
dynamics in the outcome. The policy effect γ2 would therefore be biased. By
including the covariates Xit and allowing for unobserved time-invariant hetero-
geneity, I generalize the common trend assumption: Conditional on mentioned
controls the treatment and control group are assumed to have the same trend in
the dependent variable. To assess the plausibility of the assumption, I run placebo
reform tests, placebo group tests, and pre-reform trend tests.16
Concerning endogenous selection, for example, workers with children might
prefer highly protected jobs. After a decrease in protection in small firms, workers
15The authors compare fixed effect ordered logit models, ordered logit and fixed effect OLS.
16For life satisfaction, the tests support the common trend. See Section 4.5 and Appendix 4.7.2.
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with children would endogenously sort into bigger firms and bias the policy effect.
In order to tackle these issues, observables differences and time-invariant unobserv-
able differences are controlled for by including Xit and estimating fixed-effects. I
cannot rule out any concerns related to unobservable time-variant heterogeneity
but I discuss this issue by referring to pre-treatment trend tests.
4.4.2 Data
The data source is the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). The GSOEP is a
representative survey of currently more than 11,000 private households and 20,000
individuals in Germany. The first wave was conducted in 1984 and has been re-
peated annually since then. Haisken-DeNew and Frick (2005) present technical
details. The major advantage of the GSOEP for well-being equations is its longit-
udinal structure. The major disadvantage of the GSOEP for this study is that the
treatment group variable is associated with measurement error (discussed below).
This biases the effect towards zero.
Variables
The dependent variable of interest is well-being (Yit). Well-being is proxied by
overall life satisfaction, which is a retrospective evaluation of life (Kahneman and
Krueger, 2006).17 The GSOEP contains the standard single-item life satisfaction
question (Kahneman and Krueger, 2006), ”How satisfied are you with your life,
all things considered? Completely dissatisfied (0) - completely satisfied (10).”
With regard to the statistical quality, this single-item life satisfaction question is
17In the economic literature, well-being proxied as life satisfaction is usually linked to the concept
of utility (Kahneman and Krueger, 2006). It is distinguished between expected (decision)
utility (Clark et al., 2008; Benjamin, Heffetz, Kimball and Rees-Jones, 2012), experienced
utility (Kahneman and Krueger, 2006; OECD, 2013b), and remembered utility (Kahneman
and Krueger, 2006). The latter is a weighted average of experienced utility. Life satisfaction
is considered as remembered utility (Kahneman and Krueger, 2006). With respect to the
relation between life satisfaction and expected utility, expected utility is not necessarily equal to
remembered utility as individuals make systematic computational mistakes, e.g. by neglecting
adaptation (Clark et al., 2008). Even if individuals would not make computational mistakes
with regard to the consequences of their choices for utility, they would not solely maximize life
satisfaction (remembered utility) but would consider other aspects (Benjamin et al., 2012; Clark
et al., 2008).
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considered to be a reliable and valid measure in several studies. One of the most
recent reviews of this literature is given in OECD (2013b) and in Clark et al.
(2008).18 Of course, limitations have to be taken into account (OECD, 2013b),
e.g. occasion-specific events ,and placement in the survey.
Concerning the contract type of a worker, I define permanent workers as work-
ers holding an unlimited contract, while temporary workers are defined as workers
holding a limited contract. The temporary workers are either temporary agency
workers - workers who signed a contract with a private employment agency and
were hired by third party firms - or workers with a fixed-term contract who were
directly hired by the firm. Before 1995, the GSOEP contains only insufficient
information on contract types.
In accordance to Green (2011), I proxy employability by the perceived easiness
of finding a new job.19 Workers are defined to perceive their employability as
low if they answered that it would be difficult or practically impossible to find a
comparable new job. This variable is available for 1997 and 1999.
I also include several control variables (Xit) which are important for well-
being equations and usually included in such estimations (e.g. Kassenboehmer
and Haisken-DeNew, 2009; Clark and Senik, 2010): household net income, working
hours, age, education, female dummy, whether children live in the household, year
(linear trend), state dummies (regional labor market effects), and year fixed effects
(year specific macro effects).
Treatment Group Dummy
The treatment group is defined via the number of FTEs. Figure 4.1 shows that
workers in firms with 6 to 10 FTEs versus workers in firms above 10 FTEs should
18OECD (2013b) and Clark et al. (2008) present literature on the facts that life satisfaction
is correlated with real phenomena such as brain activity and smiling, that third party eval-
uation correlates the respondent’s own report, that satisfaction measures have objective con-
sequences (Oswald, Proto and Sgroi, 2013; Krause, 2013), and that life satisfaction has robust
relationships with, e.g. health, income, and unemployment (e.g. Kassenboehmer and Haisken-
DeNew, 2009; Luttmer, 2005).
19The GSOEP question is: ”If you were to lose your job, would it be easy, difficult, or practically
impossible for you to find a comparable job?”. Outcomes are: ”easy (1), difficult (2) or
practically impossible (3)”.
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be identified.20 In the EPLP, FTEs are measured by subtracting the number of
workers in training from the overall number of employees and weighting the part-
time workers by a specific key.
A major drawback of the GSOEP is that FTEs cannot be measured precisely.
The GSOEP asks, ”Approximately how many people does the company employ
as a whole?” [less than 5, 5-19, 20-199 (99, 100-199 after the year 1998), 200-1999,
at least 2000 workers, self-employed without coworkers]. Workers who answered
that they were in firms with 5-19 (20-199) workers are defined as the treatment
(control) group. Thereby, the treatment group probably includes workers who
were not treated. At the same time, the control group might include workers who
were actually treated. Hence, the policy effect is likely to be biased towards zero,
and the true effects of EPLP are stronger.
I define two different treatment group dummies. First, for the time-invariant
treatment group dummy (TGi) the treatment status is measured at the time of
the last interview before the reform takes place. The dummy is defined to be
one, if the worker is employed in a firm with 5-19 employees at the time of the
reform, and defined to be zero, if s/he works in a firm with 20-199 employees.
The treatment status does not change over time, even if the number of workers
in the firm changes. Second, the time-variant treatment group dummy (TGit) is
measured at the year of observation. It is one, if the worker is employed in a firm
with 5-19 employees in the year of observation, and zero, if s/he works in a firm
with 20-199 employees in the year of observation. The treatment status is allowed
to change. In the latter case, workers might enter or exit the sample due to changes
in the number of workers in the firm. The advantage of the time-variant treatment
group dummy is that the number of observations are higher, which is important
in order to study effect heterogeneity.
4.4.3 Sample selection and descriptive statistics
I construct separate samples for temporary and for permanent workers as well as
for both reforms. The samples are restricted to employees who are employed in
20I choose larger firms as the control group, because Bauer et al. (2007) show that smaller firms
face different dynamics with regard to insolvencies.
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private firms, between 15 and 65 years old, without missing values in questions on
job security as well as on job satisfaction.21 Further, I exclude employees who are
in the upper/lower 1st income percentile. Concerning the reform periods, I start
observing individuals around two years before and two years after the reform.
Therefore, for the 1996 reform, the sample period begins in 1995 and ends in
1998.22 For the 1999 reform, I start in 1997 and end in 2001. It is not possible
to start earlier because of the 1996 reform. Finally, the samples are restricted to
workers for whom the treatment group dummy is defined.
Concerning permanent workers, the sample includes newly hired permanent
workers who face an actual change in EPLP and incumbent workers who face only
the announcement of a change in EPLP. This biases the effect of a direct change
in EPLP towards zero. As the sample becomes very small, however, when it is
restricted to newly hired workers, the main analyzes are conducted for the full
sample of permanent workers.23 Furthermore, the sample for permanent workers
excludes workers in the probationary period as here EPLP does not apply.
Samples for each contract type (permanent workers, temporary workers) and
for each reform period (1995 until 1998, 1998 until 2001) are generated:
1. Sample A - workers irrespective of their employment status after
the reform: The effect of a change in EPLP on workers who were in a
temporary or in a permanent contract at the time of the reform is analyzed.
For this purpose, I construct a sample of temporary/permanent workers who
were, at the time of their last interview prior to the reform, in a tempor-
ary/permanent contract as well as employed in private firms with 5-199 work-
ers. The treatment group is time-invariant (TGi). For instance, if person A
is in a temporary job in a firm with 20-199 employees in 1996, prior to the
reform, but in a permanent job in 1997, the person is included in the sample
of temporary workers but not in the sample of permanent workers. I allow
the panel to be unbalanced.
21Results for life satisfaction as the dependent variable are relatively robust to this restriction.
See Appendix 4.7.5 for Sample B. Sample is restricted due to models in Appendix 4.7.7.
22Results for Sample B are robust to this restriction and are robust to the ending month in 1998.
See Section 4.5.3.
23For results when I focus on newly hired workers, see Appendix 4.7.4.
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2. Sample B - workers remain in the employment status after the
reform: I investigate the effect of a change in EPLP on workers when they
remain in their contract type (e.g. remain temporary workers) after the
reform. For this purpose, I construct a sample which includes only persons
who are observed in the specific year in a temporary/permanent contract
and stay either in the control or treatment group (stayers).24 I allow the
treatment group to vary over time (TGit).
25 For instance, if person A holds
a temporary contract in a firm with 5-19 employees in 1995, 1996, and 1997
but not in 1998, I keep three observations (1995-1997) in the sample of
temporary workers. I allow the panel to be unbalanced.
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 present descriptive statistics of the Sample A for temporary
and permanent workers.26 Temporary workers are usually younger than permanent
workers because temporary contracts are often used to screen the productivity of
younger workers or to train youth in dual apprenticeships. This is also the case
in the estimation samples. On average, temporary workers are around 30 years
old, whereas permanent workers are, on average, around 40 years old. In terms
of monthly household net income, permanent workers are better off compared to
temporary workers. Life satisfaction and job satisfaction is around 7 on a scale of
0 to 10 for temporary and permanent workers.
4.5 Empirical results
The main result is that, on average, temporary workers suffered in terms of life
satisfaction from the decrease in EPLP in 1996.27 The negative effect of the
decrease in EPLP on life satisfaction of temporary workers is specifically strong
for temporary workers who remain in a temporary job after the reform. This
24For robustness checks for samples including movers, i.e. workers who are allowed to switch
between treatment and control group, see Section 4.5.3.
25Alternatively, I could estimate the effect based on a subsample of Sample A. As I run out of
observations in that case, I stick to Sample B.
26For descriptive statistics of Sample B, see Appendix 4.7.1.
27Results with longitudinal weights change in the sense that the signs of the policy effects remain
similar but that standard errors become larger. Among others, however, this is due to the use
of the fixed-effect dummy estimator and not the mean difference estimator, which is used for
the presented results.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics: temporary workers (at the date of the reform)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. No.
EPL - (1996)
Pre-reform period
life satisfaction 7.078 1.657 1 10 486
job satisfaction 7.097 2.218 0 10 486
job security 2.041 0.793 1 3 486
monthly HH net income (e) 2,022.34 802.718 511 4,857 486
age 28.492 11.569 17 58 486
female 0.506 0.5 0 1 486
Post-reform period
life satisfaction 6.865 1.762 0 10 406
job satisfaction 7.012 2.041 0 10 406
job security 2.032 0.748 1 3 406
monthly HH net income (e) 2,116.406 854.61 511 5,113 406
age 29.877 11.181 18 60 406
female 0.446 0.498 0 1 406
EPL + (1999)
Pre-reform period
life satisfaction 7.114 1.668 0 10 590
job satisfaction 7.105 2.085 0 10 590
job security 1.992 0.778 1 3 590
monthly HH net income (e) 2,174.832 903.256 562 5,624 590
age 27.561 10.638 17 60 590
female 0.434 0.496 0 1 590
Post-reform period
life satisfaction 7.172 1.492 1 10 786
job satisfaction 7.093 2.043 0 10 786
job security 2.14 0.728 1 3 786
monthly HH net income (e) 2,328.34 939.654 614 5,624 786
age 30.053 10.976 18 63 786
female 0.472 0.5 0 1 786
Note: Reform 1996: pre-reform period 01.01.1995-31.09.1996, post-reform period
01.10.1996-31.12.1998; Reform 1999: pre-reform period 01.01.1997-31.12.1998, post-
reform period 01.01.1999-31.12.2001; Sample A: restricted to workers who were in a
temporary job and in firms with 5-199 employees when the reform took place. Source:
Own calculation based on GSOEP.
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Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics: permanent workers (at the date of the reform)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. No.
EPL - (1996)
Pre-reform period
life satisfaction 7.039 1.583 0 10 3,634
job satisfaction 7.025 1.995 0 10 3,634
job security 2.325 0.696 1 3 3,634
monthly HH net income (e) 2,202.242 819.236 767 5,778 3,634
age 39.547 10.57 17 65 3634
female 0.424 0.494 0 1 3634
Post-reform period
life satisfaction 6.953 1.58 0 10 3,325
job satisfaction 6.916 1.943 0 10 3,325
job security 2.194 0.707 1 3 3,325
monthly HH net income (e) 2,277.961 835.237 767 5,783 3,325
age 40.879 10.194 18 65 3,325
female 0.428 0.495 0 1 3,325
EPL + (1999)
Pre-reform period
life satisfaction 7.018 1.558 0 10 3,818
job satisfaction 6.976 1.924 0 10 3,818
job security 2.191 0.714 1 3 3818
monthly HH net income (e) 2,260.053 825.903 818 5,624 3,818
age 40.018 10.186 18 65 3,818
female 0.429 0.495 0 1 3,818
Post-reform period
life satisfaction 7.068 1.553 0 10 5,191
job satisfaction 6.902 1.913 0 10 5,191
job security 2.263 0.688 1 3 5,191
monthly HH net income (e) 2,380.785 836.193 818 5,624 5,191
age 41.872 9.773 20 65 5,191
female 0.432 0.495 0 1 5,191
Note: Reform 1996: pre-reform period 01.01.1995-31.09.1996, post-reform period
01.10.1996-31.12.1998; Reform 1999: pre-reform period 01.01.1997-31.12.1998, post-
reform period 01.01.1999-31.12.2001; Sample A: restricted to workers who were in a
permanent job and in firms with 5-199 employees when the reform took place. Source:
Own calculation based on GSOEP.
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could be explained by social comparison. I cannot fully rule out bias due to
time-variant unobserved heterogeneity but pre-reform trend tests show that there
is no difference in the pre-reform trend between control and treatment group.
This finding might at least reduce concerns about the relevance of time-variant
unobserved heterogeneity. Furthermore, less employable workers are specifically
strong affected. The decrease in EPLP had no significant effect on well-being,
which would be in line with loss aversion. As the EPLP reforms affected newly
hired workers but almost not incumbents, a large proportion of permanent workers
were not affected from the decrease and increase in EPLP. Hence, as I expected, I
did not find any effects of the reforms on their well-being. Importantly, however,
all results should be considered as lower bound estimates due to a non-negligible
measurement error in the treatment status. The true effects might be stronger.
Common trend assumption
Before I present the results, the common trend assumption is discussed. The
common trend assumption is the identifying assumption for the unbiasedness of
the policy effect in a DID approach. Although no formal test exists in order to
assess the validity of this, pre-treatment trend and placebo tests help to assess
whether the assumption is critical. I summarize the main findings here, before I
present the results.
Pre-treatment tests did not result in any significant pre-treatment differences
for life satisfaction as the dependent variable.28 In Tables 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5, I test
whether a common pre-policy trend for the treatment and the control group is re-
jected - TGxReform(t-1). None of the coefficients, however, is significant.29 Hence,
in the pre-treatment period, I capture all the relevant heterogeneity which might
induce different trends between treatment and control group in terms of life satis-
faction. Although I do not technically control for unobserved time-invariant het-
erogeneity, the tests show that in the pre-reform period unobserved time-invariant
28I also tested pre-treatment trend differences for perceived job security and job satisfaction. As
I observe pre-treatment differences, which I cannot explain by anticipation or by group-specific
linear trends, I do not consider them as dependent variables in the main paper. See Appendix
4.7.2 and 4.7.7.
29Additional checks for Sample B support this (Appendix 4.7.2).
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heterogeneity does not yield a different trend between treatment and control group
when it comes to life satisfaction. This finding reduces concerns about the relev-
ance of unobserved time-variant heterogeneity for the policy effects. Finally, in the
case of an anticipation effect, one would expect that the common pre-treatment
trend is not met. This is not the case here.
In addition, I conduct placebo tests for Sample B.30 They show that life sat-
isfaction did not change for workers in medium sized (non-treated) versus large
firms (non-treated) at the time of the reforms (placebo group test); and it did not
change for workers in the treatment group (small sized firms) versus workers in
the control group (medium sized firms) in 1998 (placebo reform). Overall, I do
not find evidence against the hypothesis that treatment and control group follow
a common trend for life satisfaction.
4.5.1 Effect of EPLP on life satisfaction
This section tests for the effect of EPLP reforms on life satisfaction of workers
who were either temporarily or permanently employed at the time of the reform
(Sample A). These workers are allowed to change their employment status after
the reform, e.g. from a temporary to a permanent job.
Temporary workers
The theoretically expected effect of a decrease in EPLP on the well-being of work-
ers who were in a temporary job at the time of the reform is ambiguous. The
transition hypothesis expects a positive effect, while the comparison and anticip-
ation hypothesis suggest a negative effect on well-being.
The DID results for the 1996 reform with life satisfaction as the dependent
variable is presented in the upper left part of Table 4.3. The main result is that
workers who were in temporary job at the time of the reform suffered by around
0.5 units in life satisfaction (TGxReform) from the decrease in EPLP in 1996 - see
columns (1) to (3). Thus, the transition hypothesis is outweighed by the compar-
ison and anticipation hypotheses. As already mentioned I account for selection due
30See Appendix 4.7.2.
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to observables and time-invariant unobservables. Selection due to time-invariant
unobservables is not ruled out but the common pre-reform trend might reduce
concerns about the relevance of time-invariant unobservable heterogeneity in my
case.
The preferred model with unobservable and observable heterogeneity is presen-
ted in column (3). In this specification, temporary workers loose 0.407 units of life
satisfaction due to a decrease in EPLP which is 5.8% of the mean. When I ex-
clude the socio-demographic control variables, the policy effect becomes larger in
its magnitude (-0.548). This could be due to observables, which capture different
dynamics between control and treatment group. The results for the 1999 reform
are presented in the right part of Table 4.3 - see columns (4) to (6). The increase
in EPLP had no significant effect on life satisfaction. It is possible that this is due
to effect heterogeneity, which is investigated in Section 4.5.2.
Permanent workers
Theoretical expectations for the effect of a decrease in EPLP on the life satisfac-
tion of permanent workers are ambiguous, too. While the insecurity hypothesis
suggests a negative effect, the monitoring hypothesis expects a positive one. Due
to the reform design, however, I do not expect strong effects of the reforms on life
satisfaction of permanent workers.
The lower part of Table 4.3 shows the results for the reform in 1996 (decreasing
EPLP) - see columns (1) to (3) - and for the reform in 1999 (increasing EPLP) -
see columns (4) to (6). The policy effects (TGxReform) are not different from zero
for both reforms, which is in line that a large proportion of permanent workers
were not directly affected by the reforms. Effect heterogeneity, however, might
explain the zero effects, too, and is elaborated in Section 4.5.2.
4.5.2 Effect heterogeneity
Based on the comparison, transition, and insecurity hypotheses, workers who re-
main in their contract type after the reform might exhibit a different reform effect,
on average, compared to workers who transition into another employment status.
In order to investigate this heterogeneity, I construct samples with workers who
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Table 4.3: Dependent variable: life satisfaction
EPL - (1996) EPL + (1999)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Temporary workers (at the date of the reform)
FE FE FE FE FE FE
TGxReform(t-1) -0.154 -0.185 0.140 0.0882
(0.232) (0.244) (0.210) (0.220)
TGxReform -0.395∗ -0.548∗∗ -0.407∗ -0.00717 -0.0686 -0.0179
(0.202) (0.221) (0.236) (0.160) (0.189) (0.192)
TGxReform(t+1) 0.463∗ 0.415 0.0292 0.167
(0.259) (0.259) (0.173) (0.180)
Socio-demo. controls no no yes no no yes
N 892 892 892 1,376 1,376 1,376
R2 0.023 0.029 0.091 0.011 0.011 0.050
Permanent workers (at the date of the reform)
FE FE FE FE FE FE
TGxReform(t-1) 0.0336 0.0499 0.0397 0.0683
(0.074) (0.074) (0.071) (0.073)
TGxReform -0.0370 -0.0988 -0.0622 0.0322 -0.00483 0.00165
(0.061) (0.075) (0.078) (0.052) (0.069) (0.069)
TGxReform(t+1) 0.100 0.0917 0.0324 0.0183
(0.076) (0.075) (0.067) (0.071)
Socio-demo. controls no no yes no no yes
N 6,959 6,959 6,959 9,009 9,009 9,009
R2 0.007 0.007 0.025 0.002 0.002 0.014
Note: Fixed effects (FE) estimations, clustered standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; TG = 1 if 5-19 and TG = 0 if 20-199; Reform = [1 if year >=
reform year]; Reform(t-1) = [1 if year >= one year before the reform year]; Reform(t+1)
= [1 if year >= one year after the reform year]; Sample A: sample of workers who were
in a permanent/temporary job at the time of the reform and employed in firms with 5-199
employees at the time of the reform; Controls: reform dummies, TG, year fixed effects;
Socio-demographic (socio-demo.) controls: firm size dummies, log of monthly HH income,
working hours, working hours2, age, age2, education, female, married, child dummies as well
state fixed effects.
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remained in their contract type after the reform (Sample B)31.32 This is obviously
related to selection due to the EPLP reform. Workers who remain temporarily
employed in the treatment group might differ from those in the control group. I
discuss this issue in the preceding analyses. Furthermore, I investigate heterogen-
eity due to differences in the employability of workers.
Temporary workers
If the comparison hypothesis explains the negative effect of EPLP in 1996 on life
satisfaction of temporary workers (column (3) in Table 4.3), I expect that the
negative effect is specifically strong for temporary workers who remain in a tem-
porary job in a treated firm after the reform. This is because workers who benefited
from potentially increased transition probabilities into permanent work by actu-
ally moving into a permanent job are excluded. Thereby, the transition hypothesis
becomes less relevant, whereas the comparison hypothesis becomes more relevant,
while the relevance of the anticipation hypothesis remains similar.
The main result is that temporary workers who remained in a temporary job
suffered significantly in economical and statistical terms (TGxReform) in life sat-
isfaction from the decrease in EPLP in 1996 (Table 4.4). The negative effect of the
1996 reform holds independently of controlling for observed heterogeneity or not
and for excluding pre- and post-policy effects - see columns (1) to (3). In the pre-
ferred specification, temporary workers suffered by 0.588 units in life satisfaction
- see column (3) - which is 8% of the mean, and thereby, higher as the effect on
temporary workers who are allowed to move into a permanent job after the reform
(5.8% of the mean, see column (3) in Table 4.3). Hence, given that Centeno and
Novo (2012) show that EPLP is negatively related to transition probabilities from
temporary work to permanent work, and based on the findings here, the compar-
ison hypotheses remains a plausible explanation for the negative effect of EPLP
on life satisfaction of temporary workers.33
31For summary statistics, see Appendix 4.7.1.
32Unfortunately, I run out of observations in the case of subsamples of Sample A.
33Keeping in mind the measurement error, I test the effect on the transition probabilities, too. I
find expected signs but the magnitude and the statistical significance are quite sensitive. See
Appendix 4.7.6. A deeper investigation of this issue remains open for future research.
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If the access into permanent employment in the treatment group became easier
in the treatment group compared to the control group, the negative reform effect
could also be due to selection. One could argue that temporary workers in the
treatment group who remain in a temporary job even though transition became
easier are an adverse selection of temporary workers. They might be generally less
satisfied compared to those who remain in temporary employment in the control
group. The policy effect might capture this difference. I can rule out this argument,
if the difference is due to time-invariant difference in life satisfaction because I
control for this. If the difference is due to a different trend in life satisfaction, I do
not capture this. Pre-reform trend tests, however, show that control and treatment
group do not differ in their life satisfaction trend in the pre-reform period. This
might at least reduce concerns about the relevance of unobserved time-variant
heterogeneity for the negative policy effect.
After one year - see TGxReform(t+1), life satisfaction significantly increases
again which is shown in column (3). This is in line with the adaptation to life
events. Concerning the increase in EPLP in 1999, I do not find that the uncondi-
tional or conditional policy effects (TGxReform) on life satisfaction are different
from zero. One might expect that life satisfaction would increase from this reform,
however, the results are in line with loss aversion: Workers value a loss stronger
compared to a gain.
Finally, the effect of a change in EPLP might also differ with the perceived
employability of the workers (Green, 2011). Specifically, highly employable workers
might not mind if protection decreases, but less employable workers might be much
more concerned. Column (4) of Table 4.4 presents the results of column (3) for
the subsample of workers who gave a valid answer to the question on perceived
chances of finding a new job in 1997 (1996 reform) or in 1999 (1999 reform).34
Column (5) presents the subsample of less-employable workers, i.e. workers who
perceive it to be difficult or practically impossible to find a new comparable job.35
34Effect heterogeneity can also be investigated by interaction effects estimations (Leonardi and
Pica, 2013) rather than subsample estimations (Centeno and Novo, 2014; Bauer et al., 2007;
Autor, Donohue and Schwab, 2006; Autor, 2003). I chose subsample estimation as it allows
for a high level of heterogeneity in the life satisfaction equation.
35Unfortunately, there are too few workers who feel employable in order to estimate the effects
on this subgroup.
CHAPTER 4. EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION, WELL-BEING 140
Concerning the reform in 1996, the coefficients and standard errors remain quite
similar when it is restricted to workers who answered the question on perceived
chances to find a new similar job - see columns (3) and (4). Comparing columns
(4) and (5), the main result is that the negative effect of the 1996 reform becomes
more significant in economical and statistical terms when the sample is restricted
to persons who feel less employable. They lost 0.703 units in life satisfaction, but
this loss is only temporarily. The results for 1999 are presented in the lower part.
The policy effect, however, is again statistically not different from zero.
Permanent workers
The effect of a decrease in EPLP on permanent workers in sample of workers
who remained in a permanent job after the reform is expected to be less negative
compared to a sample of workers who might transition into a temporary job or into
unemployment. This is because permanent workers who suffered from lower EPLP
by being dismissed are excluded, and thereby the insecurity hypothesis becomes
less relevant. Overall, due to the reform design, however, I do not expect strong
effects of both EPLP reforms on the life satisfaction of permanent workers because
only newly hired permanent workers faced lower or higher EPLP but a minority
of incumbents.36 Keeping in mind the bias towards zero due to the measurement
error in the treatment status, the upper and lower parts of Table 4.5 show that the
policy effects (TGxReform) are not different from zero - neither for the decrease
nor for the increase in EPLP - see columns (1) to (3). The zero effects can also not
be explained by effect heterogeneity due to employability - see columns (3) versus
(4).
4.5.3 Robustness
Movers and stayers
Results for Sample B (workers who remain temporary/permanent employed) are
restricted to stayers. Stayers are not allowed to switch between small-sized and
36In Appendix 4.7.4, I present results for a sample which is restricted to entries.
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Table 4.4: Dependent variable: life satisfaction (temporary workers who remain tempor-
ary employees)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FE FE FE FE (No MV) FE (Less Empl)
EPL - (1996)
TGxReform(t-1) -0.327 -0.253 -0.239 -0.211
(0.283) (0.283) (0.332) (0.417)
TGxReform -0.543∗ -0.595∗ -0.588∗ -0.574 -0.703∗
(0.311) (0.342) (0.342) (0.348) (0.417)
TGxReform(t+1) 0.534∗ 0.553∗ 0.593∗∗ 0.674∗∗
(0.288) (0.292) (0.292) (0.341)
Socio-demo. controls no no yes yes yes
N 624 624 624 540 404
R2 0.040 0.053 0.110 0.133 0.172
EPL + (1999)
TGxReform(t-1) 0.106 0.148 0.0281 0.0862
(0.264) (0.268) (0.313) (0.426)
TGxReform -0.167 -0.207 -0.140 -0.172 -0.135
(0.238) (0.263) (0.271) (0.273) (0.326)
TGxReform(t+1) 0.0419 0.0802 0.0503 -0.0628
(0.220) (0.217) (0.220) (0.250)
Socio-demo. controls no no yes yes yes
N 1,155 1,155 1,155 757 587
R2 0.008 0.008 0.047 0.063 0.069
Note: Fixed effects model (FE), clustered standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; TG = 1 if 5-19 and TG = 0 if 20-199; Reform = [1 if year >= reform
year]; Reform(t-1) = [1 if year >= one year before the reform year]; Reform(t+1) = [1 if year
>= one year after the reform year]; Sample B: remain in the contract form (workers who
remain in a temporary/permanent job over the sample period), stayers (workers who remain
in TG or CG over the sample period); No missing values (No MV): sample of workers with
a valid answer to the perception of finding a new job; less employable (less empl): sample of
workers who perceive it to be practically impossible or difficult to find a new job; Controls:
reform dummies, TG, year fixed effects; Socio-demographic (socio-demo.) controls: log of
monthly HH income, working hours, working hours2, age, age2, education, female, married,
child dummies as well state fixed effects.
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Table 4.5: Dependent variable: life satisfaction (permanent workers who remain per-
manent employees)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FE FE FE FE (No MV) FE (Less Empl)
EPL - (1996)
TGxReform(t-1) 0.0487 0.0696 0.103 0.142
(0.081) (0.080) (0.087) (0.097)
TGxReform -0.0426 -0.0943 -0.0809 -0.0909 -0.0995
(0.068) (0.085) (0.085) (0.087) (0.095)
TGxReform(t+1) 0.0643 0.0555 0.0645 0.0512
(0.079) (0.079) (0.079) (0.086)
Socio-demo. controls no no yes yes yes
N 5,917 5,917 5,917 5,485 4,633
R2 0.007 0.008 0.026 0.031 0.034
EPL + (1999)
TGxReform(t-1) 0.0229 0.0261 0.0189 -0.0857
(0.082) (0.081) (0.086) (0.094)
TGxReform -0.0121 -0.0325 -0.0191 -0.0357 -0.000727
(0.061) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.083)
TGxReform(t+1) 0.0215 0.0439 0.0468 0.0338
(0.079) (0.079) (0.078) (0.087)
Socio-demo. controls no no yes yes yes
N 9,255 9,255 9,255 7,220 5,916
R2 0.001 0.001 0.011 0.016 0.016
Note: Fixed effects model (FE), clustered standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; TG = 1 if 5-19 and TG = 0 if 20-199; Reform = [1 if year >= reform
year]; Reform(t-1) = [1 if year >= one year before the reform year]; Reform(t+1) = [1 if year
>= one year after the reform year]; Sample B: remain in the contract form (workers who
remain in a temporary/permanent job over the sample period), stayers (workers who remain
in TG or CG over the sample period); No missing value (No MV): sample of workers with a
valid answer to the perception of finding a new job; less employable (less empl): sample of
workers who perceive it to be practically impossible or difficult to find a new job; Controls:
reform dummies, TG, year fixed effects; Socio-demographic (socio-demo.) controls: log of
monthly HH income, working hours, working hours2, age, age2, education, female, married,
child dummies as well state fixed effects.
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medium-sized firms, while movers are. Enlarging Sample B of temporary workers
to movers, the 1996 policy coefficient in Table 4.4 changes slightly towards zero.37
There are two explanations. First, it would be plausible that stayers compare
stronger to their temporarily employed colleagues than movers, and therefore, they
are affected stronger. Second, the policy effect (TGxReform) is not only identified
via a change in legislation but also via job switches. Job switchers, who con-
sciously switch their jobs, face a ”honeymoon” and then a ”hangover” in terms of
satisfaction (Chadi and Hetschko, 2014). If workers are aware of higher transition
probabilities in small firms, they might consciously switch. Hence, counteracting
the dynamics of the 1996 reform. The finding that from 1995 to the next period
of observation a smaller share of workers (2.2% of workers) switched from a large
into a small firm compared to 1996 to the next period (7.79%) is in line with this
argument (Table 4.6).
Table 4.6: Share of less employable temporary workers moving into CG or TG firms
Into TG from CG Stayer Into CG from TG
1995 2.20 83.52 14.29
1996 7.79 83.12 9.09
1997 4.00 93.00 3.00
Note: Treatment group (TG), control group (CG); TG = 1 if 5-19
and TG = 0 if 20-199; ”Into TG from CG” means that the worker
moves in the next observed period from TG into CG; Sample B:
remain temporary(temp)/permanent(perm) (workers who remain
in a temporary/permanent job over the sample period), stayers
(workers who remain in TG or CG over the sample period).
Sample period
Finally, I test whether the policy effect changes, when I choose different sample
periods. Policy effects are estimated for sample periods ending in January and
December. For instance, the decrease in life satisfaction by 0.703 units of less-
employable temporary workers due to a decrease in EPLP in 1996 (Table 4.4) is
robust to changes to the ending month (January 0.702 and December 0.703).38
37See Appendix 4.7.3, columns (1) to (3) versus (4) to (6) in Table 4.13.
38See Appendix 4.7.3, columns (4) to (6) in Table 4.13.
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With regard to the 1999 reform, the policy effect is robust to different sample
periods, too.
4.6 Conclusion and discussion
This study investigates the impact of two almost perfectly symmetric reforms
(1996, 1999) in German employment protection legislation for permanent con-
tracts on well-being. EPLP reforms vary by firm size and allow for a difference-in-
difference approach. Thus, I combine standard evaluation tools in the literature on
the effects of employment protection on objective outcomes with the literature on
determinants of life satisfaction for the first time. To identify the effects, I use lon-
gitudinal data of the GSOEP allowing me to control for individual fixed effects. In
order to address the potential violation of the common trend assumption required
for the DID approach and worker selection, I account for observables as well as
for time-invariant unobservables. Also, I conduct placebo-tests, and pre-treatment
trend tests. A major drawback is that the GSOEP allows me to measure firm size
only imprecisely, which is likely to bias the policy effect estimator towards zero.
Following the literature, I distinguish between effects on temporary and per-
manent workers at points of the reform. The main result is that temporary workers
suffered in terms of life satisfaction, on average, from a decrease in EPLP in 1996.
A plausible explanation for this finding would be social comparison. Centeno and
Novo (2012) found that EPLP is negatively related with transition probabilities
from temporary to permanent work. Hence, temporary workers who remain tem-
porarily employed might suffer due to comparison with colleagues who transitioned
successfully in a permanent job after the reform. I account for selection due to
observables and time-invariant unobservables and discuss the relevance of time-
invariant unobservables. Unfortunately, I cannot fully rule out remaining concerns
regarding the latter. Common pre-reform trends, however, show that treatment
and control group do not differ in their pre-reform trend. This might at least re-
duce concerns about the relevance of unobserved time-variant heterogeneity for the
policy effect. The increase in EPLP had no significant effect on well-being which
would be, however, in line with the literature on loss aversion. As the EPLP
reforms affected newly hired workers but less incumbents, a large proportion of
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permanent workers were not affected from the decrease and increase in EPLP.
Hence, I did not expect strong effects of the reforms on their well-being, which is
confirmed.
In the aftermath of the 2007 financial crisis, decreasing EPLP was often dis-
cussed and liberalizing reforms took place, e.g. in Spain. Policy makers should
account for potential negative well-being effects of a decrease in EPLP on tempor-
ary workers when designing such reforms. Based on that, a deeper investigation
of the mechanisms behind the negative effect which I discuss in the paper (e.g.
comparison and anticipation hypotheses) would be interesting to investigate. As I
cannot mitigate any remaining concerns about the relevance of time-invariant un-
observables for the policy effect, future research which investigates other sources of
variation in EPLP would be beneficial in order to investigate the relevance of the
remaining concerns. In general, combining standard evaluation techniques to study
the effect of labor market institutions and policies with research on determinants
of well-being proxied by life satisfaction is a fruitful task for future research. Re-
search in this area is still rare with important exceptions: Hamermesh et al. (2014),
Dorsett and Oswald (2014), D’Addio, Chapple, Hoherz and Landeghem (2014),
Montizaan and Vendrik (2014), Kuroki (2012), and Lepage-Saucier and Wasmer
(2012). This is surprising given that well-being is frequently applied in economic
research (e.g. Hetschko, Knabe and Scho¨b, 2014; Frey and Stutzer, 2012; Clark
and Senik, 2010) as well as in public policy (e.g. OECD, 2013b; OECD, 2011; Os-
wald, 2010).
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4.7 Appendix
4.7.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 4.7: Descriptive statistics: temporary workers who remain temporary employees
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. No.
EPL - (1996)
Pre-reform period
life satisfaction 7.078 1.706 1 10 319
job satisfaction 7.097 2.07 0 10 319
job security 1.997 0.799 1 3 319
monthly HH net income (e) 2,049.887 803.545 511 4,704 319
age 26.665 11.12 17 58 319
female 0.498 0.501 0 1 319
Post-reform period
life satisfaction 6.977 1.796 0 10 305
job satisfaction 7.075 2.168 0 10 305
job security 1.98 0.761 1 3 305
monthly HH net income (e) 2,159.207 904.051 460 5,266 305
age 25.603 10.349 17 59 305
female 0.439 0.497 0 1 305
EPL + (1999)
Pre-reform period
life satisfaction 7.064 1.753 0 10 358
job satisfaction 7.148 2.052 0 10 358
job security 1.98 0.765 1 3 358
monthly HH net income (e) 2,178.564 905.288 557 5,624 358
age 25.249 9.968 17 58 358
female 0.439 0.497 0 1 358
Post-reform period
life satisfaction 7.105 1.694 1 10 797
job satisfaction 7.118 2.083 0 10 797
job security 2.049 0.741 1 3 797
Continued on next page
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Table 4.7 – Continued from previous page
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. No.
monthly HH net income (e) 2,282.748 903.451 511 5,624 797
age 26.955 10.921 17 61 797
female 0.484 0.5 0 1 797
Note: Reform 1996: pre-reform period 01.01.1995-31.09.1996, post-reform period
01.10.1996-31.12.1998; Reform 1999: pre-reform period 01.01.1997-31.12.1998, post-
reform period 01.01.1999-31.12.2001; Sample B: stayers (workers who remain in TG
or CG), workers in a temporary job and in firms with 5-199 employees at the date of
observation. Source: Own calculation based on GSOEP.
Table 4.8: Descriptive statistics: permanent workers who remain permanent employees
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. No.
EPL - (1996)
Pre-reform period
life satisfaction 7.069 1.569 0 10 3,091
job satisfaction 7.039 1.98 0 10 3,091
job security 2.354 0.685 1 3 3,091
monthly HH net income (e) 2,200.121 809.201 767 5,670 3,091
age 39.839 10.526 17 65 3,091
female 0.424 0.494 0 1 3,091
Post-reform period
life satisfaction 6.989 1.565 0 10 2,826
job satisfaction 6.961 1.925 0 10 2,826
job security 2.202 0.699 1 3 2,826
monthly HH net income (e) 2,261.674 814.505 767 5,624 2,826
age 40.782 10.233 21 65 2,826
female 0.424 0.494 0 1 2,826
EPL + (1999)
Pre-reform period
life satisfaction 7.027 1.564 0 10 3,084
job satisfaction 7.021 1.896 0 10 3,084
job security 2.207 0.700 1 3 3,084
Continued on next page
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Table 4.8 – Continued from previous page
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. No.
monthly HH net income (e) 2,284.295 833.399 818 5,697 3,084
age 40.425 10.099 19 65 3,084
female 0.431 0.495 0 1 3,084
Post-reform period
life satisfaction 7.188 1.536 0 10 6,171
job satisfaction 7.077 1.903 0 10 6,171
job security 2.285 0.689 1 3 6,171
monthly HH net income (e) 2,408.497 851.719 818 5,880 6,171
age 41.791 9.854 19 65 6,171
female 0.439 0.496 0 1 6,171
Note: Restricted to permanent workers in firms with 5-199 employees (at least 12
months in their job); Reform 1996: pre-reform period 01.01.1995-31.09.1996, post-
reform period 01.10.1996-31.12.1998; Reform 1999: pre-reform period 01.01.1997-
31.12.1998, post-reform period 01.01.1999-31.12.2001; Sample B: stayers (workers who
remain in TG or CG), workers in a permanent job and in firms with 5-199 employees
at the date of observation. Source: Own calculation based on GSOEP.
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4.7.2 Common trend assumption
This section provides additional in depth analyses of the common trend assumption
for Sample B. I proceed as follows: First, I provide placebo tests which are typically
conducted in the literature on EPLP evaluation (e.g. Leonardi and Pica, 2013);
Second, I proceed by a detailed analyses of a potential pre-treatment trend differ-
ence between control and treatment group.
Placebo tests
In this part, I provide placebo tests for Sample B and for the subsample of Sample
B of less-employable workers. Overall, placebo tests support the common trend
assumption for life satisfaction as the outcome variable. In order to conduct a
placebo group tests, I define workers to be in the treatment group, when they
work in firms with 20-199 workers, and to be in the control group, when they are
employed in firms larger than 199 workers. Hence, both groups of workers did
not face any changes. If the policy effect is different from zero, then the general
dynamic between small and large firms differ. The policy effects are, however, not
significant - neither for the 1996 nor for the 1999 reform (Table 4.9). In order
to conduct a placebo reform test, I define a placebo reform dummy for 1998 and
choose a sample period from 1996 to 1999. I do not find that there is a general
different dynamic in life satisfaction for workers in 5-19 versus 20-199 sized firms
(Table 4.10).
Pre-treatment trend
In this part, I investigate in detail the pre-treatment trend of control and treat-
ment group for Sample B and for the subsample of Sample B of less-employable
workers. I do this for life satisfaction, job security and job satisfaction as depend-
ent variables. This analyses was conducted as a pre-analyses in order to decide
whether the common trend assumption is at least met in the pre-treatment period.
If this was not the case, I did not include the respective model in the main paper.
I proceed as follows: First, I test whether control and treatment group differ in
their pre-treatment trend; Second, if I find a difference in the pre-treatment trend
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Table 4.9: Dependent variable: life satisfaction (pseudo group)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FE FE (Less Empl) FE FE (Less Empl)
Temporary workers (remain) Permanent workers (remain)
EPL - (1996)
TGxReform -0.0626 -0.187 0.0518 0.0798
(0.302) (0.339) (0.059) (0.065)
N 824 584 10,836 8,819
EPL + (1999)
TGxReform 0.263 0.404 0.0361 0.0521
(0.239) (0.261) (0.056) (0.062)
N 1,464 786 16,459 10,778
Note: Fixed effects model (FE), clustered standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p <
0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; TG = 1 if 20-199 and TG = 0 if 200-1999; Reform = [1 if year >= reform
year]; Reform(t-1) = [1 if year >= one year before the reform year]; Reform(t+1) = [1 if year
>= one year after the reform year]; Sample B: Permanent/temporary workers (remain) are
workers who remain in a temporary/permanent job over the sample period and who remain
in TG or CG over the sample period); less employable (less empl): sample of workers who
perceive it to be practically impossible or difficult to find a new job; Controls: reform
dummies, TG, year fixed effects, TGxReform(t+1), TGxReform(t-1); Socio-demographic
(socio-demo.) controls: log of monthly HH income, working hours, working hours2, age,
age2, education, female, married, child dummies as well state fixed effects.
Table 4.10: Dependent variable: life satisfaction (placebo reform 1998)
(1) (2)
FE FE
Temporary workers (remain) Permanent workers (remain)
TGxReform 0.437 0.0474
(0.284) (0.077)
N 662 6,030
R2 0.064 0.022
Note: Fixed effects model (FE), clustered standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; TG = 1 if 5-19 and TG = 0 if 20-199; Reform = [1 if year >= 1998
year]; Reform(t-1) = [1 if year >= 1997]; Reform(t+1) = [1 if year >= 1999]; Sample B:
Permanent/temporary workers (remain) are workers who remain in a temporary/permanent
job over the sample period and who remain in TG or CG over the sample period); Con-
trols: reform dummies, TG, year fixed effects, TGxReform(t+1), TGxReform(t-1); Socio-
demographic (socio-demo.) controls: log of monthly HH income, working hours, working
hours2, age, age2, education, female, married, child dummies as well state fixed effects.
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between control and treatment group in a specific regression, I test whether anti-
cipation explains this; Third, if I cannot explain the pre-treatment trend difference
by anticipation, I investigate for this specific model whether a group-specific trend
captures the differences between treatment and control group; if this would be the
case, one could control for it in the DID analyses; Fourth, if this is not the case, I
do not consider this specific model in the main paper.
Overall, I conclude from the analyses, that the life satisfaction equations are
not problematic in terms of pre-treatment trend differences between control and
treatment group. I cannot, however, confirm this for job security and job satisfac-
tion equations. Therefore, I focus in the paper on life satisfaction as the outcome
and do not extend the main paper to job security and job satisfaction.39 This
would be interesting, however, in order to investigate potential channels for the
effect of EPLP on life satisfaction.
Pre-treatment trend
Concerning life satisfaction, the models in Tables 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 test, whether
there is a trend difference between control and treatment group in the period before
the reform takes place. For life satisfaction equations, there are no pre-treatment
trend differences. Concerning the job security and the job satisfaction equation, I
find the pre-policy effect for the decrease in EPLP in 1996 of temporary workers
to be significant, which is specifically the case for less-employable workers - see
Table 4.16, columns (5) and (6).
Anticipation
In Table 4.11, I test whether the aforementioned pre-reform differences for the
1996 reform in job security of less employable temporary workers - see Table 4.16
in column (5), or job satisfaction of less employable temporary workers - see 4.16
in columns (6) - are due to an anticipation of the reform. If the pre-policy effect
is due to anticipation, exclusion of the time period, in which the reforms were
already discussed, can abolish the pre-policy effect. The discussion for the 1996
39Appendix 4.7.7 presents some results for job satisfaction and perceived job security. Import-
antly, no implications are derived from them due to the aforementioned reasons.
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reform intensified in May 1996.40 Hence, I restrict the sample for the 1996 reform
to a period from January 1995 to April 1996, and from October 1996 to December
1998. Table 4.11 presents results for the two models. The restricted samples
are in the lower part. The pre-policy effects decrease, but I interpret this as not
substantial. In order to mitigate any concerns, I continue by investigating whether
group-specific trends explain this difference.
Group-specific trends
Similar to Besley and Burgess (2004), I investigate group-specific linear trends
TGi ∗ year for job security and job satisfaction equations of less employable tem-
porary workers (1996) in columns (1) to (4). If the pre-policy effects for less-
employable temporary workers is due to a group-specific linear trend, one could
account for this in the DID analyzes. For this purpose, I define the reform dum-
mies being one only in the respective year and zero otherwise. I estimate models
with the three re-defined reform dummies and models with two reform dummies
plus a group-specific linear trend.
The effect of a decrease in EPLP on job satisfaction turns from positive (non-
significant) to negative (non-significant) and the pre-reform effect fades - in Table
4.12 in columns (3) and (4). Hence, the group-specific trend could pick up the
pre-policy effect. In the case of perceived job security, results do not change
considerably, and the pre-policy effect remains positive significant - see columns
(1) and (2). As the pre-policy effect could not be captured by a group specific trend,
the common trend assumption seems to be critical in the case of job security. In
order to mitigate any concerns, I do not consider job satisfaction and perceived
job security in the main paper as dependent variables.
40Based on research in the online archive of the newspaper DIE ZEIT.
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Table 4.11: Is anticipation relevant?
(1) (2)
LPM FE(less empl) FE(less empl)
Temporary workers (remain)
Dependent Var. JoSec JobSat
Sample Period 1995-1998 1995-1998
TGxReform(t-1) 0.283∗∗ 0.963∗
(0.122) (0.540)
TGxReform -0.238∗∗ -0.220
(0.115) (0.463)
TGxReform(t+1) 0.0556 0.869∗∗
(0.097) (0.430)
N 404 404
R2 0.100 0.151
Sample Period 95-96, 10.96-98 95-4.96, 10.96-98
TGxReform(t-1) 0.219∗ 0.905
(0.124) (0.551)
TGxReform -0.122 -0.160
(0.120) (0.500)
TGxReform(t+1) 0.0723 0.872∗∗
(0.098) (0.427)
N 382 382
R2 0.089 0.164
Note: Linear probability model (LPM), fixed effects model (FE), clustered
standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; TG = 1 if
5-19 and TG = 0 if 20-199; Reform = [1 if year >= reform year]; Reform(t-1)
= [1 if year >= one year before the reform year]; Reform(t+1) = [1 if year >=
one year after the reform year]; JobSat: job satisfaction; JobSec: perceived job
security (0,1); Sample B: temporary workers (remain) are workers who remain
in a temporary job over the sample period and who remain in TG or CG over
the sample period; less employable (less empl): sample of workers who perceive
it to be practically impossible or difficult to find a new job; Controls: reform
dummies, TG, year fixed effects; Socio-demographic (socio-demo.) controls: log
of monthly HH income, working hours, working hours2, age, age2, education,
female, married, child dummies as well state fixed effects.
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Table 4.12: Group specific time trends and life satisfaction for the reform 1996 (less
employable temporary workers who remain temporary employees)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LPM FE LPM FE FE FE
Dependent Var. Perceived job security Job satisfaction
TGxReform(t-1) 0.283∗∗ 0.250∗∗ 0.963∗ 0.426
(0.122) (0.102) (0.540) (0.443)
TGxReform 0.0457 -0.0218 0.743 -0.332
(0.129) (0.083) (0.594) (0.386)
TGxReform(t+1) 0.101 1.612∗∗
(0.150) (0.644)
TG*year 0.0338 0.537∗∗
(0.050) (0.215)
N 404 404 404 404
R2 0.100 0.100 0.151 0.151
Note: Linear probability model (LPM), fixed effects model (FE), clustered
standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; TG = 1 if
5-19 and TG = 0 if 20-199; Reform = [1 if year = reform year]; Reform(t-1) =
[1 if year = one year before the reform year]; Reform(t+1) = [1 if year = one
year after the reform year]; Perceived job security is 0/1 for low/high perceived
job security; Sample B: remain temporary(temp)/permanent(perm) (workers
who remain in a temporary/permanent job over the sample period), stayers
(workers who remain in TG or CG over the sample period); less employable
(less empl): sample of workers who perceive it to be practically impossible or
difficult to find a new job; Controls: reform dummies, TG, year fixed effects;
Socio-demographic (socio-demo.) controls: log of monthly HH income, working
hours, working hours2, age, age2, education, female, married, child dummies
as well state fixed effects.
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4.7.3 Robustness: sample period, movers and stayers
Table 4.13: Dependent variable: life satisfaction of less empl. workers (EPL- (1996))
Movers Stayers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FE(Jan) FE(May) FE(Dec) FE(Jan) FE(May) FE(Dec)
Temporary workers (remain temporary)
TGxReform(t-1) -0.281 -0.350 -0.359 -0.113 -0.190 -0.211
(0.392) (0.388) (0.388) (0.422) (0.417) (0.417)
TGxReform -0.612 -0.579 -0.584 -0.702 -0.699∗ -0.703∗
(0.444) (0.405) (0.403) (0.452) (0.416) (0.417)
TGxReform(t+1) 0.675 0.545 0.575∗ 1.290∗ 0.654∗ 0.674∗∗
(0.628) (0.340) (0.324) (0.671) (0.359) (0.341)
N 394 475 483 325 398 404
R2 0.140 0.126 0.125 0.192 0.175 0.172
Permanent workers (remain permanent)
TGxReform(t-1) 0.0940 0.107 0.103 0.121 0.144 0.142
(0.090) (0.089) (0.089) (0.098) (0.097) (0.097)
TGxReform -0.0415 -0.0301 -0.0321 -0.100 -0.0984 -0.0995
(0.092) (0.090) (0.090) (0.097) (0.095) (0.095)
TGxReform(t+1) 0.0320 0.0120 0.00588 0.130 0.0588 0.0512
(0.160) (0.089) (0.085) (0.166) (0.090) (0.086)
N 4,390 5,338 5,442 3,745 4,553 4,633
R2 0.030 0.024 0.026 0.036 0.031 0.034
Note: Fixed effects (FE) estimations, clustered standard errors in parentheses;∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; TG = 1 if 5-19 and TG = 0 if 20-199; Reform = [1 if year >= reform
year]; Reform(t-1) = [1 if year >= one year before the reform year]; Reform(t+1) = [1 if year >=
one year after the reform year]; Sample B: remain temporary(temp)/permanent(perm) (workers
who remain in a temporary/permanent job over the sample period), stayers (workers who remain
in TG or CG over the sample period) or movers (workers who are allowed to switch between TG
or CG over the sample period); less employable (less empl): sample of workers who perceive it to
be practically impossible or difficult to find a new job; Sample period ends in January(Jan), May
or December (Dec); Controls: reform dummies, TG, year fixed effects; Socio-demographic (socio-
demo.) controls: log of monthly HH income, working hours, working hours2, age, age2, education,
female, married, child dummies as well state fixed effects.
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4.7.4 Newly hired permanent workers
The EPLP reforms changed EPLP for new hires with a permanent contract but
not (less) for incumbents in a permanent work relation. In particular, the 1996
abolishment of EPLP for small firms was only applied to workers, who signed
their contracts after September 1996; for incumbents, only a future reduction
(after September 1999) in EPLP became effective on the 1st October 1996. The
1999 reform increased EPLP for new hires and workers who signed the permanent
contract after September 1996 while for incumbents only an increase in future
EPLP became effective.
Therefore, I restrict the samples to newly hired workers. For the 1996 reform, I
only include permanent workers who signed a new contract between October 1996
- 1998 or between May 1994 - September 1996. For the 1999 reform, I only include
those, who signed the contract between October 1996-1998 or 1999 - March 2001.
Table 4.14 (lower part) presents the results in columns (3) and (6). Importantly,
the number of observations becomes considerably low, specifically for the 1996
reform (371 observations). Therefore, these samples are not employed for the
main analyses in the paper. Table 4.14 shows that the policy effect (TGxReform) is
negative for the decrease in EPLP [column (3)], while it is positive for the increase
in EPLP [column (6)]. Both effects, however, are not significant in statistical
terms.
4.7.5 Non-response in job satisfaction and perceived job
security
In this section, I present the robustness of the negative EPLP effect on life satis-
faction on temporary workers by accounting for non-responses in job satisfaction
as well as in perceived job security. For example, the sample size is reduced by
around 7% in the case of temporary workers for the 1996 reform (Sample B).41
When I compare the results for samples excluding those observations, the policy
effect for the 1996 reform becomes smaller in absolute terms but remains negative
- Table 4.14, column (1) versus (4), column (3) versus (6).
41Results for Sample A are available upon request.
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Table 4.14: Dependent variable: life satisfaction and sample restrictions (workers who
remain in contract)
EPL - EPL +
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Temporary workers FE FE (MV) FE (15y) FE FE (MV) FE (15y)
TGxReform(t-1) -0.253 -0.216 -0.245 0.148 0.0570 0.159
(0.283) (0.264) (0.291) (0.268) (0.256) (0.268)
TGxReform -0.588∗ -0.499 -0.603∗ -0.140 -0.0927 -0.137
(0.342) (0.331) (0.345) (0.271) (0.255) (0.271)
TGxReform(t+1) 0.553∗ 0.566∗∗ 0.617∗∗ 0.0802 0.0443 0.0868
(0.292) (0.276) (0.296) (0.217) (0.205) (0.217)
N 624 665 606 1,155 1,321 1,147
R2 0.110 0.102 0.108 0.047 0.044 0.048
Permanent workers FE FE (MV) FE (new) FE FE (MV) FE (new)
TGxReform(t-1) 0.0696 0.0795 0.224 0.0261 0.00619 0.277
(0.080) (0.079) (0.281) (0.081) (0.081) (0.327)
TGxReform -0.0809 -0.0713 -1.061 -0.0191 0.00221 0.608
(0.085) (0.084) (0.705) (0.075) (0.073) (0.570)
TGxReform(t+1) 0.0555 0.0377 -0.0998 0.0439 0.00857 -0.107
(0.079) (0.079) (0.314) (0.079) (0.076) (0.418)
N 5,917 6,077 371 9,255 9,836 891
R2 0.026 0.026 0.246 0.011 0.011 0.083
Note: Fixed effects (FE) estimations, clustered standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; TG = 1 if 5-19 and TG = 0 if 20-199; Reform = [1 if year >= reform
year]; Reform(t-1) = [1 if year >= one year before the reform year]; Reform(t+1) = [1 if year
>= one year after the reform year]; Sample B: remain in contract (workers who remain either
in a temporary/permanent job over the sample period), stayers (workers who remain in TG or
CG over the sample period); MV: sample includes observations with a missing value either in
job satisfaction or perceived job security; new: only newly hired permanent workers; 15y: only
temporary workers with less than 15 years in one firm; Controls: reform dummies, TG, year fixed
effects; Socio-demographic (socio-demo.) controls: log of monthly HH income, working hours,
working hours2, age, age2, education, female, married, child dummies as well state fixed effects.
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4.7.6 Probability to transition from a temporary into a
permanent job
Table 4.15: Dependent variable: Transition from temporary into permanent work
EPL - (1995-1998) EPL + (1997-2001)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LPM(FE) LPM(FE): 3 LPM(FE) LPM(FE): 3
TGxReform(t-1) -0.108 -0.122 0.116 0.0223
(0.093) (0.122) (0.092) (0.126)
TGxReform 0.141 0.275∗ -0.0488 -0.122
(0.125) (0.147) (0.081) (0.105)
TGxReform(t+1) 0.144 0.0258 0.0304 0.0108
(0.164) (0.218) (0.116) (0.142)
Socio-demo. controls yes yes yes yes
Mean yit 0.28 0.25 0.30 0.27
N 557 388 836 568
R2 0.427 0.514 0.408 0.452
Note: Dependent variable: 1 if temporary worker transitions in the next period
into a permanent job, 0 if not; linear probability model (LPM), fixed effects model
(FE),clustered standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01;
TG = 1 if 5-19 and TG = 0 if 20-199; Reform = [1 if year >= reform year]; Reform(t-
1) = [1 if year >= one year before the reform year]; Reform(t+1) = [1 if year >=
one year after the reform year]; Sample: sample of workers who worked in firms with
5-199 employees at the time of the reform, either fixed-term worker or permanent
worker, employable age; Sample ”3” means that the sample is restricted to workers
who stayed with the firm 3 years at maximum; Controls: reform dummies, TG, year
fixed effects; Socio-demographic (socio-demo.) controls: firm size dummies, log of
monthly HH income, working hours, working hours2, age, age2, education, female,
married, child dummies as well state fixed effects.
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4.7.7 Channels: Perceived job security and job satisfaction
Importantly, as already mentioned in Appendix 4.7.2, perceived job security and
job satisfaction as dependent variables are less convincing with regard to the com-
mon trend assumption. This section presents some results for job satisfaction
and job security, which are interpreted carefully and are not included in the main
paper. No major implications are drawn.
The effect of EPLP on life satisfaction might be transmitted via perceived
job security and job satisfaction. Perceived job security is positively related to
life satisfaction.42 Temporary workers might benefit in terms of perceived job
security as transition probabilities are expected to increase. They might suffer,
however, in terms of perceived job security as they could anticipate that the next
permanent job is less secure compared to before of the reform. Permanent workers
who were hired after the reform might suffer in terms of job security due to higher
likelihood of becoming unemployed. Concerning job satisfaction, job satisfaction
is conceptually and empirically positively related to life satisfaction (Praag et al.,
2003).43 Temporary workers could suffer in terms of job satisfaction when they
remain in the temporary job, while others transition into a permanent position.
Finally, permanent workers might benefit in terms of job satisfaction. Monitoring
by employers might decrease, and thereby, job related stress decreases (Lepage-
Saucier and Wasmer, 2012) while the opportunity for personal control increases.
Those, in turn, are negatively and positively related to job satisfaction (Warr,
2003).
In order to explore these ideas, I first estimate the DID regression with job
satisfaction and perceived job security as dependent variables. Second, I include
job satisfaction and job security as mediators in the life satisfaction equation (me-
diation analysis). Analyzes are conducted for the 1996 reform for Sample B for
less employable workers.
42See Section 4.2 for literature. For the effect of perceived job security on objective outcomes in
economics: Stephens (2004), Campbell et al. (2007) and Bo¨ckerman, Ilmakunnas and Johans-
son (2011).
43For the effect of job satisfaction on life satisfaction in psychology, see Section 4.2.
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Table 4.16: Mechanisms for EPL - (less employable temporary workers who remain
temporary employees)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FE FE FE FE LPM FE FE
Dependent Var. Life Satisfaction JobSec JobSat
TGxReform(t-1) -0.211 -0.366 -0.371 -0.501 0.283∗∗ 0.963∗
(0.417) (0.419) (0.415) (0.417) (0.122) (0.540)
TGxReform -0.703∗ -0.579 -0.667∗ -0.558 -0.238∗∗ -0.220
(0.417) (0.419) (0.403) (0.405) (0.115) (0.463)
TGxReform(t+1) 0.674∗∗ 0.626∗ 0.529 0.492 0.0556 0.869∗∗
(0.341) (0.333) (0.342) (0.335) (0.097) (0.430)
JobSec (low)
middle 0.468∗∗ 0.406∗
(0.225) (0.212)
high 0.657∗∗ 0.599∗∗
(0.294) (0.282)
JobSat 0.167∗∗ 0.158∗∗
(0.064) (0.064)
N 404 404 404 404 404 404
R2 0.172 0.192 0.208 0.224 0.100 0.151
Note: Linear probability model (LPM), fixed effects model (FE), clustered standard
errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; TG = 1 if 5-19 and TG
= 0 if 20-199; Reform = [1 if year >= reform year]; Reform(t-1) = [1 if year >= one
year before the reform year]; Reform(t+1) = [1 if year >= one year after the reform
year]; JobSat: job satisfaction; JobSec: perceived job security (0,1); Sample B: remain
temporary (workers who remain in a temporary job over the sample period), stayers
(workers who remain in TG or CG over the sample period); less employable (less
empl): sample of workers who perceive it to be practically impossible or difficult to
find a new job; Controls: reform dummies, TG, year fixed effects; Socio-demographic
(socio-demo.) controls: log of monthly HH income, working hours, working hours2,
age, age2, education, female, married, child dummies as well state fixed effects.
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Table 4.17: Mechanisms for EPL - (less employable permanent workers who remain
permanent employees)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FE FE FE FE LPM FE FE
Dependent Var. Life Satisfaction JobSec JobSat
TGxReform(t-1) 0.142 0.134 0.153 0.147 0.0211 -0.0701
(0.097) (0.097) (0.095) (0.095) (0.025) (0.121)
TGxReform -0.0995 -0.100 -0.105 -0.105 0.0154 0.0325
(0.095) (0.095) (0.094) (0.094) (0.024) (0.119)
TGxReform(t+1) 0.0512 0.0616 0.0718 0.0782 -0.0425 -0.129
(0.086) (0.086) (0.085) (0.085) (0.027) (0.125)
JobSec (low)
middle 0.241∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗
(0.076) (0.073)
high 0.372∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗
(0.089) (0.087)
JobSat 0.159∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.017)
N 4,633 4,633 4,633 4,633 4,633 4,633
R2 0.034 0.041 0.075 0.079 0.024 0.019
Note: Linear probability model (LPM), fixed effects model (FE), clustered standard
errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; TG = 1 if 5-19 and
TG = 0 if 20-199; Reform = [1 if year >= reform year]; Reform(t-1) = [1 if year
>= one year before the reform year]; Reform(t+1) = [1 if year >= one year after the
reform year]; JobSat: job satisfaction; JobSec: perceived job security (0,1); Sample B:
remain permanent(perm) (workers who remain in a permanent job over the sample
period), stayers (workers who remain in TG or CG over the sample period); less
employable (less empl): sample of workers who perceive it to be practically impossible
or difficult to find a new job; Controls: reform dummies, TG, year fixed effects; Socio-
demographic (socio-demo.) controls: log of monthly HH income, working hours,
working hours2, age, age2, education, female, married, child dummies as well state
fixed effects.
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Data
The GSOEP contains appropriate variables. The following dependent variables
(Yit) are considered: First, perceived job security [very concerned (1) - not con-
cerned at all (3)]44 is coded as a dummy variable, which is zero for workers who
are very concerned, and one for workers who are not concerned about their job
security;45 Second, job satisfaction [totally unhappy (0) - totally happy (10)]46.
Temporary workers
The negative effect of a decrease in EPLP on life satisfaction might hide differ-
ent channels via perceived job security and job satisfaction. Workers might have
suffered in terms of job satisfaction (comparison hypothesis) and perceived job se-
curity (comparison and anticipation hypothesis) or workers might have benefited
in terms of perceived job security (anticipation).
First, concerning the decrease in EPLP, job security and job satisfaction of
less employable temporary workers seems to be affected negatively [Table 4.16,
columns (5) and (6)] in comparison to the previous year. Less employable workers
in small firms suffered in terms of job satisfaction but not significantly.47 The
pre-policy difference and the post-policy difference, however, are positive and sig-
nificant. In Appendix 4.7.2, I test for pre-treatment differences, anticipation and
allow for group-specific trends. I conclude that there might be a positive group-
specific trend, and hence, that job satisfaction (TGxReform) could be affected
negatively. Concerning perceived job security, the coefficient is negative and sig-
nificant [Table 4.16, column (5)]. After the reform they were 0.238 percentage
points less likely to be ”not concerned” about their job security (TGxReform). In
this case, however, neither anticipation nor group-specific trends could explain the
44GSOEP question: ”What is your attitude towards the following areas - are you concerned about
them?...Your job security.”
45Multinomial models for temporary workers showed that a decrease in EPLP leads to relative
odds of being very concerned/not concerned at all rather than somewhat concerned that are
not significantly different/significantly higher. Therefore, I merged the categories of being
somewhat concerned with not concerned at all. I proceeded in the same way for permanent
workers.
46GSOEP question: ”How satisfied are you with your job?”
47I estimate a linear probability model with individual fixed-effects. A random effect ordered
logit model with three categories for the response variable is robust.
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pre-reform differences.48 Therefore, I do not make any conclusions from perceived
job security as the dependent variable.
Second, I include perceived job security and job satisfaction, in the life satis-
faction equation. When I include job satisfaction in column (3) of Table 4.16, the
negative policy effect and the post-policy effect become smaller in absolute terms
in comparison to the model without job satisfaction [column (1)]. Including job
security yields the policy effect to fade [column (2)]. Finally, when I include job
satisfaction and perceived job security in the model, the negative effect decreases
from 0.703 [column (1)] (significant) to 0.558 fade [column (4)] (non-significant),
and the post-policy effect decreases from 0.674 [column (1)] (significant) to 0.492
[column (4)] (non-significant).
To summarize, job satisfaction might contribute to explain a part of the pattern
I find for the effect of a decrease in EPLP on life satisfaction of temporary workers.
Overall, however, I do not derive any strong conclusions because of the critical
common trend assumption which is specifically the case for job security.
Permanent workers
Another possible explanation next to effect heterogeneity for the zero effect for
permanent workers (Sample B) when EPLP decreases is that possible channels
job security and job satisfaction cancel each other out. On the one hand, the
security hypothesis predicts that permanent workers suffer in terms of perceived
job security because permanent contracts become more instable. On the other
hand, the monitoring hypothesis predicts that workers might be more satisfied
with their job. Due to the reform design, however, for the majority of permanent
workers only future EPLP changes. Therefore, the expected effect is not very
strong.
First, I find that less employable permanent workers did not benefit in terms
of job satisfaction from a decrease in EPLP [Table 4.17 column (6)]. They also did
not suffer in terms of perceived job security [column (5)].49 Second, including these
48See Appendix 4.7.2.
49I estimate a linear probability model with individual fixed effects. A random effect ordered
logit model with three outcomes for the response variable also identified no significant reform
effects.
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variables into the life satisfaction equation does not change the policy effect nor
the standard errors considerably. Neither effect heterogeneity nor opposing mech-
anisms of perceived job security and job satisfaction could explain why permanent
workers were not affected by a decrease in EPLP. The most plausible explanation
is the reform design.
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